Just because people can look at a project in detail, doesn't mean they
will. More to the point, just because people can, doesn't mean code
auditing gurus will look at it.
And sometimes, when they do look they get booted out of the project
http://www.heise-security.co.uk/news/82500
-gp
We are having a good thread going on fuzzing, commercial tools, etc. on the
fuzzing list. This is a large forward but I thought some of you might want
to weigh in, or at least take a look at the thread.
JS
Hello all,
Although we at Codenomicon do not fuzz in the true meaning of the word
(that
http://www.ieee-security.org/TC/SP2007/cfp-W2SP.html
Workshop Call for Position Papers
W2SP 2007: Web 2.0 Security and Privacy 2007
Sponsored by the IEEE Technical Committee on Security and Privacy
Held in conjunction with the 2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Thursday, May 24, The
Awesome.
---
http://en.epochtimes.com/tools/printer.asp?id=50336
The Epoch Times
Home Science Technology
Chinese Professor Cracks Fifth Data Security Algorithm
SHA-1 added to list of accomplishments
Central News Agency
Jan 11, 2007
Associate professor Wang
Hi guys,
I have question about source-code statical analysis tools that are available
at the market now.
Are there tools that support C/C++, Java, PHP, Flash (actionscript) all in
one?
Most of the tools support C/C++ and Java, but I have not found any that can
handle also PHP.
Do you know some?
Kevin, I would love to see open source communities embrace secure coding
practices with stronger assistance from software vendors in this space. This of
course requires going beyond audit capability and figuring out ways to get
the tools into developers hands.
As a contributor to open source
RATS will do PHP as well there is a plugin for Eclipse that will do static
analysis on PHP code which is called Pixy. The next step would be to
investigate some of the tools from SPI Dynamics, a few of them are black-box
but if you combine some black-box testing with some static analysis, add
some
Cracking a hash would [...]. There are an infinite number of
messages that all hash to the same value.
Yes, but there's no guarantee that this is true of any particular hash
value, such as the one you're intersted in, only that there exists at
least one hash value that it's true of.
(At
Hi,
Correction: Paros Proxy is owned and copyrighted by Chinotec Technologies
Co.
OWASP provides another usefull tool: WebScarab
(http://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_WebScarab_Project)
I you look for PHP security resources,
http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_PHP_Project can
Spot on thread, Ed:
On 3/20/07, Ed Reed [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Not all of these are consumer uprisings - some are, some aren't - but I
think they're all examples of the kinds of economic adjustments that occur
in mature markets.
- Unsafe at any speed (the triumph of consumer safety over
3APA3A wrote:
First, by reading 'crack' I thought lady can recover full message by
it's signature. After careful reading she can bruteforce collisions 2000
times faster.
Cracking a hash would never mean recovering the full original message,
except for possibly messages that were smaller
3APA3A wrote:
I know meaning of 'hash function' term, I wrote few articles on
challenge-response authentication and I did few hash functions
implementations for hashtables and authentication in FreeRADIUS and
3proxy. Can I claim my right for sarcasm after calling
On Wed, 21 Mar 2007, mudge wrote:
Sorry, but I couldn't help but be reminded of an old L0pht topic that
we brought up in January of 1999. Having just re-read it I found it
still relatively poignant: Cyberspace Underwriters Laboratories[1].
I was thinking about this, too, I should have
I was originally going to say this off-list, but it's not that big a deal.
Arian J. Evans said:
I think you are on to something here in how to think about this subject.
Perhaps I should float my little paper out there and we could shape up
something worth while describing how the industry is
On Mar 21, 2007, at 3:57 PM, Arian J. Evans wrote:
Spot on thread, Ed:
On 3/20/07, Ed Reed [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Not all of these are consumer uprisings - some are, some aren't -
but I think they're all examples of the kinds of economic
adjustments that occur in mature markets.
My understanding that the kind of birthday attack under discussion would
start at 80-bits if SHA-1 (at 160-bits) were 100% secure. The attack
under discussion is reported to reduce that to the neighborhood of
60-something bits.
I am not a mathematician though, so I would be perfectly willing to
Thanks for the response. I already own the book and understand how to engage
vendors. Where I am seeking assistance is all the work that goes on within a
large enterprise before these two things occur. The ideal situation for me
would be to get my hands on the five to ten page Powerpoint slide
At 8:55 AM -0400 3/20/07, Michael S Hines wrote:
I'm not sure what your sources are but from what I'm hearing and reading the
problem is that there are many missing drivers for what have become standard
peripherals that people are used to - and some of the vendors are reluctant
to develop new
JD Meier had a good post recently on influencing without authority, which is the
position security finds itself in:
1. assume all potential allies
2. clarify goals and priorities
3. diagnose the allies world
4. identify relevant currencies
5. deal with relationships
6. influence through give and
Quick question for folks here. I participate in multiple user-groups and the
topic of secure coding practices has never appeared. What would it take for a
software vendor on this list to present to the CT OO Users Group (
www.cooug.org). These events are well attended.
Likewise, I am also a
James McGovern apparently wrote...
The uprising from customers may already be starting. It is
called open source. The real question is what is the duty of
others on this forum to make sure that newly created software
doesn't suffer from the same problems as the commercial
closed source
I am attempting to figure out how other Fortune enterprises have went about
selling the need for secure coding practices and can't seem to find the answer
I seek. Essentially, I have discovered that one of a few scenarios exist (a)
the leadership chain was highly technical and intuitively
Very interesting. Crispin is in the throes of big software. Anybody want to
help me mount a rescue campaign from jamaica?
gem
company www.cigital.com
podcast www.cigital.com/silverbullet
blog www.cigital.com/justiceleague
book www.swsec.com
-Original Message-
From: Crispin Cowan
Gary McGraw wrote:
I'm not sure vista is bombing because of good quality. That certainly would
be ironic.
Word on the way down in the guts street is that vista is too many things
cobbled together into one big kinda functioning mess.
I.e. it is mis-featured, and lacks on some
Crispin Cowan wrote:
Crispin, now believes that users are fundamentally what holds back security
I was once berated on stage by Jamie Lewis for sounding like I was
placing the blame for poor security on customers themselves.
I have moved on, and believe, instead, that it is the economic
In terms of creating a SDLC, pop out to Borders and get Howard and Lipner¹s
³The Security Development Lifecycle² ISBN 9780735622142
http://www.microsoft.com/mspress/books/8753.aspx
It is simply the best text I¹ve read in a long time.
You may be interested in the work Mark Curphey et al is doing
Ed Reed wrote:
Crispin Cowan wrote:
Crispin, now believes that users are fundamentally what holds back security
I was once berated on stage by Jamie Lewis for sounding like I was
placing the blame for poor security on customers themselves.
Fight back harder. Jamie is wrong.
Andrew, James,
Agreed, Microsoft has put some interesting thoughts out in their SDL
book. Companies that produce a software product will find a lot of
this approach resonates well. IT shops supporting financial houses
will have more difficulty. McGraw wrote a decent blog entry on this
On Mon, 19 Mar 2007, Crispin Cowan wrote:
Since many users are economically motivated, this may explain why users
don't care much about security :)
But... but... but...
I understand the sentiment, but there's something missing in it. Namely,
that the costs related to security are not really
Following the success of last year's OWASP Autumn of
Codehttp://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Autumn_Of_Code_2006(AoC 06)
we are are now launching the OWASP
Spring of Code
2007http://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Spring_Of_Code_2007(SpoC
007) with more budget, more energy and more expectations
Hi all,
The 12th episode of the Silver Bullet Security Podcast went live last
night. This episode features an interview with Becky Bace, one of the
earliest security gurus and a very interesting woman.
http://www.cigital.com/silverbullet/show-012/
As usual, my thanks to IEEE Security Privacy
In my opinion, though fuzz testing is certainly a useful technique (we've used
it in hardware verification for years), any certification based solely on fuzz
testing for security would be ludicrous. Fuzz testing is not a silver bullet.
The biggest stumbling block for software certification is
Hi crispy,
I'm not sure vista is bombing because of good quality. That certainly would
be ironic.
Word on the way down in the guts street is that vista is too many things
cobbled together into one big kinda functioning mess. My bet is that Vista SP2
will be a completely different beast.
On Tue, 13 Mar 2007, Gary McGraw wrote:
In my opinion, though fuzz testing is certainly a useful technique (we've
used it in hardware verification for years), any certification based solely
on fuzz testing for security would be ludicrous. Fuzz testing is not a
silver bullet.
Fuzzing is
On Tue, 13 Mar 2007, somebody wrote (attribution isn't clear to me):
no. my feeling is that it focuses management on unimportant things like
meeting checkpoints rather then actually doing useful things.
I heartily agree. Compliance almost always becomes (in the worst sense
of the word) a
On Mar 9, 2007, at 5:27 PM, McGovern, James F ((HTSC, IT)) wrote:
Ken, in terms of a previous response to your posting in terms of
getting customers to ask for secure coding practices from vendors,
wouldn't it start with figuring out how they could simply cut-and-
paste InfoSec policies into
Once again i'll ask. Which vertical is the kind of company where you're seeing
this awful behavior in?
BTW, sammy migues agrees with you in a thread we're having on the justice
league blog www.cigital.com/justiceleague (look under SOX).
gem
company www.cigital.com
podcast
There is a text box in Software Security about this with some language I
copied (with permission) from jack danahy of ounce labs.
www.swsec.com
gem
company www.cigital.com
podcast www.cigital.com/silverbullet
blog www.cigital.com/justiceleague
book www.swsec.com
-Original Message-
On 3/14/07, Gary McGraw [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Once again i'll ask. Which vertical is the kind of company where you're
seeing this awful behavior in?
well, fwiw, i've noticed it in finance/investment, and the entertainment
industries. but i honestly don't think the industry type makes a
hi sc-l,
this month's darkreading column is about compliance. my own belief is
that compliance has really helped move software security forward. in
particular, sox and pci have been a boon:
http://www.darkreading.com/document.asp?doc_id=119163
what do you think? have compliance efforts you
Maybe it depends on the vertical? What vertical(s) did you find it a
distraction in?
gem
-Original Message-
From: Michael Silk [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Mon Mar 12 17:34:56 2007
To: Gary McGraw
Cc: SC-L@securecoding.org
Subject:Re: [SC-L] Darkreading:
On 3/13/07, Gary McGraw [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
hi sc-l,
this month's darkreading column is about compliance. my own belief is
that compliance has really helped move software security forward. in
particular, sox and pci have been a boon:
what do you think? have compliance efforts you know about helped to
forward software security?
Compliance brings accountability. Without accountability or financial impact
people have
little incentive for putting security on the priority list. I for one welcome
our compliance
overlords.
Ed Reed wrote:
For a long time I thought that software product liability would
eventually be forced onto developers in response to their long-term
failure to take responsibility for their shoddy code. I was mistaken.
The pool of producers (i.e., the software industry) is probably too
small
On Mon, 12 Mar 2007, Crispin Cowan wrote:
Ed Reed wrote:
For a long time I thought that software product liability would
eventually be forced onto developers in response to their long-term
failure to take responsibility for their shoddy code. I was mistaken.
The pool of producers (i.e.,
I'm not a CISSP person just because my clients haven't required it
yet. However,
they are concerned with application security and restricting access to those
who are not authorized (in addition to XSS, SQL injection, and the usual
list of suspects). I call myself a 'secure developer' only
On a slightly tangential note, and apologies if this was mentioned on this
list previously, OWASP has some guidelines on how consumers can write up
contracts with their vendors related to secure software:
http://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Secure_Software_Contract_Annex
- Steve
I respectfully disagree.
The need for a firewall or IDS is due to the poor coding of the receptor of
network traffic - so you have to prevent bad things from reaching the
receptor (which is the TCP/IP stack and then the host operating system - and
then the middleware and then the application).
I'm gonna have to go ahead and disagree with you, there, Michael. You're
looking at things far too narrowly. And here's a very simple example:
Small business. Single DMZ. Hosts DB and Web App on separate platforms.
Web app needs to make back-end calls to DB. There's no reason whatsoever
why
[EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
certifications such as CISSP whereby the exams that
prove you are a security professional talk all about
physical security and network security but really don't
address software development in any meaningful way.
Perhaps what is needed is a separate certification.
Ken, in terms of a previous response to your posting in terms of getting
customers to ask for secure coding practices from vendors, wouldn't it start
with figuring out how they could simply cut-and-paste InfoSec policies into
their own?
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Hopefully lots of the consultants on this list have been wildly successful in
getting Fortune enterprises to embrace secure coding practices. I am curious to
learn of those who have also been successful in getting these same Fortune
enterprises to incorporate the notion of secure coding
If you have two individuals, one of which has been practicing secure coding
practices and encouraging others to do so for years while another individual
was involved with firewalls, intrusion detection, information security policies
and so on, are they both information security professionals or
actually just the former. Robert Garigue characterized firewalls, nids, et al
as good network hygiene. The equivalent of a dentist telling you to brush your
teeth. An infosec pro needs much more depth than that. The model is charlemagne
The right answer is both IMO. You need the thinkers, integrators, and
operators to do it right. The term Security Professional at its basic
level simply denotes someone who works to make things secure.
You can't be secure with only application security any more than you can
be secure with only
Traditionally InfoSec folks defined themselves as being knowledgable in
firewalls, policies, etc. Lately, many enterprises are starting to recognize
the importance of security within the software development lifecycle where even
some have acknowledged that software is a common problem space for
On 3/9/07, McGovern, James F (HTSC, IT) [EMAIL PROTECTED]
wrote:
Traditionally InfoSec folks defined themselves as being knowledgable in
firewalls, policies, etc. Lately, many enterprises are starting to recognize
the importance of security within the software development lifecycle where
even
What Garigue was trying to say is that deploying a firewall on a network is
not security's mandate; it is _part of_ running a network. Basic hygiene.
Brushing your teeth is part of having teeth. Deploying anti-virus on a
windows desktop is not security; it is _part of_ operating a desktop. This
is
On Thu, 8 Mar 2007, Greg Beeley wrote:
Perhaps one of the issues here is that if you are in operations work
(network security, etc.), there are more aspects of the CISSP that are
relevant to your daily work. In software development, there is usually
just the one - app development sec - that
Based on my general impressions in day-to-day operations for CVE (around
150 new vulns a week on average), maybe 40-60% of disclosures happen
without any apparent attempt at vendor coordination, another 10-20% with a
communication breakdown (including they didn't answer in 2 days), and
the rest
This is a workshop that may be of interest to subscribers of this mailing
list.
http://www.ieee-security.org/TC/SP2007/cfp-W2SP.html
Workshop Call for Position Papers
W2SP 2007: Web 2.0 Security and Privacy 2007
Sponsored by the
On Mar 5, 2007, at 9:30 PM, Gary McGraw wrote:
I think some vendors have come around to the economics argument. In
every case, those vendors with extreme reputation exposure have
attempted to move past penetrate and patch. Microsoft, for one, is
trying hard, but (to use my broken leg
For a long time I thought that software product liability would
eventually be forced onto developers in response to their long-term
failure to take responsibility for their shoddy code. I was mistaken.
The pool of producers (i.e., the software industry) is probably too
small for such blunt
Kenneth Van Wyk wrote:
So, I applaud the public disclosure model from the standpoint of
consumer advocacy. But, I'm convinced that we need to find a process
that better balances the needs of the consumer against the secure
software engineering needs. Some patches can't reasonably be produced
On Tue, 27 Feb 2007, J. M. Seitz wrote:
Always a great debate, I somewhat agree with Marcus, there are plenty of
pimps out there looking for fame, and there are definitely a lot of them
(us) that are working behind the scenes, taking the time to help the vendors
and to stay somewhat out of
Though I share Steve's sentiments on the anti-researcher bias, and I
agree with Gary's yin-yang conclusion, I really hate the question itself.
The disclosure question itself *presumes* that the current state of the
industry (defective products) is economically efficient. The premise
absolves
a) the final binaries were the ones infected (very easy to detect (imagine
if the infected code was actually from 'real' SVN source code and made from
a 'trusted' developer))
b) by the speed this was detected the exploit (and the blog page didn't
give a lot of details about it) must have
nice, the business model is evolving.
But this is still a very 'inefficient' attack since:
a) the final binaries were the ones infected (very easy to detect (imagine
if the infected code was actually from 'real' SVN source code and made from
a 'trusted' developer))
b) by the speed this was
Hi sc-lers,
Last week we started a blog at Cigital called Justice League that will
be populated by regular postings from Cigital Principals (John Steven,
Craig Miller, Sammy Migues, Scott Matsumoto, and Pravir Chandra)
http://www.cigital.com/justiceleague/
Our blog is positioned as an ecclectic
Here's an interesting article from Dark Reading about web fuzzers.
Web fuzzing seems to be gaining some traction these days as a popular
means of testing web apps and web services.
http://www.darkreading.com/document.asp?
doc_id=118162f_src=darkreading_section_296
Any good/bad
On Feb 27, 2007, at 3:33 AM, Steven M. Christey wrote:
Given the complex manipulations that can work in XSS attacks (see
RSnake's
cheat sheet) as well as directory traversal, combined with the sheer
number of potential inputs in web applications, multipied by all the
variations in encodings, I
Just for the record, the testing literature (non-security) supports ken's point
of view. Possibly the most amusing thing about all of this discussion about
black box versus white box is that this is only one of many many divisions in
testing. Others include partition testing, fault injection,
On 2/27/07, Kenneth Van Wyk [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Here's an interesting article from Dark Reading about web fuzzers. Web
fuzzing seems to be gaining some traction these days as a popular means of
testing web apps and web services.
On Feb 27, 2007, at 4:54 AM, Michael Silk wrote:
unconvinced of what? what fuzzing is useful? or that it's the best
security testing method ever? or you remain unconvinced that fuzzing
in web apps is fuzzing in os apps?
fuzzing has obvious advantages. that's all anyone should care about.
No,
In my personal experience with web app testing, I have found that web
fuzzers are not nearly as useful as fuzzers used for applications, and more
specifically I have found numerous bugs doing direct API fuzzing. In the
case of testing web applications I find that using something like
SpiDynamics
Hi all,
The neverending debate over disclosure continued at RSA this year with a
panel featuring Chris Wysopl and others rehashing old ground. There are
points on both sides, with radicals on one side (say marcus ranum)
calling the disclosure people vulnerability pimps and radicals on the
other
J. M. Seitz wrote:
On a related note, does anyone have an example where Company A was
disclosing vulnerabilities about competing Company B's product and got into
trouble over it? Is this something that could be litigated?
In fact, Tom Ptacek found a hole in one of Marcus' products while
On 2/28/07, Gary McGraw [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Hi all,
The neverending debate over disclosure continued at RSA this year with a
panel featuring Chris Wysopl and others rehashing old ground. There are
points on both sides, with radicals on one side (say marcus ranum)
calling the disclosure
ANNOUNCING THE OWASP TESTING GUIDE
The OWASP Testing Guide includes a best practice penetration testing
framework which users can implement in their own organizations and a
low level penetration testing guide that describes techniques for
testing most common web application and web service
SC-L,
So my trusty rss aggregator (NewsFire) found an interesting blog for
me this morning, and I thought I'd share it here. The blog is from
Free Software Magazine and it's titled, The seven sins of
programmers. On the surface, it has nothing whatsoever to do with
software security --
Along these same lines, I submit ³the Four Coders of the Apocalypse² by Dave
Thomas and Andy Hunt. One of the major areas we need to work is adoption.
Programmers are not all created equal, this presentation shows four types of
programmers, and describes what drives them and ideas on dealing with
I'll be there, and presenting. I'd be interested in a BoF (but not a
BOF).
--
Karen Mercedes Goertzel, CISSP
Booz Allen Hamilton
703.902.6981
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Kenneth Van Wyk
Sent: Thursday,
Hi sc-lers,
We've all been involved in the controversies surrounding disclosure,
whether talking to malicious hackers is a good or bad idea, and whether
security technology can be evil. One of the first people to ponder
these things was Dorothy Denning. I'm pleased to have interviewed
Dorothy
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
Hi Ken,
I am currently researching the differences between Threat Analysis and
Threat Modeling.
I thought your readers on the mailing list may give me a clearer
distinction.
How I understand it is that *both* identify security threats,
Jason,
I differentiate between the two like this:
Threat Analysis looks at specific threats (e.g., msblaster, zotob, latest
exploit of pick your fav sw/os).
Threat Modeling looks at classes of threats (e.g., network-distributed
malware, OS vulnerabilities of Type).
Threat analysis is used as
This is the call for participation for the annual Network and
Distributed System Security conference, starting in two weeks February
28th to March 2nd in San Diego http://www.isoc.org/isoc/conferences/ndss/07/
NDSS is a traditional scholarly academic security conference with a peer
reviewed track
(posted with permission from the moderator)
Hi, last week I did an audio interview with David from Uk's Next Generation
User Group (http://www.nxtgenug.net) about OWASP and my work as a security
consultant.
You can listen to the Podcast here:
http://www.nxtgenug.net/Podcasts.aspx?PodcastID=21
[Forwarded from webappsec list...KRvW]
Final Call For Papers
Refereed Papers Track at OWASP AppSec Europe 2007 Conference
Date: 16-17 May 2007
Location: Milan, Italy
http://www.owasp.org/index.php/6th_OWASP_AppSec_Conference_-_Italy_2007
The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP,
Ken rejected my first attempt at pass by value, so here's pass by
reference instead! See the email below for an explanation.
http://www.swsec.com/book/annotated-biblio-from-SS.pdf
-Original Message-
From: Gary McGraw
Sent: Friday, February 02, 2007 12:56 AM
Hi all,
I got to thinking
How many of the list members are going to RSA? Any plans to get together for
some coffee?
___
Secure Coding mailing list (SC-L) SC-L@securecoding.org
List information, subscriptions, etc - http://krvw.com/mailman/listinfo/sc-l
List charter available
I'll be there.
- Robert
http://www.cgisecurity.com/
http://www.webappsec.org/
How many of the list members are going to RSA? Any plans to get together for
some coffee?
___
Secure Coding mailing list (SC-L) SC-L@securecoding.org
List
I'll be there. I have two panels. Come to the ieee sp reception after the
rootkits panel.
gem
company www.cigital.com
podcast www.cigital.com/silverbullet
book www.swsec.com
-Original Message-
From: KT [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Fri Feb 02 20:04:40 2007
To: Secure
One examining only source code will miss any errors or problems that may be
introduced by the compiler or linker. As Symantec says - working with the
object code is working at the level the attackers work.
Of course one would have to verify the object code made public is the same
object code
List,
What are some of the magazines the users of this list subscribe to? Any great
technical software security / Information securoty books lately? I have been
busy lately and havn't been able to keep up. The last good book I read was
writing secure code 2
Thanks in advaance!!
At 5:20 PM +1100 1/25/07, Crispin Cowan wrote:
ljknews wrote:
My guess is that if a company actually is capable of analyzing
binary code they only do it for the highest volume instruction
sets.
They certainly will focus on larger markets first. If you want them to
focus on *your* market,
Avi,
This is an excellent question, which I've been mulling over the past few
weeks... after taking a few days, here are my thoughts and concerns with Web
2.0...
-
Web 2.0 vs. Privacy Security
Permalink:
You also are not taking into account the number of vulnerabilities that are
discovered by security consultants under NDA which are never published.
I have lost the count on the number of vulnerabilities (at the time
zero-days) that I have discovered in commercial software and where never
Benjamin Tomhave wrote...
This is completely unsurprising. Apparently nobody told the agile
dev community that they still need to follow all the secure coding
practices preached at the traditional dev folks for eons. XSS,
redirects, and SQL injection attacks are not revolutionary, are not
Ken,
I enjoyed reading your this article. My book The Art of Software
Security Testing is based on the concept of using penetration techniques
as part of the development lifecycle and is specifically targetted at QA
professionals. One of my co-authors Elfriede Dustin has written 5 QA
books
FYI, CERT/CC reported 8064 software vulnerabilities in 2006, for a
35% increase over 2005.
See http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/01/21/2006_vulns_tally/
The article further states, The greatest factor in the skyrocketing
number of vulnerabilities is that certain types of flaws in community
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