On 02/22/18 15:56, David Jones wrote:
> On 02/22/2018 08:52 AM, Benny Pedersen wrote:
>> Giovanni Bechis skrev den 2018-02-22 15:39:
>>
sub check_dkim_valid {
my ($self, $pms, $full_ref, @acceptable_domains) = @_;
$self->_check_dkim_signature($pms) if
On 02/22/2018 08:52 AM, Benny Pedersen wrote:
Giovanni Bechis skrev den 2018-02-22 15:39:
sub check_dkim_valid {
my ($self, $pms, $full_ref, @acceptable_domains) = @_;
$self->_check_dkim_signature($pms) if
!$pms->{dkim_checked_signature};
my $result = 0;
if (!$pms->{dkim_valid}) {
Giovanni Bechis skrev den 2018-02-22 15:39:
sub check_dkim_valid {
my ($self, $pms, $full_ref, @acceptable_domains) = @_;
$self->_check_dkim_signature($pms) if
!$pms->{dkim_checked_signature};
my $result = 0;
if (!$pms->{dkim_valid}) {
# don't bother
} elsif
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
On 02/22/18 15:34, Benny Pedersen wrote:
> Benny Pedersen skrev den 2018-02-21 17:55:
>> David Jones skrev den 2018-02-21 17:41:
>>
>>> I have that same code in my DKIM.pm and I am running 3.4.1. Maybe the
>>> size acceptable for whitelisting is
Benny Pedersen skrev den 2018-02-21 17:55:
David Jones skrev den 2018-02-21 17:41:
I have that same code in my DKIM.pm and I am running 3.4.1. Maybe the
size acceptable for whitelisting is different from the DKIM_VALID
check?
minimal key bits could be a plugin test yes, but imho it never
David Jones skrev den 2018-02-21 17:41:
I have that same code in my DKIM.pm and I am running 3.4.1. Maybe the
size acceptable for whitelisting is different from the DKIM_VALID
check?
minimal key bits could be a plugin test yes, but imho it never made to
do this
Does the check_dkim_valid
On 02/21/2018 10:22 AM, Benny Pedersen wrote:
David Jones skrev den 2018-02-21 15:46:
Bug 7559 opened. I don't want to delay 3.4.2 either. I don't think
this is major enough to have to go into 3.4.2 unless someone can
provide a quick patch for Kevin.
in dkim.pm plugin i find
# minimal
David Jones skrev den 2018-02-21 15:46:
Bug 7559 opened. I don't want to delay 3.4.2 either. I don't think
this is major enough to have to go into 3.4.2 unless someone can
provide a quick patch for Kevin.
in dkim.pm plugin i find
# minimal signing key size in bits that is acceptable for
On 02/21/18 00:24, Benny Pedersen wrote:
> David Jones skrev den 2018-02-21 00:14:
>
>> https://pastebin.com/mjvB0MKg (scored 10.96)
>> -0.10 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature
>
> Authentication-Results: smtp3i.ena.net;
> dkim=policy reason="signing key
On 02/21/2018 08:30 AM, Benny Pedersen wrote:
Kevin A. McGrail skrev den 2018-02-21 14:44:
On 2/21/2018 8:42 AM, David Jones wrote:
Do we need to open a bug to get SA's DKIM code to check for a minimum
key size?
When in doubt, open a bug.
more bugs will delay 3.4.2 :=)
Bug 7559 opened.
Kevin A. McGrail skrev den 2018-02-21 14:44:
On 2/21/2018 8:42 AM, David Jones wrote:
Do we need to open a bug to get SA's DKIM code to check for a minimum
key size?
When in doubt, open a bug.
more bugs will delay 3.4.2 :=)
David Jones skrev den 2018-02-21 14:42:
My guess is SA's DKIM check doesn't care about the size of the key.
OpenDKIM has a setting of "MinimumKeyBits 1024" since anything smaller
can be trivially cracked.
Do we need to open a bug to get SA's DKIM code to check for a minimum
key size?
yes
On 21-02-18 14:54, David Jones wrote:
> On 02/21/2018 07:44 AM, Kevin A. McGrail wrote:
>> On 2/21/2018 8:42 AM, David Jones wrote:
>>> Do we need to open a bug to get SA's DKIM code to check for a minimum
>>> key size?
>>
>> When in doubt, open a bug.
>>
>
> Well. Ummm. I found this when
On 02/21/2018 07:44 AM, Kevin A. McGrail wrote:
On 2/21/2018 8:42 AM, David Jones wrote:
Do we need to open a bug to get SA's DKIM code to check for a minimum
key size?
When in doubt, open a bug.
Well. Ummm. I found this when starting to create the bug:
On 2/21/2018 8:42 AM, David Jones wrote:
Do we need to open a bug to get SA's DKIM code to check for a minimum
key size?
When in doubt, open a bug.
On 02/20/2018 05:24 PM, Benny Pedersen wrote:
David Jones skrev den 2018-02-21 00:14:
https://pastebin.com/mjvB0MKg (scored 10.96)
-0.10 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK
signature
Authentication-Results: smtp3i.ena.net;
dkim=policy reason="signing key too
On 20 Feb 2018, at 16:48, David Jones wrote:
It doesn't seem like a good idea for whitelists to list these senders
just because most of the email is ham.
I can see no evidence for that in a quick check of my personal mail. In
10 years:
68 messages
50 spam (all reported)
6 replies to spam
David Jones skrev den 2018-02-21 00:14:
https://pastebin.com/mjvB0MKg (scored 10.96)
-0.10 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature
Authentication-Results: smtp3i.ena.net;
dkim=policy reason="signing key too small" (768-bit key)
header.d=mails-express.com
a whitelist
perspective for those servers by offsetting the whitelist negative
scores to get them back to around zero and let Bayes plus other
content-based rules determine the allow or block.
It doesn't seem like a good idea for whitelists to list these senders
just because most of the email is ham
David Jones skrev den 2018-02-20 23:08:
That is ridiculous!!! It requires 8 DNS queries and shouldn't include
Google's servers.
+1
v=spf1 ip4:23.83.208.1/20 ip4:23.91.112.0/20 ip4:46.232.183.0/24
ip4:50.87.152.0/21 ip4:50.116.64.0/18 ip4:64.233.160.0/19
ip4:66.102.0.0/20
by offsetting the whitelist negative
scores to get them back to around zero and let Bayes plus other
content-based rules determine the allow or block.
It doesn't seem like a good idea for whitelists to list these senders
just because most of the email is ham. If a small percentage is spam,
then how do
them back to around zero and let Bayes plus other
content-based rules determine the allow or block.
It doesn't seem like a good idea for whitelists to list these senders
just because most of the email is ham. If a small percentage is spam,
then how do we report that back to Hostkarma
|internetbilisim\.net|privateemail\.com|registrar-servers\.com|emailsrvr\.com|registeredsite\.com)
\[/
Many of these servers are listed on whitelists. My solution is to meta
those whitelists to add back the points they subtract and then
selectively whitelist_auth safe/good sending domains coming from
that SPF:PASS means you can rely on domain based logic
(trusts/whitelists/reputation) rather than only IP based logic,
allowing you to safely whitelist example.com without guessing what
IPs example.com uses (and might use tomorrow.)
In our commercial service, we have the very mild policy
own.
I'd suggest that SPF:PASS means you can rely on domain based logic
(trusts/whitelists/reputation) rather than only IP based logic, allowing
you to safely whitelist example.com without guessing what IPs
example.com uses (and might use tomorrow.)
--
Dave Warren
http://www.hireahit.com/
http
Am 10.07.2015 um 00:07 schrieb Dianne Skoll d...@roaringpenguin.com:
On Fri, 10 Jul 2015 07:58:39 +1000
Noel Butler noel.but...@ausics.net wrote:
+1
I'll throw my +1 in on this also. Almost by definition, the kinds of
organizations who buy into these certifications to get their mail
On 7/9/2015 6:07 PM, Dianne Skoll wrote:
On Fri, 10 Jul 2015 07:58:39 +1000
Noel Butler noel.but...@ausics.net wrote:
+1
I'll throw my +1 in on this also. Almost by definition, the kinds of
organizations who buy into these certifications to get their mail
delivered are unlikely to be the
On Thu, 9 Jul 2015 18:07:07 -0400
Dianne Skoll wrote:
On Fri, 10 Jul 2015 07:58:39 +1000
Noel Butler noel.but...@ausics.net wrote:
+1
I'll throw my +1 in on this also. Almost by definition, the kinds of
organizations who buy into these certifications to get their mail
delivered are
On Fri, 10 Jul 2015 17:34:06 +0200
Reindl Harald h.rei...@thelounge.net wrote:
it's enough *once time* overlook the small letters besides soem
checkbox saying we give your data to our partners and so agree
without intention while it's hard to impossible to realize the
connection when wekks or
Am 10.07.2015 um 17:15 schrieb Ian Zimmerman:
On 2015-07-10 16:36 +0200, Reindl Harald wrote:
most users enable checkboxes which are needed to get random forms
submitted, even if they say i agree to get mails from here and
there and are missing the context when that mails are coming later
On 2015-07-10 13:54 +0100, RW wrote:
I don't get any spam at all in the return-path lists.
...
I don't doubt that there's some abuse, but I also find it hard to
believe that the accuracy of the return-path rules isn't dominated by
user behaviour.
Can you specify user behaviour in more
Am 10.07.2015 um 16:34 schrieb Ian Zimmerman:
On 2015-07-10 13:54 +0100, RW wrote:
I don't get any spam at all in the return-path lists.
...
I don't doubt that there's some abuse, but I also find it hard to
believe that the accuracy of the return-path rules isn't dominated by
user
On Fri, 10 Jul 2015 12:09:27 -0400
Rob McEwen wrote:
And some on this thread are not realizing that DNSWL has various
LEVELS in its ratings of senders
I don't see anything in this thread to suggest that.
most of the time that
a virus-sent spam is sent from an IP in DNSWL, it is from an
Also, often, the Return Path certified sender is an ESP who sends for a
variety of customers. There is not always an absolute guarantee that
every one of that ESP's customer is ethical and truthful. A good ESP
will quickly fire such any such bad apple customer... but some do a
much better job
On Fri, 10 Jul 2015 09:06:58 +0200
Matthias Leisi matth...@leisi.net wrote:
For the record, this is the reason why dnswl.org http://dnswl.org/
does not charge for listings (and we don’t call it certification): it
always leads to conflicts of interest.
Yes, I trust dnswl.org.
What we need is
On 2015-07-10 16:36 +0200, Reindl Harald wrote:
most users enable checkboxes which are needed to get random forms
submitted, even if they say i agree to get mails from here and
there and are missing the context when that mails are coming later
You don't know me, so you can hardly claim a
I just got in my inbox what I consider spam from the Belgian domain
selling Japanese copiers printers (you probably know which one). What
made it pass through SA were RCVD_IN_RP_CERTIFIED and RCVD_IN_RP_SAFE.
Together they account for a whopping -5 points - a poison antidote pill!
Isn't that a
I just got in my inbox what I consider spam from the Belgian domain
selling Japanese copiers printers (you probably know which one). What
made it pass through SA were RCVD_IN_RP_CERTIFIED and RCVD_IN_RP_SAFE.
Together they account for a whopping -5 points - a poison antidote pill!
Isn't that a
On 2015-07-09 16:58 +, David Jones wrote:
Did the email have a valid unsubscribe link/process?
It is in Dutch, and I can't read Dutch.
(Yes, I do use the language plugin.)
I shortcircuit as ham for these two rule hits and never have had a
report of spam that couldn't be reliably/safely
, mailchimp.com, etc.) and provide
legitimate unsubscribe methods. Just unsubscribe from the
trustworthy senders usually in whitelists like Return Path and
others. If they start abusing things, most of the good ones will
have an abuse reporting system so look in the headers and report
the abuse so
From: Ian Zimmerman i...@buug.org
Sent: Thursday, July 9, 2015 11:02 AM
To: users@spamassassin.apache.org
Subject: Return Path (TM) whitelists
I just got in my inbox what I consider spam from the Belgian domain
selling Japanese copiers printers (you probably know which one). What
made it pass
with returnpath, getting spam from places
that they have certified. The notion of giving those rules a small
positive score is quite reasonable.
Generally, SA assigns scores based on a ham/spam corpus. For rules that
aren't pay-to-play whitelists, this is totally reasonable. For
whitelists
inbox placement...
(hint: we nuke all whitelists in SA anyway)
On Fri, 10 Jul 2015 07:58:39 +1000
Noel Butler noel.but...@ausics.net wrote:
+1
I'll throw my +1 in on this also. Almost by definition, the kinds of
organizations who buy into these certifications to get their mail
delivered are unlikely to be the kinds of organizations I want to
hear from.
AndreaS Schamanek skrev den 2013-07-03 21:52:
Only if I also add 172.31.38.210 (private address from a reserved
block) it
works as I expected it.
Looks like I will use trusted_networks to save some CPU cycles but
I'll also
keep my meta rules.
yep, rfc1700 is default listed in spamassassin,
by JMF-WHITE and
DNSWL_MED)
which (would) lead to false negatives. Moreover, it renders our
statistical analyses useless for their IPs.
Put such sources in SA's trusted_networks. This also ensures that
blacklists (and whitelists) are applied to the IPs delivering to these
forwarding systems
On Wed, 3 Jul 2013 12:52:43 -0700 (PDT)
AndreaS Schamanek wrote:
Anyway, using trusted_networks I found that it doesn't work fully
unless I manage to list their complete mail infrastructure. I didn't
know that IPs from trusted_networks can actually be subject to evals.
...
Only if I also add
Hi SA fellows,
I sometimes disagree with whitelists such as DNSWL_MED,
chaosreigns.com/iprep/ or JMF-WHITE. There are 2 main issues:
1) Less often recently, but I did see freemail MTA IPs from Google,
Yahoo! and other big players showing up on whitelists. Considering the
amount of spam
ensures that
blacklists (and whitelists) are applied to the IPs delivering to these
forwarding systems.
-- Matthias
server and let spamassassin query it, ip-repution is
part of can-it other front end for spamassassin, google it
Should I file complaints?
whitelists is basicly just for mta stage, not spamassassin testing,
only reason dnseval exists is for mta setup that does not test rbls, for
dnswl you can
Hi,
Was wondering if could have some advice, and I probably know what I'm going
to do anyway, just wanted a few others opinions..
I've been analysing a load of mail which is having it's SA score reduced by
what looks like paid for whitelists. A view of the SA scores I'm seeing is:
Rule
On Mon, 21 Nov 2011 03:11:48 -0800 (PST), pipjg wrote:
Has anyone else seen this or got any advice on this matter? Should we
be
trusting a paid for whitelist?
where do you pay ?
why not report spam to returnpath ?
but feel free to set scores to zero, if you like to pay :-)
for whitelists. A view of the SA
scores I'm seeing is:
Rule Total Ham % Spam%
RP_MATCHES_RCVD 161,165 142,559 88.5
18,60611.5 RCVD_IN_RP_SAFE22,405 22,399
100 6 0 RCVD_IN_RP_CERTIFIED 22,130
22,125 100
On 11/21, pipjg wrote:
dumn here? Does the T_ mean something I don't know?
Yes, it means there is a bug in the way spamassassin rules are being
published. It stands for testing.
rules with a T_ prefix to their names are never published
- http://wiki.apache.org/spamassassin/SaUpdateBackend
This
On 11/21/2011 10:53 AM, dar...@chaosreigns.com wrote:
On 11/21, pipjg wrote:
dumn here? Does the T_ mean something I don't know?
Yes, it means there is a bug in the way spamassassin rules are being
published. It stands for testing.
rules with a T_ prefix to their names are never published
On Mon, 21 Nov 2011 13:50:05 +
RW wrote:
On Mon, 21 Nov 2011 03:11:48 -0800 (PST)
pipjg wrote:
RuleTotal Ham % Spam%
RP_MATCHES_RCVD 161,165 142,559 88.5
18,606 11.5 RCVD_IN_RP_SAFE22,405 22,399
describe RP_MATCHES_RCVD
I've been repeatedly running into problems where dns white-lists have
been causing false negatives in spam. Valid looking headers are being
injected at the beginning of emails which are tripping dns whitelists
(see below). As a result I've been slowly disabling dns whitelist rules:
score
On 9/17/2010 10:55 AM, Lawren Quigley-Jones wrote:
I've been repeatedly running into problems where dns white-lists have
been causing false negatives in spam. Valid looking headers are being
injected at the beginning of emails which are tripping dns whitelists
(see below). As a result I've
στις 17/09/2010 05:55 μμ, O/H Lawren Quigley-Jones έγραψε:
I've been repeatedly running into problems where dns white-lists have
been causing false negatives in spam. Valid looking headers are being
injected at the beginning of emails which are tripping dns whitelists
(see below
injected at the beginning of emails which are tripping dns
whitelists (see below). As a result I've been slowly disabling dns
whitelist rules:
score HABEAS_ACCREDITED_COI 0
score HABEAS_ACCREDITED_SOI 0
score RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED 0
score RCVD_IN_BSP_TRUSTED 0
score RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI 0
I'm running
On fre 17 sep 2010 16:55:11 CEST, Lawren Quigley-Jones wrote
I'm running SpamAssassin on ubuntu hardy: spamassassin 3.2.4-1ubuntu1.2
is this a joke ?
:)
--
xpoint http://www.unicom.com/pw/reply-to-harmful.html
McDonald, Dan wrote:
Please excuse the top-post. This truly brain-damaged mua does not
allow me to edit the body.
Easiest way to disable whitelists is:
grep -E score\ RCVD.+-
/var/lib/spamassassin/updates_spamassassin_org/50_scores.cf | cut -d\
-f1-3 /etc/mail/spamassassin
On Fri, 2010-01-29 at 09:18 -0500, Bowie Bailey wrote:
McDonald, Dan wrote:
Please excuse the top-post. This truly brain-damaged mua does not
allow me to edit the body.
Easiest way to disable whitelists is:
grep -E score\ RCVD.+-
/var/lib/spamassassin/updates_spamassassin_org
Daniel J McDonald wrote:
On Fri, 2010-01-29 at 09:18 -0500, Bowie Bailey wrote:
McDonald, Dan wrote:
Please excuse the top-post. This truly brain-damaged mua does not
allow me to edit the body.
Easiest way to disable whitelists is:
grep -E score\ RCVD.+-
/var/lib/spamassassin
McDonald, Dan wrote:
grep -E score\ RCVD.+-
/var/lib/spamassassin/updates_spamassassin_org/50_scores.cf | cut -d\
-f1-3 /etc/mail/spamassassin/no-whitelists.cf
Nice. Now I just need to decide if I wait for ports to update or just manually
install 3.3
--
You try to shape the world to
What whitelists are enabled in SA 3.3.0 and what's the easiest way to disable
them all?
--
YOU [humans] NEED TO BELIEVE IN THINGS THAT AREN'T TRUE. HOW ELSE CAN THEY
BECOME? --Hogfather
Please excuse the top-post. This truly brain-damaged mua does not allow me to
edit the body.
Easiest way to disable whitelists is:
grep -E score\ RCVD.+-
/var/lib/spamassassin/updates_spamassassin_org/50_scores.cf | cut -d\ -f1-3
/etc/mail/spamassassin/no-whitelists.cf
Sent with Good
From: mouss mo...@ml.netoyen.net
Sent: Monday, 2009/December/21 15:47
jdow a écrit :
http://isc.sans.org/diary.html?storyid=7780
It can be quite frustrating to run an ISP and comply with the often
arbitrary, strange, and I suspect contradictory demands of the likes
of SORBS and Trend Micro.
On 12/22/09 2:49 PM, jdow wrote:
I agree he could have included more information than he did without
giving away names involved. One piece of wording suggests he is an
admin at a box or rack rental place such as rackspace rather than a
wire rental place; and, it's customers are meeting with
jdow a écrit :
At least one well respected ninja sort from this list is also a
volunteer SANS Internet Storm Cellar operator. These folks do not seem
to be in the least inexperienced in the ways of malware and malware
delivery. That is why I take that diary entry at face value.
maybe I'm
Warren Togami wrote:
While whitelists are not directly effective (statistically, when
averaged across a large corpus), whitelists are powerful tools in
indirect ways including:
* Pushing the score beyond the auto-learn threshold for things like
Bayes to function without manual
On Sun, 20 Dec 2009, jdow wrote:
http://isc.sans.org/diary.html?storyid=7780
It can be quite frustrating to run an ISP and comply with the often
arbitrary, strange, and I suspect contradictory demands of the likes
of SORBS and Trend Micro. An ISP Abuse handler vents in this article.
On
jdow a écrit :
http://isc.sans.org/diary.html?storyid=7780
It can be quite frustrating to run an ISP and comply with the often
arbitrary, strange, and I suspect contradictory demands of the likes
of SORBS and Trend Micro. An ISP Abuse handler vents in this article.
from the text, there is
http://isc.sans.org/diary.html?storyid=7780
It can be quite frustrating to run an ISP and comply with the often
arbitrary, strange, and I suspect contradictory demands of the likes
of SORBS and Trend Micro. An ISP Abuse handler vents in this article.
{^_^}
On Sun, 20 Dec 2009, jdow wrote:
http://isc.sans.org/diary.html?storyid=7780
It can be quite frustrating to run an ISP and comply with the often
arbitrary, strange, and I suspect contradictory demands of the likes
of SORBS and Trend Micro. An ISP Abuse handler vents in this article.
SORBS
Res wrote:
On Sun, 20 Dec 2009, jdow wrote:
http://isc.sans.org/diary.html?storyid=7780
It can be quite frustrating to run an ISP and comply with the often
arbitrary, strange, and I suspect contradictory demands of the likes
of SORBS and Trend Micro. An ISP Abuse handler vents in this
On Sat, 19 Dec 2009, Daryl C. W. O'Shea wrote:
More unfortunately, privacy concerns prevent me from building a useful
corpus of ham. Sigh
But otherwise such a good idea
Can you not trust yourself to use your own ham? You don't need to
provide us with your mail. You can scan your own
On 12/20/2009 09:20 AM, Charles Gregory wrote:
On Sat, 19 Dec 2009, Daryl C. W. O'Shea wrote:
More unfortunately, privacy concerns prevent me from building a useful
corpus of ham. Sigh
But otherwise such a good idea
Can you not trust yourself to use your own ham? You don't need to
On Sun, 20 Dec 2009, Per Jessen wrote:
SORBS would only put you in their DUL listing for anything resembling
hosts that are dynamic,
AFAIK, also ranges that were declared to by dynamic, e.g. in whois
info. I once had a range allocated which had previously been declared
to be dynamic, and it
From: Charles Gregory cgreg...@hwcn.org
Sent: Sunday, 2009/December/20 06:20
On Sat, 19 Dec 2009, Daryl C. W. O'Shea wrote:
More unfortunately, privacy concerns prevent me from building a useful
corpus of ham. Sigh
But otherwise such a good idea
Can you not trust yourself to use your
On Sun, 20 Dec 2009, jdow wrote:
I'm just a touch naive here; but, it seems to me it should be possible,
somehow, to build running spamd daemons, one with the regular rules
and one with the mass check rules.
There's nothing special about masscheck rules. Masscheck is just running
the current
On Sun, 20 Dec 2009, jdow wrote:
The downside is that this is not confirmed ham and confirmed spam.
(nod) Exactly. And that is what is needed to do a masscheck...
I wonder how much companies would pay for a part time SpamAssassin
honcho who can be trusted (bonded?) and can write SARE-ish
On Fri, 18 Dec 2009, Warren Togami wrote:
Why wait, when you do relatively simple things to help make it happen?
http://wiki.apache.org/spamassassin/NightlyMassCheck
We can more frequently update rules if more people participate in the
nightly masschecks. The current documentation is a bit of
On 19/12/2009 5:51 PM, Charles Gregory wrote:
On Fri, 18 Dec 2009, Warren Togami wrote:
Why wait, when you do relatively simple things to help make it happen?
http://wiki.apache.org/spamassassin/NightlyMassCheck
We can more frequently update rules if more people participate in the
nightly
On Thu, 17 Dec 2009, jdow wrote:
It is a good thing this issue was raised. It led to appropriate mass
check runs. I expect that will lead to saner scoring within the SA
framework. If not and it bites me, THEN I'll raise the issue again.
Does that seem fair?
50_scores.cf:score
On Fri, 18 Dec 2009, Charles Gregory wrote:
On Thu, 17 Dec 2009, jdow wrote:
It is a good thing this issue was raised. It led to appropriate mass
check runs. I expect that will lead to saner scoring within the SA
framework. If not and it bites me, THEN I'll raise the issue again.
Does that
On Dec 18, 2009, at 7:56, Charles Gregory cgreg...@hwcn.org wrote:
Still no changes through the sa-update channel.
Is there a time delay in the masscheck results being applied?
It's already been stayed no changes to 3.2.5 will be made until 3.3 is
done, hasn't it?
From: Charles Gregory cgreg...@hwcn.org
Sent: Friday, 2009/December/18 06:56
On Thu, 17 Dec 2009, jdow wrote:
It is a good thing this issue was raised. It led to appropriate mass
check runs. I expect that will lead to saner scoring within the SA
framework. If not and it bites me, THEN I'll
On Fri, 18 Dec 2009, LuKreme wrote:
It's already been stayed no changes to 3.2.5 will be made until 3.3 is
done, hasn't it?
Well, at this point, I respectfully bow, and take a step back, so as not
to sound too demanding of our great volunteers (smile), but I believe
in another of my posts I
On Fri, 18 Dec 2009, Charles Gregory wrote:
I recognize, from the existence of such sites as 'rules du jour' that it
has long been a practice for SA to release 'core' rule updates very
infrequently. But with respect, I question whether that is still a good
practice, particularly when an
On Fri, 18 Dec 2009, jdow wrote:
On Thu, 17 Dec 2009, jdow wrote:
Still no changes through the sa-update channel.
Is there a time delay in the masscheck results being applied?
Yes, there is, Mr. Gregory. It exists between your monitor and your
keyboard.
There is a one inch gap between
On Fri, 18 Dec 2009, John Hardin wrote:
We hope to get rule scoring and publication much more automated - i.e.,
if a rule in the sandbox works well based on the automated masschecks,
it would be automatically scored and published via sa-update.
Music to my ears. I will wait (semi-)patiently.
From: Charles Gregory cgreg...@hwcn.org
Sent: Friday, 2009/December/18 13:49
On Fri, 18 Dec 2009, jdow wrote:
On Thu, 17 Dec 2009, jdow wrote:
Still no changes through the sa-update channel.
Is there a time delay in the masscheck results being applied?
Yes, there is, Mr. Gregory. It
On 12/18/2009 04:56 PM, Charles Gregory wrote:
On Fri, 18 Dec 2009, John Hardin wrote:
We hope to get rule scoring and publication much more automated -
i.e., if a rule in the sandbox works well based on the automated
masschecks, it would be automatically scored and published via sa-update.
On 18/12/2009 5:13 PM, Warren Togami wrote:
On 12/18/2009 04:56 PM, Charles Gregory wrote:
On Fri, 18 Dec 2009, John Hardin wrote:
We hope to get rule scoring and publication much more automated -
i.e., if a rule in the sandbox works well based on the automated
masschecks, it would be
Warren Togami wrote:
https://issues.apache.org/SpamAssassin/show_bug.cgi?id=6247#c49
https://issues.apache.org/SpamAssassin/show_bug.cgi?id=6247#c51
It turns out that the ReturnPath and DNSWL whitelists have a
statistically insignificant impact on spamassassin's ability to
determine ham vs
Warren Togami wrote:
While whitelists are not directly effective (statistically, when
averaged across a large corpus), whitelists are powerful tools in
indirect ways including:
* Pushing the score beyond the auto-learn threshold for things like
Bayes to function without manual
on Bug #6247 I found some
interesting details that throws a wrench into this lively debate.
https: //issues.apache.org/SpamAssassin/show_bug.cgi?id=6247#c49
https: //issues.apache.org/SpamAssassin/show_bug.cgi?id=6247#c51
It turns out that the ReturnPath and DNSWL whitelists have a statistically
On 12/17/2009 11:27 AM, Jason Bertoch wrote:
If whitelists are to be enabled by default, I believe their score should
be moved considerably more toward zero.
/Jason
I don't necessarily disagree with this desire, as now we know the
whitelists actually are making almost zero difference
Very interesting data indeed -- and a testament to the accuracy of the
SpamAssassin rules weighting process.
On Dec 16, 2009, at 4:10 PM, Warren Togami wrote:
While whitelists are not directly effective (statistically, when averaged
across a large corpus), whitelists are powerful tools
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