On Mar 20, 2013, at 1:10 PM, Russ White <[email protected]> wrote: > In response to a paper that says removing ROAs is a form of DoS, or that > there are potential problems in the space of the relationship between > the registry and the address owner, then we've moved from "unknown," to > "contested." The response given essentially says, "don't worry about > attacks, because in the case of attacks, we'll just ignore those ROA > thingies."
The problem in the paper was equating removing ROAs with DoS attacks with actual reachability implications. > If that's the case, then why bother with the ROAs in the first place? ROAs provide a method to give your correct routes precedence over other routes from (hostile) sources. It is an optional service, and loss of the RPKI system is not loss of connectivity. The fact that it is optional doesn't mean that it won't be valued by many folks for its use in routine operations. (Just as you may value having an alarm system for your home because of the protection it provides, its failure doesn't also automatically unlock your front door...) > Again, you can't have your cake and eat it too... Either ROAs mean > something, and attacks against the ROA system are a real threat, or the > attacks are not worth worrying about --in which case, the ROAs > themselves don't mean anything from day one. Loss of a ROA (e.g. due to an attack on the RPKI system) does not cause a _reachability event_ if folks are using best practices for route precedence; that's what was implied in the paper and is wrong. Successful attacks against the RPKI system do have an impact, but it is simply that you are again vulnerable to route hijacking. FYI, /John _______________________________________________ sidr mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr
