On Mar 20, 2013, at 1:51 PM, Russ White <[email protected]> wrote: > How often do you think an attacker would bother with taking out a ROA > without taking out the route as well?
Invert the question... Of the thousands of entities that could today inject (hostile) routes and do a hijack today, how many of them will be able to also mount an attack against the RPKI infrastructure? > But this misses the larger point > --if the ROAs are supposed to provide security, then either: > > 1. Removing the ROAs is a problem in terms of increased risk, which is a > problem which needs to be addressed. I never argued with addressing the risks that might be posed; I was pointing out that the risk does not equate (on its own) with a reachability event, as alluded to by the paper. /John _______________________________________________ sidr mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr
