[A edited copy of a piece I published Oct 4th in the International Relations list. steve]
I think that most Western nation leadership will eventually support the U.S.' military action against Iraq. However, they may do so not because they necessarily think Bush is right that Saddam's weapons are a threat to the West, but because it is a politically acceptable pretext concealing longer term economic and geo-political issues--ones they do not wish to share at this time with their citizens. Forked Tongue The war with Iran, a heavily militarized powerful client state of the U.S. under the dictatorship of the Shah, left Iraq bankrupt. Faced with rebuilding its infrastructure destroyed in the war, Iraq needed money. No country would loan it money except the U.S. Borrowing money from the U.S. made Iraq its client state. A client State could take no action without the permission of the more powerful nation. In 1990 Saddam Hussein complained to our State Department about Kuwait's illegal removal of Iraqi underground oil by slant drilling across the border into Iraq. This had continued for years, but now Iraq needed the money that this oil would supply to pay its bills. Saddam considered a war with Kuwait but needed Washington's permission. From Ramsey Clark's "The Fire This Time" (1994, Thunder's Mouth Press), pp.23-24: On July 25 - the day after the United States announced Gulf exercises with the UAE, while Iraqi troops were massing on the Kuwaiti border, and as General Schwarzkopf readied CENTCOM for war against Iraq - Saddam Hussein summoned Ambassador [April] Glaspie to his office in what seems to have been a final attempt to clarify Washington's position on his dispute with Kuwait. Glaspie assured him: "We have no opinion on Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait.... [Secretary of State] James Baker has directed our official spokesmen to emphasize this instruction." [83] She was expresssing official policy. On July 24, she had received a cable from the State Department explicitly directing her to reiterate that the United States had "no position" on "Arab-Arab" conflicts. [84] After the war, on March 21, 1991, Glaspie denied this version of her meeting with Hussein. She testified to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that she had repeatedly warned Hussein that the United States would not tolerate Iraq's use of violence to settle the dispute with Kuwait. She said Hussein had been too "stupid" to understand how the Unite States would react. [85] But in July 1991, Glaspie's cables to the State Department describing the meeting were finally released to the Senate. The cable showed that her Senate testimony was largely fabricated, and that the version released by Iraq was accurate. [86] On July 12, 1991 Committee Chairman Senator Claiborne Pell wrote an angry letter to Secretary of State James Baker demanding an explanation for the inconsistencies between Glaspie's testimony and the cable. Senator Alan Cranston charged that Glaspie had deliberately misled Congress about her role in the Gulf War. [the book continues with Assistant Secretary of State Kelly telling a Congressional committee on 31 July that the US had no treaty obligations to defend Kuwait] Follow the Oil (eh, Money) Its seems somewhat odd that our State Department would tell Iraq "go ahead, we don't care" and shortly thereafter launch one of the largest military actions in this century. Was this simple a case of "crossed wires" (pretty hard to believe) or intentional, part of a long-term U.S. or Western strategy to provide cover for future unilateral actions to assure the unimpeded flow of oil? Its critical that Americans realize that Bush, Chenney and some senior advisors come from the petroleum industry. Whatever one may think of their politics, they are no fools when it comes to oil. Based on analysis of oil exploration records, Dr. M. King Hubbert developed a model and predicted in 1956 that the USA would peak in its production of oil around 1970. He was discouraged from disclosing this foreboding news by his employers. He felt morally obligated to disclose the truth, and yet when he did so, his peers laughed at him. As we all know, he was right on, and the USA and the world suffered the first oil shock soon after the USA reached the peak he predicted. If oil production peaks are key economic turning points then the peak in world production should be of keen interests to all economists; to all citizens of developed countries. Dr. C.J.Campbell, "Oil Depletion - Updated Through 2001," http://www.hubbertpeak.com/campbell/update2002.htm believes that "...the peak of Conventional oil may have been passed in 2000, the peak of all liquids (e.g., shale oil, etc) comes around 2010, followed by the peak of all hydrocarbons around 2015. The entry of deepwater production and growing NGL from gas is seen as critical. If they come in as forecast, overall oil production need not fall below present levels for about twenty years. If, contrary to expectation, the economy should recover and the demand for oil rise to match the past growth trend, then peak would be advanced to around 2005, and the subsequent decline would be steeper. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the World is indeed facing a discontinuity of historic proportions. The Stone Age did not end because we ran out of stone but because bronze and iron proved to be better substitutes. Firewood gave way to coal; and coal to oil and gas, not because they ran out or went into short supply but because the substitutes were cheaper and more efficient. But now, oil production does reach a peak without sight of a preferred substitute. The remarkable prosperity of the past Century, which was largely built on an abundant supply of cheap oil-based energy, may therefore be coming to an end. It is stressed that we are not about to run out of oil, having about as much left as we have used already, but production is about to peak. The perception of this peak may have consequences that far exceed the growing physical constraints to supply, which will not bite in earnest for twenty or thirty years." Whistling Past the Graveyard U.S. Administrations cannot be trusted with the truth in public discourse. Its not too far fetched to see the coming war with Iraq as a giant smoke screen designed to make palatable increased U.S. and Western control of the Gulf in advance of a coming world oil production peak, one that could lead to shift in the world's strategic balance. Americans have an unfortunate memory problem when it comes to uncomfortable truths. Bush and his henchmen are betting that like so many, "revisionist history," times before the sheeple will either never know, choose not to remember or condone past misdeeds as unfortunate mistakes, as long affordable fuel continues to flow. By following Bush, we are all betting that our adversaries in the Middle East never get their hands on the means to make us pay for our past "mistakes." "The Fire This Time" references: [83] "The Glaspie Transcript: Saddam meets the U.S. Ambassador," in The Gulf War Reader, Micah Sifry and Christopher Cerf, eds., (New York: Times Books, 1991), 130. [84] Leslie H. Gelb, "Mr Bush's Fateful Blunder," New York Times, July 17, 1991, A21. [85] Thomas Friedman, "Envoy to Iraq, Faulted in Crisis, Says She Warned Hussein Sternly," New York Times, March 21, 1991. [86] "U.S. Messages on the July Meeting of Saddam Hussein and American Envoy," New York Times, July 13, 1991. See also Sydney Blumenthal's, "April's Bluff: The Secrets of Ms. Glaspie's Cable," The New Republic, August 5, 1991.
