One of my hobbies is keeping track of publicly trusted (by any of the major root programs) CAs, for which there are no logged certificates. There's over 1000 of these. In the last day, presumably as a result of these efforts, 50-100 CAs were removed from the list.
Cheers, Alex On Thu, Jun 22, 2017 at 5:51 AM, Rob Stradling <rob.stradl...@comodo.com> wrote: > On 19/06/17 20:41, Tavis Ormandy via dev-security-policy wrote: > >> Thanks Alex, I took a look, it looks like the check pings crt.sh - is >> doing >> that for a large number of certificates acceptable Rob? >> > > Hi Tavis. Yes, Alex's tool uses https://crt.sh/gen-add-chain to find a > suitable cert chain and build the JSON that can then be submitted to a > log's /ct/v1/add-chain. It should be fine to do that for a large number of > certs. crt.sh exists to be used. ;-) > > I made a smaller set, the certificates that have 'SSL server: Yes' or 'Any >> Purpose : Yes', there were only a few thousand that verified, so I just >> checked those and found 551 not in crt.sh. >> >> (The *vast* majority are code signing certificates, many are individual >> apple developer certificates) >> >> Is this useful? if not, what key usage is interesting? >> >> https://lock.cmpxchg8b.com/ServerOrAny.zip >> > > Thanks for this, Tavis. I pointed my certscraper ( > https://github.com/robstradling/certscraper) at this URL a couple of days > ago. This submitted many of the certs to the Dodo and Rocketeer logs. > > However, it didn't manage to build chains for all of them. I haven't yet > had a chance to investigate why. > > > Tavis. >> >> On Mon, Jun 19, 2017 at 7:03 AM, Alex Gaynor <agay...@mozilla.com> wrote: >> >> If you're interested in playing around with submitting them yourself, or >>> checking if they're already submitted, I've got some random tools for >>> working with CT: https://github.com/alex/ct-tools >>> >>> Specifically ct-tools check <cert1.pem, cert2.pem, ...> will get what you >>> want. It's all serial, so for 8M certs you probably want to Bring Your >>> Own >>> Parallelism (I should fix this...) >>> >>> Alex >>> >>> On Mon, Jun 19, 2017 at 6:51 AM, Rob Stradling via dev-security-policy < >>> dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: >>> >>> On 16/06/17 20:11, Andrew Ayer via dev-security-policy wrote: >>>> >>>> On Fri, 16 Jun 2017 10:29:45 -0700 Tavis Ormandy wrote: >>>>> >>>>> <snip> >>>> >>>> Is there an easy way to check which certificates from my set you're >>>>> >>>>>> missing? (I'm not a PKI guy, I was collecting unusual extension OIDs >>>>>> for fuzzing). >>>>>> >>>>>> I collected these from public sources, so can just give you my whole >>>>>> set if you already have tools for importing them and don't mind >>>>>> processing them, I have around ~8M (mostly leaf) certificates, the >>>>>> set with isCa will be much smaller. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> Please do post the whole set. I suspect there are several people on >>>>> this list (including myself and Rob) who have the tools and experience >>>>> to process large sets of certificates and post them to public >>>>> Certificate Transparency logs (whence they will be fed into crt.sh). >>>>> >>>>> It would be useful to include the leaf certificates as well, to catch >>>>> CAs which are engaging in bad practices such as signing non-SSL certs >>>>> with SHA-1 under an intermediate that is capable of issuing SSL >>>>> certificates. >>>>> >>>>> Thanks a bunch for this! >>>>> >>>>> >>>> +1 >>>> >>>> Tavis, please do post the whole set. And thanks! >>>> >>> > -- > Rob Stradling > Senior Research & Development Scientist > COMODO - Creating Trust Online > _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
