On 12 Jul 2012, at 00:44, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/11/2012 2:22 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Jul 2012, at 22:17, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/11/2012 6:23 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 11 July 2012 09:55, Alberto G. Corona <agocor...@gmail.com>
wrote:
Even the phisical TOE is part of this second world. there are no
countries, no cars, no persons, no electrons outside of the
world of the mind. Outside of the mind there is only
mathematics. And this math has been anthropically selected by the
mind.
Well put. Mind - the epistemological subject - is uniquely
characterised by its irreducibly synthetic or compositional
character, the reverse polarity of a maximally reduced,
"objective" ontology.
But it isn't uniquely characterized by that. I don't even know
what "irreducibly synthetic" means. I know what "synthetic"
means; it means made (synthesized) of something else, it means
artificial, not natural?? But in any case "the subject", the
first-person, is also singular and persistent thru time.
There is certainly a tension between knowledge which is subjective
and gained from perception and the model of the world based on it
which is third-person communicable. When we bestow the property
"exists" on the ontology of the third-person world model, we then
take on the task of explaining the first-person subjective in
terms of that model. Everyone on this list (except me) seems to
assume this impossible.
Neither me. Just that if comp is true we got a simpler ontology.
This is just the flip side of Bruno's task of explaining the third-
person world in terms of subjective knowledge
Not at all. I explain the *physical* world in term of first person
plural world, themselves describe in third person arithmetic.
The 'first person plural world' is what I mean by knowledge on which
there is intersubjective agreement.
OK. Those, when expressible, are belief, and if true (but we can't
know that) they become knowledge (but not certainty).
Comp is not idealist.
Yes I understand that. But doesn't it derive ideas (conscious
thoughts) from computation (arithmetic) and the physical world from
coherent subsets of ideas.
Consciousness is not really derived. It is only assumed to be
associated with relevant computations. We derive from that, but that
is not derived from less.
which he models by computational relations like "provable".
Provable = objective (doubtful) belief
Why do you writer "doubtful". Why should one doubt what is
provable?...because the axioms are dubious?
Yes. We cannot know that we are consistent, or correct.
Provable and true/satisfied-in-a-reality = Subjective knowledge
(the communicable part).
But we can't know what is "satisfied-in-a-reality", we can only know
what is provable from our premises
Making it into a belief. That might be wrong.
and what we experience directly.
That is true, and undoubtable.
Are you saying there are provable things that we can't communicate
As being proved, we can communicate them as belief, if we believe in
the axioms.
or the there are provable things which are not true (not satisfied-
in-a-reality)?
That can happen, even if nobody really doubt some simple theory, like
arithmetic.
Bruno
Brent
(Incompleteness forces us to make those nuances).
Bruno
Brent
This is implicitly assumed by everyone, but explicitly
acknowledged by hardly anybody. Consequently the typical
response whenever I express this thought is blank incomprehension.
David
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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