On 22 Jan 2015, at 06:06, 'Roger' via Everything List wrote:

Roger: Just because things can exist outside the mind/head doesn't mean that a specific thing does occur outside the mind/head. If the pi proposition and the 10^(10^(10^100))th decimal point of pi can be shown outside the mind/head or any experimental evidence for the existence of the pi proposition or the 10^(10^(10^100))th decimal point of pi existing outside the mind/head, I'd be happy to accept it. I can see that a circle can exist outside the head, but I don't see anywhere outside the mind/head, the proposition that if you divide the circle's circumference by its diameter you get pi.

But that proposition is not in the head of anybody. A body can get a representation of that proposition in some language (be it LISP or neural nets, or numbers): that is usually called a sentence, and *that* is in the head of the machine or the number. The proposition itself is what is intended by the sentence and the universal machine in presence. That pi is what you find by dividing the circle's circumference by the diameter is (true by definition), and that the sum of the inverse of all squared natural number is true, by a proposition proved by Euler.

That is true. period. It was true before Euler proved it, and after, although this is only a metaphor. The number are just not concept to which time or space attribute can apply.

There is no number, nor proposition, in a brain. You might find representations of number, and of propositions in the brain, but it makes no sense to say that a number is in a brain, or on the planet mars.

Then a brain itself can be described as the representation of a universal numbers with respect to some other universal numbers.

If you accept Church-Turing thesis, all computations exists in the elementary arithmetical reality, and in a very special redundant way, and we are there, and we must explain why the white rabbits are so rare and why the rabbit hole is so deep. The quantum almost solves that problem, but to solve the mind-body problem, we must justify why only the quantum works.

Bruno

Roger: I understand that the sentence, the words and the thought "divide a circle's circumference by its diameter to get pi" are in the mind/head.

Yes. even in the mind/head of all universal machine, in the sense of Turing-Church, which can be defined in arithmetic.

But, what is outside the head is a circle, with a circumference and a diameter.

This is ambiguous.Are you talkng about the "platonic perfect circle"? Or about a circle physically realized, like with a pen and a compass?

Roger: A physically realized circle.

I doubt this exist. And with computationalism, I doubt this makes sense.




There is no process outside the mind/head saying that if you divide the circumference by the diameter, the number 3.14... results.


Yes there is. For each choice of a universal numbers in N, you will have an infinity of numbers which describes that process, like all programs simulating Archimedes algorithm to compute Pi. Those programs and their executions are entirely well defined in arithmetic. Some quite indirectly, like the programs simulating the milky way, in string theory, just before Archimedes discovered his algorithm.





 That process and the idea of even doing it are inside the mind/head.

But with computationalism everything is inside the mind/ead of the universal numbers, even the idea that there is something outside the mind/head of the universal machine.

Roger: If you believe in computationalism and arithmetical reality.

Computationalism implies the arithmetical reality. You need it to just define computation, Church thesis, etc. You need at least a part of it (the sigma_1 complete part).

I don't know any one not believing in the arithmetical reality, even philosophers (which sometimes claims that they does not admit them, but eventually betray themselves.

Not everybody agrees that it is enough for explaining consciousness and the physical reality, but most everyday concept (like forever, while, again, anniversary, death, everyday, ...) assumes the intuition needed for agreeing on the elementary arithmetical axioms.




It will give 3.14 for all physical circles and their circumferences and diameters outside the head, but the only thing outside the head is the circle.

The platonic circle? Perhaps.

Roger: As above, a physically realized circle.

I really doubt you could realize a circle in nature. Only an approximation, and then I am not sure if nature is not in the head of the Turing machines and relative numbers.

So you take as axioms that there is a primary physical universe. I do not. To better tackle the mind-body problem, it is better to be agnostic on this, and open to the idea that such a primary physical universe might not exist.




 The process and the idea are inside the mind/head.

There are also in arithmetic, and in the mind/head of all universal numbers, although they can focus on something else.



The "what you find by dividing..." in your sentence also kind of implies that an action needs to be taken by the observer.

OK, but the observer is defined by a relative number, or a couple of universal numbers. We never go outside a tiny fragment of arithmetic, except for the reasoning on the measure on the computational histories, where analytical tools are not forbidden at the metalevel.

Keep in mind that I do not assume a physical universe, if only because I want a non circular explanation of matter and of the physical.

Everett use computationalism to justify the absence of collapse, but this works only if we can derive the SWE from the measure on *all* computational "dreams" in arithmetic.

Bruno

Roger: It just seems like we're starting out with different assumptions (arithmetical reality/computationalism versus physically existent entities), and I don't think we can resolve that one. But, that's okay. As I mentioned before, we'll all keep working our models and try and make some progress.

Indeed. All what I say, with materialism = the doctrine which asserts the existence of primary matter, or physicalism, is that Mechanism and Materialism are incompatible. You can put it in this ways:

Mechanism & Materialism -> contradiction.

Mechanism -> ~ Materialism

Materialism -> ~ Mechanism

The problem is only for those believing in both mechanism and materialism.

Then a materialist must provides a non mechanist theory of mind. And a mechanist must provides a non materialist theory of matter, with mind defined by the object of study of computer science. That last task is more easy, and leads to a testable theory of matter by machines.

Bruno






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