On 30 Apr 2015, at 04:34, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 29 Apr 2015, at 02:12, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Given Platonia, they always exist timelessly, they never have to
be calculated because the are timelessly true.
But the view from the inside points of view is different.
You appeal sometimes to the block universe view of relativity theory
-- the block is static, but observers inside experience time. In
general relativity there are difficulties with the definition of a
time variable, but in special relativity, time can be defined as a
direction in the block. Then slices through the block orthogonal to
this direction give the experienced moments of time.
I do not think that you can do anything similar with Platonia
because it is not a well-defined four dimensional object with a
defined Minkowskian structure.
The point is that Platonia is structured by the view from inside, and
[]p & <>t should give the quantum Minkowskian structure (if that is
correct physics). And this works. We got a quantization, and some
Minkowski structure already appear (thanks to some other result by
Goldblatt).
Anyway, I just give a way to refute comp: prove that we don't get that
structure in any of S4Grz1, X1*, Z1*.
If everything is to 'happen' in Platonia, you need to specify a
temporal variable.
Time is handled by the "& p" intensional variants. S4Grz is already a
logic of time. In fact it is a logic of evolving knowledge.
This is not trivial, and I have not seen any convincing explanation
of how you intend to do this.
The UD-theorem (UDA) is only that we *have to* do this, if we want to
understand what matter can consist in once we assume computationalism
(or if we want to solve the mind-body problem in the comp frame).
In the math part, I *illustrate* how we *have to* proceed (and keep
the distinction between qualia and quanta) and where the quantization
are needed, they are offered on a plateau. You need to study computer
self-reference theory before (good book: Boolos 79, Boolos 93,
Smorinsky 85, etc.).
Bruno
Bruce
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