On 30 April 2015 at 17:01, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: Here we are in a place where I think you type of argument can still be used > to criticize comp itself. Comp explains matter, but someone can reason > along your line and pretend that it still fail to explain entirely > consciousness. It just push the bottom on an arbitrary Turing universalm > level, and makes everything into dreams, some cohere enough to give matter > and consciousness, but consciousness looks like it is still explained in > term of (infinities) of 3p relations, as the view from inside can be > invoked by the materialist (forgetting that by using comp, he must explain > matter too). >
But I believe this move against comp can be resisted, as I've previously remarked, by the indefeasible self-justification, or 'redemption', accorded by the view from inside. Provided it is not effectively denied (eliminativism) the 1p view can simultaneously justify both itself and its explicit 3p epistemology in the computationalist frame. But, lacking any such explicit epistemology in the materialist frame, there is no such analogous move available to the materialist. So either he tries to invoke the inside view by brute association with physical action (a la Brent, at least some of the time) or, as you say above, he makes an explicit or implicit appeal to comp. But then he finds himself in the same boat with you, whether he realises it or (more usually) not. David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
