On 30 Apr 2015, at 16:26, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 30 Apr 2015, at 04:34, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 29 Apr 2015, at 02:12, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Given Platonia, they always exist timelessly, they never have to
be calculated because the are timelessly true.
But the view from the inside points of view is different.
You appeal sometimes to the block universe view of relativity
theory -- the block is static, but observers inside experience
time. In general relativity there are difficulties with the
definition of a time variable, but in special relativity, time can
be defined as a direction in the block. Then slices through the
block orthogonal to this direction give the experienced moments of
time.
I do not think that you can do anything similar with Platonia
because it is not a well-defined four dimensional object with a
defined Minkowskian structure.
The point is that Platonia is structured by the view from inside,
and []p & <>t should give the quantum Minkowskian structure (if
that is correct physics). And this works. We got a quantization,
and some Minkowski structure already appear (thanks to some other
result by Goldblatt).
Anyway, I just give a way to refute comp: prove that we don't get
that structure in any of S4Grz1, X1*, Z1*.
The preferable view would be that if you don't get even the basic
physics out in a comparatively straightforward manner, then your
program is not of great interest. This is the criticism that has
long been leveled against string theory in physics -- it makes no
independently testable predictions. A lot of promise perhaps, but no
pay off.
I formulate the computationalist mind-body problem. I show it to be
hard.
Then, it is amazing what the Lôbian number can already tell us when
thinking about that question.
I am not proposing a theory. I study the theological consequences on
taking rationalism or mechanism seriously enough.
I am still not sure if you are really interested in the mind-body
problem. Unless you believe that consciousness reduces the wave
packet, and this by using special oracle (different from the FPI), you
don't even seemed to suggest a reason why computationalism is
incorrect, or a reason to not admit its consequences.
It is not a question of believing or defending any proposition. it is
only a question of understanding a problem, reasoning validly. UDA1-7
is purely deductive. Step-8 touch "reality" and just diminish the need
of Occam razor (as we cannot *prove* anything about reality, not even
that it exists).
No pay of? Have you a simpler explanation of where the physical laws
come from, and why it can hurt, and this without invoking an
ontological commitment?
My feeling is that you ignore the mind-body problem, and have some
lack in recursion theory or theoretical computer science (a branch of
math). That would not be a problem if you were not talking negatively
like if I was presenting something new and original when I just
benefit from Church, Turing and Gödel +Löb, etc. to remind that
"even" by assuming comp the mind-body problem is NOT solved, and that
it is two times more complex than the materialist usually believes,
given that we *have to* justify the beliefs in matter without invoking
the existence of matter.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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