Here's the link: https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/5PR1FXp_CSU/PnuTSn_82PwJ
Jason On Sat, Jul 4, 2015 at 8:07 PM, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote: > I believe John Clark is trolling everyone. He understands and believes in > FPI brought about by duplication but is feigning incomprehension. > > For proof: Search this group's history for the thread "RE: For John Clark" > and see the post he made on October 31st 2013 in response to a post I made. > > In that post he accepts that fundamental randomness is indistinguishable > from the unpredictability caused by duplication. > > Jason > > On Saturday, July 4, 2015, Terren Suydam <terren.suy...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > On Sat, Jul 4, 2015 at 12:24 PM, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> > >> On Fri, Jul 3, 2015 Terren Suydam <terren.suy...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> > >>> > >>> > > >>> when I implore you to respond to my argument (which by the way uses no > personal pronouns) about your position you deliberately remove it from your > response or assume I'm parroting Bruno, or use some other rhetorical trick > that gets you out of answering it. > >> > >> I honestly don't know what you're referring to, I've reread a few of > your most recent posts but I'm still not sure. I must have missed it, > please repeat the question. > >> > >> John K Clark > > > > Let me make my argument as explicit as possible. > > > > You assume computationalism, or the idea that consciousness supervenes > on the physical brain. > > Starting with a Many Worlds thought experiment (such as Schrodinger's > Cat), there is one conscious subject supervening on one conscious brain > prior to the duplication. > > After the duplication above, there are two physical brains which diverge > as a consequence of observing the different outcomes of the experiment > > Therefore there are two consciousnesses, supervening on the two physical > brains. > > You accept the idea that in a Many Worlds experiment like the above, the > subject is duplicated, and prior to the experiment, the subject can > sensibly assign probabilities to which outcome will be experienced > post-duplication. > > Moving on to a duplication machine experiment, such as the one > postulated in Bruno's step 3, there is one conscious subject supervening on > one conscious brain prior to the duplication (identical to #2 above) > > After the duplication above, there are two physical brains which diverge > as a consequence of observing the different outcomes of the experiment > (identical to #3 above) > > Therefore there are two consciousnesses, supervening on the two physical > brains. (identical to #4 above) > > Therefore, as in #5 above, prior to the experiment the subject can > sensibly assign probabilities to which outcome will be experienced > post-duplication. > > > > There are no personal pronouns in play here, as none are needed. The > only thing that is needed to make Step 3 go through is a conscious > experiencer pre-duplication, and a split into two bodies post-duplication. > It is not important whether anyone observing this experiment can make sense > of the identity of the bodies. > > Terren > > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > Groups "Everything List" group. > > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send > an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
