On 05 Jul 2015, at 03:07, Jason Resch wrote:
I believe John Clark is trolling everyone.
There are a lot of evidences indeed. Of course it is hard to be sure,
and then it would be interestibg to understand why.
He understands and believes in FPI brought about by duplication but
is feigning incomprehension.
I think you are not alone with that feeling.
For proof: Search this group's history for the thread "RE: For John
Clark" and see the post he made on October 31st 2013 in response to
a post I made.
In that post he accepts that fundamental randomness is
indistinguishable from the unpredictability caused by duplication.
He did this often, and usually conclude that it is just trivial, but
then still refuse to move to the next step without justification.
He seems to be annoyed that, by staying obviously unique, the first
person notion introduces an asymmetry in the predictions, where of
course, we welcome that asymmetry and the fact that is guarantied in
duplication, like in superposition.
But this is just simple deny, as both copies verified and witness that
unicity, which keeps all along the duplication thought experience. And
we have the same in the iterated duplication.
John Clark is weird. Trolling is a grave accusation, but may be that
is the explanation.
Bruno
Jason
On Saturday, July 4, 2015, Terren Suydam <terren.suy...@gmail.com>
wrote:
>
> On Sat, Jul 4, 2015 at 12:24 PM, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com>
wrote:
>>
>> On Fri, Jul 3, 2015 Terren Suydam <terren.suy...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> >
>>> when I implore you to respond to my argument (which by the way
uses no personal pronouns) about your position you deliberately
remove it from your response or assume I'm parroting Bruno, or use
some other rhetorical trick that gets you out of answering it.
>>
>> I honestly don't know what you're referring to, I've reread a few
of your most recent posts but I'm still not sure. I must have missed
it, please repeat the question.
>>
>> John K Clark
>
> Let me make my argument as explicit as possible.
>
> You assume computationalism, or the idea that consciousness
supervenes on the physical brain.
> Starting with a Many Worlds thought experiment (such as
Schrodinger's Cat), there is one conscious subject supervening on
one conscious brain prior to the duplication.
> After the duplication above, there are two physical brains which
diverge as a consequence of observing the different outcomes of the
experiment
> Therefore there are two consciousnesses, supervening on the two
physical brains.
> You accept the idea that in a Many Worlds experiment like the
above, the subject is duplicated, and prior to the experiment, the
subject can sensibly assign probabilities to which outcome will be
experienced post-duplication.
> Moving on to a duplication machine experiment, such as the one
postulated in Bruno's step 3, there is one conscious subject
supervening on one conscious brain prior to the duplication
(identical to #2 above)
> After the duplication above, there are two physical brains which
diverge as a consequence of observing the different outcomes of the
experiment (identical to #3 above)
> Therefore there are two consciousnesses, supervening on the two
physical brains. (identical to #4 above)
> Therefore, as in #5 above, prior to the experiment the subject can
sensibly assign probabilities to which outcome will be experienced
post-duplication.
>
> There are no personal pronouns in play here, as none are needed.
The only thing that is needed to make Step 3 go through is a
conscious experiencer pre-duplication, and a split into two bodies
post-duplication. It is not important whether anyone observing this
experiment can make sense of the identity of the bodies.
> Terren
>
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