No point per se, but was invoking an idea that fission in our imaginary realm of teleportation combines the personal experiences of single individuals, when the original person decides to fission sort of like an ameoba, but then rejoin together so that the orginal being posesses both experiences as memory. Fueion is the re-identification of the original person. Call it the ultimate in multitasking. If 2, why not more? Think of all those Agent Smiths in Matrix Reloaded. There is no need for amnesia, unless you are indicating that our magical teleportation machine induces this? If amnesia, why not acne, or bad breath?? <span style="font-size: 16px;"> </span> <span style="font-size: 16px;">Science fiction writer Wil McCarthy deal with some of these issues with his writings over the last 25 years. The fantasy teleportation technology provided for a large buffer for backup, in case somebody came to a bad end, soon after they left the teleportation process. A backup copy could thus, be generated, or at least the copy would, be identical to the deceased, minus the time immediately prior to their demise. The author indicated that this form of travel, teleportation, involved the annihilation of the original, and the creation of a perfect copy stepping out of the teleport device. He also noted, that most people of this future did not like to think about this fact. McCarthy also wrote that on average, when teleportation became popular, everyone re-did themselves, to be about 4 inches taller. </span> Sent from AOL Mobile Mail
-----Original Message----- From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> To: everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com> Sent: Tue, Jul 19, 2016 11:43 AM Subject: Re: Holiday Exercise <div id="AOLMsgPart_2_7621705d-ef8c-46b8-a143-c56201313579"> <div style="word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; " class="aolReplacedBody"> <div><div>On 19 Jul 2016, at 13:47, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:<br class="aolmail_Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote><font color="black" size="2" face="arial">The who argument here, is one of fission, plus, identity. But what of fusion.</font></blockquote> Fusing is far more complex, and involve amnesia. better to understand fission first. Eventually fusin is treated by the translation of UDA in arithmetic, as intuition can only be wrong for obvious reason (evolution in (semi--classical environment). <blockquote><font color="black" size="2" face="arial"> Let us say Biff, using magical teleportation technology, clones himself into 2 identical guys called Biff and Biff zips off to Moscow, Boff decides to shop for fishing equipment, in Helsinki.</font></blockquote> Keep in mind that we were at step 3, where the Helsinki guy is annihilated. here you are unclear. What do you mean by "zips off to Moscow". I think you made also a typo (I guess the guys are named Biff and Boff, and I guess Boff is the original, non annihilated, staying in Helsinki). <blockquote><font color="black" size="2" face="arial"> After a few hours seeing the sights, buying some goods, Biff, bought a case of Stoly, Boff, some fishing gear, both zap back to "Copenhagen," their site of origin. Once they arrive, they discuss their trips with each other and agree to re-merge. The transporter is used, and Boff is absorbed back into Biff. Biff emerges from the transporter, memories of both places intact, and anticipating a weekend of fishing and Stoly. This would be fission, then fusion or re-fusion. </font></blockquote> That seems coherent with computationalism, no problem, and it is a bit like the two simultaneous dreams I mentioned. It is not clear if you were trying to make a point, or to criticize a reasoning. The advantage of fission, is that it is clear-cut, and feasible in principle and theory. Fusion is much harder to define, and there are millions type of fusions possible. Bruno <blockquote><font color="black" size="2" face="arial"> <span style="font-family: arial, helvetica; font-size: 10pt;"> </span> <span style="font-family: arial, helvetica; font-size: 10pt;"> </span> <span style="font-family: arial, helvetica; font-size: 10pt;">-----Original Message-----</span> <div style="font-family:arial,helvetica;font-size:10pt;color:black">From: Bruno Marchal <<a target="_blank" href="mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be";>marc...@ulb.ac.be</a>> To: everything-list <<a target="_blank" href="mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com";>everything-list@googlegroups.com</a>> Sent: Tue, Jul 19, 2016 3:58 am Subject: Re: Holiday Exercise On 19 Jul 2016, at 09:41, Bruce Kellett wrote: > On 19/07/2016 5:28 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> On 19 Jul 2016, at 06:58, Bruce Kellett wrote: >>> On 19/07/2016 2:18 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> On 18 Jul 2016, at 03:54, Bruce Kellett wrote: >>>> >>>>> As you say in another post, computationalism depends on the >>>>> breakdown of transitivity for personal identity: M is the same >>>>> as H; W is the same as H; but M is not the same as W. Given >>>>> this, you have all sorts of problems with the nature of personal >>>>> identity -- maybe it is not a modal concept! I will talk more >>>>> about this in reply to your other post. >>>> >>>> Well, the machine notion of 3p-self can be defined in arithmetic, >>>> and all correct machine knows that her 1p-self is not. Sure it is >>>> a tricky notion, but the non transitivity is not a problem, as >>>> the "Parfit person series" will work transitively in all cases, >>>> except when duplication occurs, but why would that cause any >>>> problem, you tell me. Nothing here threats the validity of the >>>> reasoning leading to the reversal physics/arithmetic. I think you >>>> confused non transitivity (the failing of some transitive link) >>>> with intransitivity (the failing of all transitive link). With >>>> self-duplication, we lost transitivity in one case, but both >>>> surviver recover it as long as they do'nt duplicate again, and so >>>> the old guy who stayed in Moscow remains the same young guy who >>>> teleported at Moscow through some duplication a long time ago. >>>> You might elaborate on your problem, as I don't see any. >>> >>> I think a relation is either transitive or it is intransitive: >>> personal identity is a transitive relation; 'father of' is an >>> intransitive relation. You can't be 'half-pregnant', as it were. >>> >>> I quote from Wikipedia on personal identity: >>> "Generally, personal identity is the unique numerical identity of >>> a person in the course of time. That is, the necessary and >>> sufficient conditions under which a person at one time and a >>> person at another time can be said to be the same person, >>> persisting through time." >>> >>> And from the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy: <a target="_blank" >>> href="http://www.iep.utm.edu/person-i/";>www.iep.utm.edu/person-i/</a> >>> "Personal identity is an instance of the relation of numerical >>> identity; investigations into the nature of the former, therefore, >>> must respect the formal properties that govern the latter. The >>> concept of identity is uniquely defined by (a) the logical laws of >>> congruence: if X is identical with Y, then all non-relational >>> properties borne by X are borne by Y, or formally "A(x,y)[(x = y) >>> --> (Fx = Fy)]; and (b) reflexivity: every X is identical with >>> itself, or formally "Ax(x = x). (Note that congruence and >>> reflexivity entail that identity is symmetric, "A(x,y)[(x = y) --> >>> (y = x)], and transitive, "A(x,y,z)[((x = y) & (y = z)) --> (x = >>> z)]." >>> >>> And later in the same article: >>> "Should fission be an acceptable scenario, it presents problems >>> for the psychological approach in particular. The fission outcomes >>> Y1 and Y2 are both psychologically continuous with X. According to >>> the psychological approach, therefore, they are both identical >>> with X. By congruence, however, they are not identical with each >>> other: Y1 and Y2 share many properties, but even at the very time >>> the fission operation is completed differ with regard to others, >>> such as spatio-temporal location. Consequently fission cases seem >>> to show that the psychological approach entails that a thing could >>> be identical with two non-identical things, which of course >>> violates the transitivity of identity." >>> >>> Fission, in this case, is equivalent to the duplication protocols >>> under consideration in this discussion. There does not seem to be >>> any widely agreed resolution of the problems that the duplication >>> scenarios entail. Some acknowledge that these scenarios indicate >>> that psychological continuity is not sufficient for person >>> identity. "These commentators typically complement their >>> psychological theory with a non-branching proviso and/or a closest >>> continuer clause. The former states that even though X would >>> survive as Y1 or Y2 if the other did not exist, given that the >>> other does exist, X ceases to exist." This might be problematic, >>> however, and we could avoid some problems by adding a closest- >>> continuer or best candidate clause, stating roughly that the best >>> candidate for survival in a duplication scenario, that is, the >>> duplicate which bears the most or the most important resemblances >>> to the original person X, is identical with X." For instance, if >>> the original survives the duplication, he is the closest continuer >>> and hence uniquely identical to the original. >>> >>> And so on. As I have said, the philosophical literature on >>> personal identity is extensive and quite complex. The idea of >>> transitivity of personal identity does seem to be central, so >>> duplication cases are often problematic. >>> >>> Parfit's analysis seems to suggest that the duplication scenarios, >>> since they violate transitivity, entail that the original that is >>> being duplicated does not survive the duplication. However, in the >>> duplication case with two copies, Y1 and Y2, although the original >>> X dies, having two survivors identical to the original is even >>> better that being identical to just one survivor. "Generally, >>> according to Parfit, psychological continuity with any reliable >>> cause matters in survival, and since personal identity does not >>> consist merely in psychological continuity with any reliable >>> cause, personal identity is not what matters in survival." >>> >>> Whatever line one takes with respect to personal identity in >>> general, and in duplication cases in particular, it seems clear >>> that the simple psychological account of personal identity is >>> insufficient to survive all the difficulties. Abandoning the >>> transitivity of identity is difficult in general because it is >>> precisely that transitivity that gives us a reliable notion of the >>> continuity of personhood through time. The things that might seem >>> to violate transitivity in duplication (copies in separate >>> locations, etc, that is, non-psychological differences), also >>> would give violations of transitivity relating copies of the same >>> person at different times and places. We need a principled account >>> of exactly what leads to the violation of transitivity in one case >>> and not in the other. That is why I still think that the original >>> is the continuation if not deleted during duplication, and the >>> duplicate in that case is simply a new separate person -- sharing >>> some background and memories with the original, for sure, but >>> actually a different person. Identical twins can share many >>> memories and other characteristics without us ever thinking that >>> they are two copies of the same person. If the original is deleted >>> during duplication, then two new distinct individuals are created. >>> >>> In this way, the important principles of identity, such as >>> congruence and transitivity, are respected in all cases. >> >> But then computationalism is made false. > > So computationalism is false. Is that a problem outside a very > narrow circle of believers? As Diderot understood, computationalism (or the older Mechanism) is what make rationalism possible. Non computationalism is believed by creationist, or by those who invoke opportunistic magic to stop any argument going against some fairy tales type of belief they would like to keep. Anyway, my goal was just to show that IF computationalism is correct, then physicalism is false, and that we can test computationalism by looking at the physics extracted from arithmetical self-reference, and as it fits we get, for the first time I think, an explanation of where quanta, and qualia, comes from, based on very few assumptions (Robinson arithmetic). This means that the evidences are in favor of computationalism and not on (weak) materialism, for which there are no evidences at all. Bruno > > Bruce > > >> With computationalism, or with Everett, the duplication illustrates >> the non transitivity of 1p identity. There is no problem with this, >> other than eventually justifying the physical laws by arithmetical >> self-reference. And this is confirmed by the fact that the logic of >> alternatives continuation in that frame gives exactly what we >> expect: a quantum logic. >> >> Bruno > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > Groups "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, > send an email to everything-<a target="_blank" > href="mailto:list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com";>list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com</a>. > To post to this group, send email to everything-<a target="_blank" > href="mailto:l...@googlegroups.com";>l...@googlegroups.com</a>. > Visit this group at <a target="_blank" > href="https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list";>https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list</a>. > For more options, visit <a target="_blank" > href="https://groups.google.com/d/optout";>https://groups.google.com/d/optout</a>. <a target="_blank" href="http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/";>http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/</a> -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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