On 19 Jul 2016, at 13:39, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 19/07/2016 5:58 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 19 Jul 2016, at 09:41, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 19/07/2016 5:28 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 19 Jul 2016, at 06:58, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 19/07/2016 2:18 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 18 Jul 2016, at 03:54, Bruce Kellett wrote:
As you say in another post, computationalism depends on the
breakdown of transitivity for personal identity: M is the same
as H; W is the same as H; but M is not the same as W. Given
this, you have all sorts of problems with the nature of
personal identity -- maybe it is not a modal concept! I will
talk more about this in reply to your other post.
Well, the machine notion of 3p-self can be defined in
arithmetic, and all correct machine knows that her 1p-self is
not. Sure it is a tricky notion, but the non transitivity is
not a problem, as the "Parfit person series" will work
transitively in all cases, except when duplication occurs, but
why would that cause any problem, you tell me. Nothing here
threats the validity of the reasoning leading to the reversal
physics/arithmetic. I think you confused non transitivity (the
failing of some transitive link) with intransitivity (the
failing of all transitive link). With self-duplication, we lost
transitivity in one case, but both surviver recover it as long
as they do'nt duplicate again, and so the old guy who stayed in
Moscow remains the same young guy who teleported at Moscow
through some duplication a long time ago. You might elaborate
on your problem, as I don't see any.
I think a relation is either transitive or it is intransitive:
personal identity is a transitive relation; 'father of' is an
intransitive relation. You can't be 'half-pregnant', as it were.
I quote from Wikipedia on personal identity:
"Generally, personal identity is the unique numerical identity
of a person in the course of time. That is, the necessary and
sufficient conditions under which a person at one time and a
person at another time can be said to be the same person,
persisting through time."
And from the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy: www.iep.utm.edu/person-i/
"Personal identity is an instance of the relation of numerical
identity; investigations into the nature of the former,
therefore, must respect the formal properties that govern the
latter. The concept of identity is uniquely defined by (a) the
logical laws of congruence: if X is identical with Y, then all
non-relational properties borne by X are borne by Y, or formally
"A(x,y)[(x = y) --> (Fx = Fy)]; and (b) reflexivity: every X is
identical with itself, or formally "Ax(x = x). (Note that
congruence and reflexivity entail that identity is symmetric,
"A(x,y)[(x = y) --> (y = x)], and transitive, "A(x,y,z)[((x = y)
& (y = z)) --> (x = z)]."
And later in the same article:
"Should fission be an acceptable scenario, it presents problems
for the psychological approach in particular. The fission
outcomes Y1 and Y2 are both psychologically continuous with X.
According to the psychological approach, therefore, they are
both identical with X. By congruence, however, they are not
identical with each other: Y1 and Y2 share many properties, but
even at the very time the fission operation is completed differ
with regard to others, such as spatio-temporal location.
Consequently fission cases seem to show that the psychological
approach entails that a thing could be identical with two non-
identical things, which of course violates the transitivity of
identity."
Fission, in this case, is equivalent to the duplication
protocols under consideration in this discussion. There does not
seem to be any widely agreed resolution of the problems that the
duplication scenarios entail. Some acknowledge that these
scenarios indicate that psychological continuity is not
sufficient for person identity. "These commentators typically
complement their psychological theory with a non-branching
proviso and/or a closest continuer clause. The former states
that even though X would survive as Y1 or Y2 if the other did
not exist, given that the other does exist, X ceases to exist."
This might be problematic, however, and we could avoid some
problems by adding a closest-continuer or best candidate clause,
stating roughly that the best candidate for survival in a
duplication scenario, that is, the duplicate which bears the
most or the most important resemblances to the original person
X, is identical with X." For instance, if the original survives
the duplication, he is the closest continuer and hence uniquely
identical to the original.
And so on. As I have said, the philosophical literature on
personal identity is extensive and quite complex. The idea of
transitivity of personal identity does seem to be central, so
duplication cases are often problematic.
Parfit's analysis seems to suggest that the duplication
scenarios, since they violate transitivity, entail that the
original that is being duplicated does not survive the
duplication. However, in the duplication case with two copies,
Y1 and Y2, although the original X dies, having two survivors
identical to the original is even better that being identical to
just one survivor. "Generally, according to Parfit,
psychological continuity with any reliable cause matters in
survival, and since personal identity does not consist merely in
psychological continuity with any reliable cause, personal
identity is not what matters in survival."
Whatever line one takes with respect to personal identity in
general, and in duplication cases in particular, it seems clear
that the simple psychological account of personal identity is
insufficient to survive all the difficulties. Abandoning the
transitivity of identity is difficult in general because it is
precisely that transitivity that gives us a reliable notion of
the continuity of personhood through time. The things that might
seem to violate transitivity in duplication (copies in separate
locations, etc, that is, non-psychological differences), also
would give violations of transitivity relating copies of the
same person at different times and places. We need a principled
account of exactly what leads to the violation of transitivity
in one case and not in the other. That is why I still think that
the original is the continuation if not deleted during
duplication, and the duplicate in that case is simply a new
separate person -- sharing some background and memories with the
original, for sure, but actually a different person. Identical
twins can share many memories and other characteristics without
us ever thinking that they are two copies of the same person. If
the original is deleted during duplication, then two new
distinct individuals are created.
In this way, the important principles of identity, such as
congruence and transitivity, are respected in all cases.
But then computationalism is made false.
So computationalism is false. Is that a problem outside a very
narrow circle of believers?
As Diderot understood, computationalism (or the older Mechanism) is
what make rationalism possible. Non computationalism is believed by
creationist, or by those who invoke opportunistic magic to stop any
argument going against some fairy tales type of belief they would
like to keep.
This is a rather disappointing response to a relatively
straightforward attempt at philosophical analysis of some of the
issues at stake. Rather than engaging with the points that have been
made you resort to a generalized broad brush slander of those who
don't immediately accept your ideas.
I did in the previews posts. Just read them and debunk my analysis
there. Here I just recall that with the very weak form of
computationalism I am using, you need to make explicit the magic you
are using to throw out such a weak form of computationalism.
Just read the previews posts for *all* details.
Anyway, my goal was just to show that IF computationalism is
correct, then physicalism is false,
In which endeavour you have failed.
Where is the error? I have, and others too, reply to your critics. The
only reply you gave to such replies were vague and non specific. Or
perhaps you are convinced by thetable-knocking doubt argument? That
has been refuted centuries if not millenia ago. I have just no idea
of what is your critics. At which step of the UDA have you a trouble?
and that we can test computationalism by looking at the physics
extracted from arithmetical self-reference, and as it fits we get,
for the first time I think, an explanation of where quanta, and
qualia, comes from, based on very few assumptions (Robinson
arithmetic).
I have not seen any derivation or explanation of qualia -- where
does the sense of redness, for instance, appear in your analysis.
For this you need to study a bot of mathematical logic, so to that you
can understand the quanta and qualia logic. The qualia appears in
S4Grz1, in X1 and X1*. Quanta are shown, to be special cases of
sharable qualia, which is needed to be expected intuitively from the
UD Argument.
Your theory has not extracted any serious physics from anywhere at
all. The quantum is far from anything that you have come up with.
Why? I think you have shown that you do not grasp elementary computer
science, but the quanta and the qualia theory relies on advanced work
in the domain (notably the modal translation of quantum logic, and its
recovering from the intensional nuances brought by incompleteness on
the self-referential logics. You nedd to study the books of Mendelson
and Boolos, or to study french and read my self-contained version, but
it obviously ask for work.
The fact that you keep criticizing without reading put some doubt on
you will to understand.
This means that the evidences are in favor of computationalism and
not on (weak) materialism, for which there are no evidences at all.
You draw a false dichotomy: there are more possibilities than
computationalism and materialism. There is a great deal of evidence
for the success of empirical science -- more than you can show for
your theory.
It is the tehory of all universal machine believing in enough
induction axioms. It explains both quanta and qualia, unlike any
physical theory which brush away the problem since 1500 years. And it
is confirmed by the facts up to now. But you need to study it in more
detail to appreciate this.
Then, saying that Mechanism + Materialism leads to a contradiction is
not the same as saying that there is only mechanism or materialism. It
means only that we can believe in both, like many materialists (if not
all) believe.
You have frequently asked for arguments against computationalism,
Only to those who claims that it is false.
and claim that no serious criticism has ever been offered. But when
some substantive criticism of ideas that are at the heart of your
argument is presented, you do not engage, but retreat to vague
generalities. This does not inspire confidence.
I think you are just lying here. You are the one to whom we can't
answer, very often, due to the absence of a specific critics, and a
boring ad hominem sequence of insults in disguise.
Tell me at which step of the UDA you have a problem. That is still
unclear to me, and I guess to anyone following this list.
Bruno
Bruce
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