On 19 Jul 2016, at 09:41, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 19/07/2016 5:28 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 19 Jul 2016, at 06:58, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 19/07/2016 2:18 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 18 Jul 2016, at 03:54, Bruce Kellett wrote:
As you say in another post, computationalism depends on the
breakdown of transitivity for personal identity: M is the same
as H; W is the same as H; but M is not the same as W. Given
this, you have all sorts of problems with the nature of personal
identity -- maybe it is not a modal concept! I will talk more
about this in reply to your other post.
Well, the machine notion of 3p-self can be defined in arithmetic,
and all correct machine knows that her 1p-self is not. Sure it is
a tricky notion, but the non transitivity is not a problem, as
the "Parfit person series" will work transitively in all cases,
except when duplication occurs, but why would that cause any
problem, you tell me. Nothing here threats the validity of the
reasoning leading to the reversal physics/arithmetic. I think you
confused non transitivity (the failing of some transitive link)
with intransitivity (the failing of all transitive link). With
self-duplication, we lost transitivity in one case, but both
surviver recover it as long as they do'nt duplicate again, and so
the old guy who stayed in Moscow remains the same young guy who
teleported at Moscow through some duplication a long time ago.
You might elaborate on your problem, as I don't see any.
I think a relation is either transitive or it is intransitive:
personal identity is a transitive relation; 'father of' is an
intransitive relation. You can't be 'half-pregnant', as it were.
I quote from Wikipedia on personal identity:
"Generally, personal identity is the unique numerical identity of
a person in the course of time. That is, the necessary and
sufficient conditions under which a person at one time and a
person at another time can be said to be the same person,
persisting through time."
And from the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy: www.iep.utm.edu/person-i/
"Personal identity is an instance of the relation of numerical
identity; investigations into the nature of the former, therefore,
must respect the formal properties that govern the latter. The
concept of identity is uniquely defined by (a) the logical laws of
congruence: if X is identical with Y, then all non-relational
properties borne by X are borne by Y, or formally "A(x,y)[(x = y)
--> (Fx = Fy)]; and (b) reflexivity: every X is identical with
itself, or formally "Ax(x = x). (Note that congruence and
reflexivity entail that identity is symmetric, "A(x,y)[(x = y) -->
(y = x)], and transitive, "A(x,y,z)[((x = y) & (y = z)) --> (x =
z)]."
And later in the same article:
"Should fission be an acceptable scenario, it presents problems
for the psychological approach in particular. The fission outcomes
Y1 and Y2 are both psychologically continuous with X. According to
the psychological approach, therefore, they are both identical
with X. By congruence, however, they are not identical with each
other: Y1 and Y2 share many properties, but even at the very time
the fission operation is completed differ with regard to others,
such as spatio-temporal location. Consequently fission cases seem
to show that the psychological approach entails that a thing could
be identical with two non-identical things, which of course
violates the transitivity of identity."
Fission, in this case, is equivalent to the duplication protocols
under consideration in this discussion. There does not seem to be
any widely agreed resolution of the problems that the duplication
scenarios entail. Some acknowledge that these scenarios indicate
that psychological continuity is not sufficient for person
identity. "These commentators typically complement their
psychological theory with a non-branching proviso and/or a closest
continuer clause. The former states that even though X would
survive as Y1 or Y2 if the other did not exist, given that the
other does exist, X ceases to exist." This might be problematic,
however, and we could avoid some problems by adding a closest-
continuer or best candidate clause, stating roughly that the best
candidate for survival in a duplication scenario, that is, the
duplicate which bears the most or the most important resemblances
to the original person X, is identical with X." For instance, if
the original survives the duplication, he is the closest continuer
and hence uniquely identical to the original.
And so on. As I have said, the philosophical literature on
personal identity is extensive and quite complex. The idea of
transitivity of personal identity does seem to be central, so
duplication cases are often problematic.
Parfit's analysis seems to suggest that the duplication scenarios,
since they violate transitivity, entail that the original that is
being duplicated does not survive the duplication. However, in the
duplication case with two copies, Y1 and Y2, although the original
X dies, having two survivors identical to the original is even
better that being identical to just one survivor. "Generally,
according to Parfit, psychological continuity with any reliable
cause matters in survival, and since personal identity does not
consist merely in psychological continuity with any reliable
cause, personal identity is not what matters in survival."
Whatever line one takes with respect to personal identity in
general, and in duplication cases in particular, it seems clear
that the simple psychological account of personal identity is
insufficient to survive all the difficulties. Abandoning the
transitivity of identity is difficult in general because it is
precisely that transitivity that gives us a reliable notion of the
continuity of personhood through time. The things that might seem
to violate transitivity in duplication (copies in separate
locations, etc, that is, non-psychological differences), also
would give violations of transitivity relating copies of the same
person at different times and places. We need a principled account
of exactly what leads to the violation of transitivity in one case
and not in the other. That is why I still think that the original
is the continuation if not deleted during duplication, and the
duplicate in that case is simply a new separate person -- sharing
some background and memories with the original, for sure, but
actually a different person. Identical twins can share many
memories and other characteristics without us ever thinking that
they are two copies of the same person. If the original is deleted
during duplication, then two new distinct individuals are created.
In this way, the important principles of identity, such as
congruence and transitivity, are respected in all cases.
But then computationalism is made false.
So computationalism is false. Is that a problem outside a very
narrow circle of believers?
As Diderot understood, computationalism (or the older Mechanism) is
what make rationalism possible. Non computationalism is believed by
creationist, or by those who invoke opportunistic magic to stop any
argument going against some fairy tales type of belief they would like
to keep.
Anyway, my goal was just to show that IF computationalism is correct,
then physicalism is false, and that we can test computationalism by
looking at the physics extracted from arithmetical self-reference, and
as it fits we get, for the first time I think, an explanation of where
quanta, and qualia, comes from, based on very few assumptions
(Robinson arithmetic).
This means that the evidences are in favor of computationalism and not
on (weak) materialism, for which there are no evidences at all.
Bruno
Bruce
With computationalism, or with Everett, the duplication illustrates
the non transitivity of 1p identity. There is no problem with this,
other than eventually justifying the physical laws by arithmetical
self-reference. And this is confirmed by the fact that the logic of
alternatives continuation in that frame gives exactly what we
expect: a quantum logic.
Bruno
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