On 8/3/2016 7:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 02 Aug 2016, at 20:52, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/2/2016 6:15 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
It's not that it can't, but rather that it doesn't, and if it does
then that would require some extra physical explanation, a radio
link between brains or something.
That's what I mean by illegitimately appealing to physics while
claiming that physics must be derived from computation of consciousness.
Are you OK with Clark's answer to question 1?
What about question 2?
I've given up following your exchanges with Clark. They seem to be
about semantics. I don't see any problem with your arguments there,
except recognizing that it is an assumption that duplicated brains will
have separate consciousness. That's probably true, based on a
physicalist model. Whether it is probable on a computationalist model
is less clear.
You argument is not valid, here. We can make local assumption, and
then eliminate them later, which is done in this case in step 7 (with
or without step 8).
You can't make a "local" assumption in step 3, use it to argue for step
7 and then use truth of step 7 as evidence for the assumption in step
3. That's circular
Brent
Let us not go to much quickly. The "Holiday exercise" is about step 3
only. It does not presuppose a primary physical reality. Only a
physical reality, which later is shown as possibly existing, but non
primary. But that is for later. Just tell me if you are OK with the
question 1, and the principle exposed in question 2.
Bruno
Brent
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