On 03 Aug 2016, at 21:01, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/3/2016 7:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 02 Aug 2016, at 20:52, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/2/2016 6:15 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
It's not that it can't, but rather that it doesn't, and if it
does then that would require some extra physical explanation, a
radio link between brains or something.
That's what I mean by illegitimately appealing to physics while
claiming that physics must be derived from computation of
consciousness.
Are you OK with Clark's answer to question 1?
What about question 2?
I've given up following your exchanges with Clark. They seem to be
about semantics.
It is enough to interpret "gibberish" by "I have no more argument".
I don't see any problem with your arguments there,
OK.
except recognizing that it is an assumption that duplicated brains
will have separate consciousness.
I don't use the term consciousness, except in the replies of those who
does.
I need only that the duplicated memories (diaries) get the notice or
the imprint of the memory of seeing Moscow (respectively Washington).
And that follows trivially from the digital mechanist assumption DM,
or from P=1 (conditioned by DM and the default hypotheses). "P=1"
itself will be shwon to belong to G* minus G. It needs an act of faith.
It is not relevant, at this stage, to identify or not "I see Moscow"
in the first person sense, with "I am conscious that I see Moscow".
To get the reversal, the differentiation of the first person diaries
is quite enough. OK?
That's probably true, based on a physicalist model. Whether it is
probable on a computationalist model is less clear.
You survive intact, with your eyes intact, and the first person
discourse is defined by the memory of the outcome of the first person
self-localization. They do both see different cities. Assuming DM, it
is plain obvious that the first person discourse (and consciousness)
differentiate. If each copy repeat the experience 10 times, the many
first person discourses available will differentiate into 2^10
discourses, from the guy with the (conscious) first person experience
WWWWWWWWWW to the guy with the first person conscious first person
experience MMMMMMMMMM, and the 1022 (conscious) first person
experience in between.
It is irrelevant if we talk about an emulation of all this in
arithmetic or in some physical reality. We need only to assume some
stable relative number relations, like, notably, physicists measures
and extrapolate through physical assumption usually expressed in
mathematical formula.
I use physics like Turing made its machine looking physical, unlike
Church Lamdda calculus, or Robinson Arithmetic.
You argument is not valid, here. We can make local assumption, and
then eliminate them later, which is done in this case in step 7
(with or without step 8).
You can't make a "local" assumption in step 3, use it to argue for
step 7 and then use truth of step 7 as evidence for the assumption
in step 3. That's circular
I don't do that at all.
I assume a physical reality, to make things easier. I do not assume it
to be primary, and the contradiction that we will obtain is only with
the idea that such a physical reality is primary and that it is the
selector of the (conscious) histories.
There is no problem at all with physics. I would not have taken so
much time to show that DM is empirically testable if I did not believe
in a physical reality, and in its importance for searching truth.
The problem is only with physicalism (and with weak materialism).
Let us discuss step seven when everybody agree on step 3.
Oh! I see other post by you. I comment them here.
No, because the physical assumption is eliminated at step 7.
But I don't think that step is correct. As I've argued several
times I don't think there can be consciousness without a physical
context.
And as I replied, you are correct. But that is non relevant for the
understanding of the reversal imposed by DM..
The point is that the physical context does not need to be primary for
having consciousness.
The physical context is, so to speak, one half historico-geographical,
and one half theological, where theological means, here, the unknown
first person result of the infinitely many universal numbers which
competes (in elementary arithmetic) to bring your most probable
continuations.
It is the many computations interpretation of arithmetic made by the
universal numbers in arithmetic. That is testable, and the MWI of QM
confirmed, intuitively, and formally.
You need to understand that the models (the intended realities/meaning
in the logician sense of model) of Robinson arithmetic realize or
emulate all computations. That is the part I have been asked to
suppress in my french thesis as that is too much well known, and
trivial, once we assume the Church-Post-Kleene-Turing thesis.
But it is "trivial" only for theoretical computer scientists and
mathematical logicians, I guess.
I got the feeling that you attribute me an assumption which is only a
theorem in Peano Arithmetic (the existence of the universal numbers
and their relations with the arithmetical reality).
Bruno
Brent
Let us not go to much quickly. The "Holiday exercise" is about step
3 only. It does not presuppose a primary physical reality. Only a
physical reality, which later is shown as possibly existing, but
non primary. But that is for later. Just tell me if you are OK with
the question 1, and the principle exposed in question 2.
Bruno
Brent
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