On 3/08/2016 12:01 pm, Russell Standish wrote:
On Tue, Aug 02, 2016 at 06:55:58PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 02 Aug 2016, at 14:40, Bruce Kellett wrote:
I suggest that for step 3 to go through, you need to demonstrate
that computationalism requires that a single consciousness cannot
inhabit two or more separate physical bodies: without such a
demonstration you cannot conclude that W&M is not a possible
outcome that the duplicated person could experience. You must
demonstrate that different inputs lead to a differentiation of the
consciousnesses in the duplication case, while not so
differentiating the consciousness of a single person. The required
demonstration must be based on the assumptions of computationalism
alone, you cannot rely on physics that is not yet in evidence.
Computationalism refutes that claim immediately. Take the WM-
duplication experience, maybe the virtual case to make the
reconstitution box as much numerically identical than the copies of
the body (at the relevant digital level). Or just suppose the atom
in the reconstitution box does not distinguish the first person
experiences. In such a case, after the guy pushed on the button in
Helsinki, he will find itself with once consciousness, emulated in
two places at once. So one consciousness inhabits two physical
separated brains, and as I explained you in my preceding posts, the
understanding of this is part of the understanding of the FPI (step
3) and the sequel. Eventually, one consciousness is emulated in
infinitely many different numerical relations in arithmetic, and the
bodies appearances will emerge from that.
You asked me something impossible, contradicting comp immediately,
and which would be a problem for the sequel of the reasoning. It is
a bit weird.
Hi Bruce,
I'm not satisfied with Bruno's answer here, so let me try my
perspective. Computational supervenience states that two
counterfactually equivalent computations must instantiate the same
conscious state. Obviously it is possible for two inequivalent
computations to instantiate the same state, even computations passing
through different sets of states, which is clearly the case in step 3.
However, we are being asked to consider two conscious states where the
conscious state differs by at least one bit - the W/M bit. Clearly, by the YD
assumption, both states are survivor states from the original
conscious state, but are not the same consciousness because of the
single bit difference.
By that reasoning, no consciousness survives through time.
Bruce
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