I think that time (and physicality) within 1p is sufficient, if there have a large enough plurality of interacting finite minds. What I have trouble with DM is that it is not obvious where we get that plurality. I still suspect that a weak version of Tennenbaum's theorem could solve this problem, but we may lose Turing completeness. I would happily trade completeness for correctness.
http://mathoverflow.net/questions/38160/computable-nonstandard-models-for-weak-systems-of-arithemtic/121252 On Thu, Sep 15, 2016 at 1:30 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > On 15 Sep 2016, at 13:44, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > On 15 September 2016 at 05:25, Stephen Paul King < > stephe...@provensecure.com> wrote: > >> Hi Stathis, >> >> I really like this explanation of supervenience. I only worry that we >> need a lot more detail, of how exactly "A and B are unaffected if the >> timing, order or duration of a and b are changed." works. AFAIK, this >> requirement looks a lot like mutual independence, but it clearly can not >> be. There must be a non-zero probability of transitions within the >> processes at each level of the tower, something like a 'time' at each. >> > > Information about timing, order or duration of a and b that does not > change a and b cannot change A and B either. This follows from the > definition of supervenience. > > >> >> That brings me to my next question: Where do we get the inequality of >> entropy when it is NOT at equilibrium for a system. Deriving an arrow of >> time is not just a matter of figuring out how to chain labels in observer >> moments, we need an actual transition from one state to another in our >> theory. >> Does anyone here have a nice explanation of Markov Processes that they >> could point me to? >> > > If there are real processes occurring in real time, this is not > necessarily relevant to the supervenient mental processes. A future mental > state could be computed in real time before a past mental state; it could > have happened to you right now, and you wouldn't know. Thus, even if there > is a real world, with real time and an arrow of time, the subjective world > is timeless. > > > OK. In the 3-1 picture, where we look at the cloud of true (and prouvable) > sigma_1 sentences, that seems quite reasonable. > > Before smoking salvia, I would have added: but *only* in the 3-1 picture. > I would have defended the idea that in the 1p picture, the (1p) subjective > experience is bounded to get some duration/subjective-time aspects, like > Brouwer, Bergson, Dogen and other Heracliteans seemed to claim, and even > like the universal machine seems to claim ([]p & p, the 1p, leads to a > logic of intuitionist time) but salvia succeeded in making me doubt about > this. Salvia can be *quite* dissociative. > > Still today, I doubt that consciousness without time makes subjective > sense, but I believe there might be an altered consciousness state where we > feel to live the contrary. Coming back from that state is a highly > surprising and highly confusing experience. We can memorize only a piece of > that coming back. > > Bruno > > > > -- > Stathis Papaioannou > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the > Google Groups "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/ > topic/everything-list/FnHZFBf-Acw/unsubscribe. > To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- Kindest Regards, Stephen Paul King Senior Researcher Mobile: (864) 567-3099 stephe...@provensecure.com http://www.provensecure.us/ “This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law or may be constituted as attorney work product. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any use, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this message in error, notify sender immediately and delete this message immediately.” -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
