On 15 Sep 2016, at 19:38, Stephen Paul King wrote:
I think that time (and physicality) within 1p is sufficient, if
there have a large enough plurality of interacting finite minds.
What I have trouble with DM is that it is not obvious where we get
that plurality. I still suspect that a weak version of Tennenbaum's
theorem could solve this problem, but we may lose Turing
completeness. I would happily trade completeness for correctness.
http://mathoverflow.net/questions/38160/computable-nonstandard-models-for-weak-systems-of-arithemtic/121252
Tennenbaum theorem does not make us losing Turing-completeness. Quite
the contrary, we escape the bound of the computable, which belongs to
all intepretation of arithmetic, standard and non standard as well.
We would loose computationalism, in some sense.
Bruno
On Thu, Sep 15, 2016 at 1:30 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
On 15 Sep 2016, at 13:44, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 15 September 2016 at 05:25, Stephen Paul King <stephe...@provensecure.com
> wrote:
Hi Stathis,
I really like this explanation of supervenience. I only worry
that we need a lot more detail, of how exactly "A and B are
unaffected if the timing, order or duration of a and b are
changed." works. AFAIK, this requirement looks a lot like mutual
independence, but it clearly can not be. There must be a non-zero
probability of transitions within the processes at each level of
the tower, something like a 'time' at each.
Information about timing, order or duration of a and b that does
not change a and b cannot change A and B either. This follows from
the definition of supervenience.
That brings me to my next question: Where do we get the
inequality of entropy when it is NOT at equilibrium for a system.
Deriving an arrow of time is not just a matter of figuring out how
to chain labels in observer moments, we need an actual transition
from one state to another in our theory.
Does anyone here have a nice explanation of Markov Processes
that they could point me to?
If there are real processes occurring in real time, this is not
necessarily relevant to the supervenient mental processes. A future
mental state could be computed in real time before a past mental
state; it could have happened to you right now, and you wouldn't
know. Thus, even if there is a real world, with real time and an
arrow of time, the subjective world is timeless.
OK. In the 3-1 picture, where we look at the cloud of true (and
prouvable) sigma_1 sentences, that seems quite reasonable.
Before smoking salvia, I would have added: but *only* in the 3-1
picture. I would have defended the idea that in the 1p picture, the
(1p) subjective experience is bounded to get some duration/
subjective-time aspects, like Brouwer, Bergson, Dogen and other
Heracliteans seemed to claim, and even like the universal machine
seems to claim ([]p & p, the 1p, leads to a logic of intuitionist
time) but salvia succeeded in making me doubt about this. Salvia can
be *quite* dissociative.
Still today, I doubt that consciousness without time makes
subjective sense, but I believe there might be an altered
consciousness state where we feel to live the contrary. Coming back
from that state is a highly surprising and highly confusing
experience. We can memorize only a piece of that coming back.
Bruno
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