> On 9 Sep 2020, at 07:51, Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 14:56, Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com > <mailto:bhkellet...@gmail.com>> wrote: > On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 2:49 PM Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com > <mailto:stath...@gmail.com>> wrote: > On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 12:35, Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com > <mailto:bhkellet...@gmail.com>> wrote: > On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 12:32 PM Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com > <mailto:stath...@gmail.com>> wrote: > On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 11:53, Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com > <mailto:bhkellet...@gmail.com>> wrote: > On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 11:39 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <everything-list@googlegroups.com <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> > wrote: > On 9/8/2020 6:14 PM, smitra wrote: > > On 09-09-2020 02:16, Bruce Kellett wrote: > > >> I don't find that answer convincing, because of the implicit dualist > >> assumption. A perfectly reasonable answer to the question asked the > >> night before duplication is: "I won't be in a room tomorrow morning, > >> because when I am duplicated with 100 continuers, I cease to exist and > >> each of the continuers becomes a new, separate person. This is because > >> there is a tie among the continuers, with no closest continuer. In > >> that situation, the original ceases, and the continuers are separate > >> persons." > >> > >> Now you might not like this answer, but it is perfectly coherent and > >> rational. It has the great advantage that it avoids the stench of > >> dualism that hangs over your theory. > >> > >> Bruce > >> > > > > The tie will be broken by small random fluctuations in the physical > > states of the copies. > > Dualism would imply that one and only one of the duplicates has your > soul and is "you". I see no problem is just saying they are Bruce > Kellet-1, Bruce Kellet-2,... Bruce Kellet-100. They all remember the > bet, and assuming their stake is duplicated too, they each either get > $100 or lose $25. The existence of more than one Bruce Kellet certainly > creates problems in law and language. But law and language are invented > to deal with reality, not define it. > > > You are right about what dualism implies. So if you ask the question of the > person the night before duplication, it has no answer unless you assume > dualism. I think you are right about multiple BKs: BK1, BK2,... and so on. > These are different persons who share some memories with the BK of the night > before. Closest continuer theory works well in these duplication scenarios, > despite the fact that people on this list seem averse to that theory for some > undefined reason. > > You could say that any suggestion that one of the BK's is a continuation of > the original, even when there is only one BK extant at any time, implies > dualism. > > > Not on the closest continuer theory. If there is a tie, there is no unique > closest continuer. If there is only one continuer, he is necessarily the > closest. Dualism is not required. > > But why should the closest continuer be a continuation of the person rather > than the next-closest continuer, unless the soul has a preference for it? > > Be a dualist if you want to. But the closest continuer theory is a convention > designed to resolve questions of personal identity in cases of personal > duplication, absent a "soul". Arbitrary random selections are not as > satisfactory. > > I'm not a dualist. I think there is no metaphysical basis for continuity of > identity, it is just a psychological construct.
That is a bit dangerous, and on the verge of reductionism. I understand why you say this in this context, but the psychological constructs must be taken seriously. The physical reality itself will become a first person plural psychological construct too. I am not sure if you have understood that we need some arithmetical realism just to define precisely what is a digital machine, and o enunciate the Church-Turing thesis, but then we need to take into account the fact that all computations are emulated by that minimal amount of arithmetic that we have supposed. I know that Parfit called “mechanism” “reductionism”, but Mechanism is in reality a powerful vaccine against reductionism, beginning by the reductionist conception of machine and number. With Mechanism, we do have an ontological reductionism: only numbers exist, with only two simple laws: addition and multiplication. Then the physical reality emerges as a first person plural persistent sharable interfering web of histories, which is confirmed by quantum mechanics without collapse, up to now. It is the believer in a “physical reality out there” to explain how it manage to make some computations more real than other. It is up to them to show some evidence for that belief. This requires to abandon digital mechanism eventually. If you or anyone have still a problem with this, I can explain more. This is known since the 1930s, but ignored by many. Bruno PS I will certainly say more on this, but now I have hundred of exam copies to note... > > -- > Stathis Papaioannou > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAH%3D2ypWWG1%2BTwaBqC5GfBp1xXmaHFXj54rG_0yeRjth2gTUmuw%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAH%3D2ypWWG1%2BTwaBqC5GfBp1xXmaHFXj54rG_0yeRjth2gTUmuw%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/C5D53CB6-41CB-4118-9E6C-A2E2BE563161%40ulb.ac.be.
