> On 9 Sep 2020, at 02:16, Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com> wrote: > > On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 10:06 AM Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com > <mailto:stath...@gmail.com>> wrote: > On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 09:00, Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com > <mailto:bhkellet...@gmail.com>> wrote: > On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 8:14 AM Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com > <mailto:stath...@gmail.com>> wrote: > On Tue, 8 Sep 2020 at 22:10, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com > <mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com>> wrote: > On Mon, Sep 7, 2020 at 6:49 PM Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com > <mailto:stath...@gmail.com>> wrote: > > > The probability of interest is that one particular John Clark will see a > > prime number, not that some John Clark will see a prime number. A gambler > > who buys a lottery ticket is interested in the probability that one > > particular gambler will buy the winning ticket, not the probability that > > some gambler will buy the winning ticket > > BEFORE the duplication "one particular John Clark" and "some John Clark" are > exactly the same person, that is Bruno's Mr.You, that is the person Bruno > makes his bet with. Thus AFTER the duplication the identity of Mr.You becomes > completely ambiguous, there is now no way to tell who he made the bet with, > or how to determine the outcome and figure out who won and who lost. And > that's why Bruno loves personal pronouns so much and refuses to stop using > them, they can be used to sweep logical contradictions and absurdities under > the rug, and that can be very useful if the towering logical edifice of your > theory is built on a foundation of sand. The only way Bruno can stop using > personal pronouns is by means of Bruno's patented peepee terminology and > start talking about THE First Person Perspective, when of course after the > duplication there is no such thing as THE First Person Perspective, there is > only A First Person Perspective. > > > Nothing singles him out, one is picked at random out of the 100, > > But this entire thought experiment Is about what "you" can predict BEFORE the > duplication, Back then nobody can single anybody out because there is only > one John Clark. And this thought experiment is about what "you" can expect to > see, so the gambler must be Mr.You, so the gambler is also duplicated 100 > times. > > > and the question is asked, what is the probability that this particular one > > will see a prime number? > > I can predict today with 100% certainty that tomorrow AFTER the duplication > when the John Clark in room #11 walks out turns around and looks at the > number on his door he will see a prime number, but that is a very VERY long > way from the original ambiguous question that was asked BEFORE the > duplication, namely "AFTER the duplication what is the probability "you" will > see a prime number?". And that has no answer because it is not a question, > it's gibberish. > > I think what you and Bruce Kellett are perhaps objecting to is the dualist > idea that there is a unique John Clark soul, with the question of probability > with duplicates implicitly asking which one of the duplicates this soul will > fly into. We know that souls are delusional, and this applies to a single > world situation also. If you survive the night, it means that an entity > identifying as John Clark wakes up in your bed tomorrow morning, not that > your soul has persisted in the one body. If there are 100 John Clarks > tomorrow then John Clark has survived, because all it takes is one, and there > is a 25/100 probability that a randomly chosen John Clark will see a prime > number. This is the non-delusional interpretation of the question “what is > the probability that you will see a prime number?”. The “you” cannot refer to > a magical soul, because such a thing never existed in the first place. > > > I am certainly objecting to the perceived dualist assumption in your response > to the question (asked before duplication): "What is the probability that you > will see a prime number on your door when you wake tomorrow?". As JC points > out, by tomorrow there will be 100 individuals in the frame. Who is the "You" > to whom you posed the question yesterday? If the question in that form has an > answer, then you must assume that just one of the 100 individuals next > morning has inherited the soul of JC, and is the person to whom you > originally referred. By subtly changing the question so that you refer only > to asking the question of some random individual the next morning, you avoid > this dualist implication by essentially saying that the initial "You" > referred to, is the random individual you selected in the morning. If the two > questions are to be related at all, then you must make the dualist assumption. > > I have given you the non-dualist interpretation of the question: "what is the > probability that you will see a prime number tomorrow" is "what is the > probability that a randomly chosen John Clark will see a prime number". > Perhaps some people assume that a magical soul will fly into one, and only > one, of the John Clarks, but they are wrong, just as they are wrong about a > magical soul persisting in a single John Clark waking up in his bed normally, > ensuring that it is him and not someone who merely believes he is him. > > > I don't find that answer convincing, because of the implicit dualist > assumption. A perfectly reasonable answer to the question asked the night > before duplication is: "I won't be in a room tomorrow morning, because when I > am duplicated with 100 continuers, I cease to exist and each of the > continuers becomes a new, separate person. This is because there is a tie > among the continuers, with no closest continuer. In that situation, the > original ceases, and the continuers are separate persons." > > Now you might not like this answer, but it is perfectly coherent and > rational. It has the great advantage that it avoids the stench of dualism > that hangs over your theory.
It eliminates the first person. It is rational to save materialism, but you need indeed, to save the closest continuer theory, to negate Digital Mechanism, where the notion of exact copies at the relevant level makes senseless the notion of a unique closest continuer, indeed. You are just negating mechanism, but this makes the soul into a magical thing, or into oblivion… The Mechanist here have agreed that the personal identity is in the memory of experience, and that all copies are genuine survivor. That is why they are all equal continuer, but as this cannot be experienced, that can only conclude that there is a first person indeterminacy, and indeed, similar to the one used by Everett. But then with Mechanism, we have to derive the wave from all computations realised in arithmetic. No universal machine can distinguish which universal machine run it, be it a subset of physical laws or elementary arithmetic. Hat makes mechanism testable, and indeed, not yet refuted thanks to Quantum Mechanics, where the superposition of histoires get deducible when we look to our body/environment close enough. Bruno > > Bruce > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLSUuOXkh3rAsBe%3DtC%2BqY2OqSu0Gh3OEj0KG9v2A4oxN%3DA%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLSUuOXkh3rAsBe%3DtC%2BqY2OqSu0Gh3OEj0KG9v2A4oxN%3DA%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/357997F3-225A-4A1A-9BB5-40EE52AB75E4%40ulb.ac.be.
