On Wednesday, September 9, 2020 at 11:38:32 AM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 9 Sep 2020, at 07:51, Stathis Papaioannou <stat...@gmail.com > <javascript:>> wrote: > > > > On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 14:56, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com > <javascript:>> wrote: > >> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 2:49 PM Stathis Papaioannou <stat...@gmail.com >> <javascript:>> wrote: >> >>> On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 12:35, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com >>> <javascript:>> wrote: >>> >>>> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 12:32 PM Stathis Papaioannou <stat...@gmail.com >>>> <javascript:>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 11:53, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com >>>>> <javascript:>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 11:39 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < >>>>>> everyth...@googlegroups.com <javascript:>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> On 9/8/2020 6:14 PM, smitra wrote: >>>>>>> > On 09-09-2020 02:16, Bruce Kellett wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >> I don't find that answer convincing, because of the implicit >>>>>>> dualist >>>>>>> >> assumption. A perfectly reasonable answer to the question asked >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> >> night before duplication is: "I won't be in a room tomorrow >>>>>>> morning, >>>>>>> >> because when I am duplicated with 100 continuers, I cease to >>>>>>> exist and >>>>>>> >> each of the continuers becomes a new, separate person. This is >>>>>>> because >>>>>>> >> there is a tie among the continuers, with no closest continuer. In >>>>>>> >> that situation, the original ceases, and the continuers are >>>>>>> separate >>>>>>> >> persons." >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> Now you might not like this answer, but it is perfectly coherent >>>>>>> and >>>>>>> >> rational. It has the great advantage that it avoids the stench of >>>>>>> >> dualism that hangs over your theory. >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> Bruce >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > The tie will be broken by small random fluctuations in the >>>>>>> physical >>>>>>> > states of the copies. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Dualism would imply that one and only one of the duplicates has your >>>>>>> soul and is "you". I see no problem is just saying they are Bruce >>>>>>> Kellet-1, Bruce Kellet-2,... Bruce Kellet-100. They all remember >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> bet, and assuming their stake is duplicated too, they each either >>>>>>> get >>>>>>> $100 or lose $25. The existence of more than one Bruce Kellet >>>>>>> certainly >>>>>>> creates problems in law and language. But law and language are >>>>>>> invented >>>>>>> to deal with reality, not define it. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> You are right about what dualism implies. So if you ask the question >>>>>> of the person the night before duplication, it has no answer unless you >>>>>> assume dualism. I think you are right about multiple BKs: BK1, BK2,... >>>>>> and >>>>>> so on. These are different persons who share some memories with the BK >>>>>> of >>>>>> the night before. Closest continuer theory works well in these >>>>>> duplication >>>>>> scenarios, despite the fact that people on this list seem averse to that >>>>>> theory for some undefined reason. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> You could say that any suggestion that one of the BK's is a >>>>> continuation of the original, even when there is only one BK extant at >>>>> any >>>>> time, implies dualism. >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Not on the closest continuer theory. If there is a tie, there is no >>>> unique closest continuer. If there is only one continuer, he is >>>> necessarily >>>> the closest. Dualism is not required. >>>> >>> >>> But why should the closest continuer be a continuation of the person >>> rather than the next-closest continuer, unless the soul has a preference >>> for it? >>> >> >> Be a dualist if you want to. But the closest continuer theory is a >> convention designed to resolve questions of personal identity in cases of >> personal duplication, absent a "soul". Arbitrary random selections are not >> as satisfactory. >> > > I'm not a dualist. I think there is no metaphysical basis for continuity > of identity, it is just a psychological construct. > > > > That is a bit dangerous, and on the verge of reductionism. I understand > why you say this in this context, but the psychological constructs must be > taken seriously. The physical reality itself will become a first person > plural psychological construct too. > > I am not sure if you have understood that we need some arithmetical > realism just to define precisely what is a digital machine, and o enunciate > the Church-Turing thesis, but then we need to take into account the fact > that all computations are emulated by that minimal amount of arithmetic > that we have supposed. > > I know that Parfit called “mechanism” “reductionism”, but Mechanism is in > reality a powerful vaccine against reductionism, beginning by the > reductionist conception of machine and number. > > With Mechanism, we do have an ontological reductionism: only numbers > exist, with only two simple laws: addition and multiplication. Then the > physical reality emerges as a first person plural persistent sharable > interfering web of histories, which is confirmed by quantum mechanics > without collapse, up to now. > > It is the believer in a “physical reality out there” to explain how it > manage to make some computations more real than other. It is up to them to > show some evidence for that belief. >
That's easy. For millennia, by the rules of your discourse, every person/number killing another with some weapon essentially states: "This computation is more real. This one." There's been too much evidence of that kind, and any form of determinism essentially justifies all of that evidence, citing some truth or realism á la "that's the way the dovetailer runs" in a fatalistic manner. This sort of relativism leads to forgone conclusions about the nature of life, essentially disintegrating any/all forms of violence, when science should pursue said nature of life with the hope of its optimization. I see this as evidence of ideology within your discourse, as "no ethics" with regards to numbers is mere nihilism/relativity/fatalism. Even if physics were obtained in a satisfying manner from self-reference, I'd tend towards interpretations that don't evaporate questions of violence, good, and evil for some relativism; as tricky as they may be... my hunch is that those questions related to the large variety of descriptions of selfhood/subject need further elaboration. > This requires to abandon digital mechanism eventually. > > If you or anyone have still a problem with this, I can explain more. This > is known since the 1930s, but ignored by many. > > Bruno > > PS I will certainly say more on this, but now I have hundred of exam > copies to note... > You have exam papers to grade now at the beginning of the school year? Or did those exams get teleported from Helsinki from before the virus (with some invariance for delays)? PGC -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/e99bd8c7-63f7-485c-8f09-776ffca0cb18o%40googlegroups.com.
