> On 10 Sep 2020, at 15:07, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote: > > On Thu, Sep 10, 2020 at 5:36 AM Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be > <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote: > > >>> It has a perfectly clear referent, > > >> If it were perfectly clear then why doesn't Bruno Marchal use the referent > >> in Bruno Marchal's thought experiments rather than a personal pronoun? > >> John Clark has been asking Bruno Marchal to do that for years but Bruno > >> Marchal absolutely refuses. > > >That is incorrect. I gave you the answer for year, but it asks for > >distinguishing the 1p and the 3p > > And that is absolutely positively 100% impossible because in a world where > self duplication is common place there is no such thing as THE first person.
That is equivalent to saying that when we undergo a self-duplication, and thus even just a brain transplant, we die. Because we all know *the* first person* we are, even after the WM duplication, the guy in W and the guy in M know perfectly who hey are, and know perfectly that they could not have predict in advance who they are feeling now. In Helsinki, reason prevents to predict that we will FEEL being two persons at once: indeed, in Helsinki you can predict with certainty that you (anyone doing the experience) will feel to be unique, and “the” refers to that unique person that we can only feel to be. The other copies are respectively doppelgänger to each other. > > >> And as John Clark has been saying for years, if "you" is duplicated then > >> there is no longer such a thing as "THE first person" there is only "A > >> first person”. > > > Exactly, and that is the reason why in Helsinki, the guy cannot have any > > certainty other that “W v M”, > > It's not just Helsinki, if self duplication is commonplace then the guy can't > be certain in Moscow or Washington or anywhere or at anytime about anything > as long as you keep talking gibberish like THE first person. Just push a little bit that line of thought, and you will eliminate consciousness, first person, etc. You are also predicting that if you look at the schroedinger cat, you die. > > > For both copies, “the first person” is the one in the mirror they see > > themselves in the city they feel to be in. > > Then I guess you don't think the Helsinki man of yesterday survived because > today there is nobody in Helsinki and the mirror there is blank. I don’t see how that follows. It would be like saying that John Clark is dead right now in all places he is absent. > I however think that Helsinki man has survived because today there are not > one but two people who remember being him yesterday. OK. But none get the feeling of his doppelgänger in any direct way. They have become two persons, with distinct and unique first person experience, and both are the H-man. Personal identity is not transitive. The HM and the HW are both the H person, but the HM and the HW are different person. > If I were the Helsinki man I'd say that's great, two is better than one. That is why we reproduce biologically already. We are some billions, or more if you remember that we are mammals. But the question is about predicting first person experience, independently of deciding who or what we really are, as long as we accept the “yes doctor” hypothesis. It is a simple fact that after reiterating the duplication a great number of times, the vast majority of personal memories will be algorthmically incompressible, and that the copies (who does not “feel the split”) will admit they can’t predict their immediate future (the first personal future which subsist given that we have admitted that we don’t die). > > > There are indeed two first person but each of them feel to be the first > > person > > Then I guess you've changed your mind after all these years and now believe > the first person Helsinki man will see both cities because this is all about > the Helsinki man, so the fact that the Washington man will not see Moscow is > irrelevant. The Helsinki man is the Washington man and the Washington man is > the Helsinki man, but the Washington man is not the Moscow man. That’s correct, and that is the reason why the Helsinki Man can predict with certainty that he will get a coffee cup in only once city, but without knowing in advance which one. You see, no ambiguity, just first person indeterminacy. You confuse 1-p, 3-1-p, 1-1-p, 3-3-p, etc. Bruno > > John K Clark > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv2tg7%3DgEYXSiSRJOE%3D%2BukpzSMGxr8t%3D4zJQPGyLG0n_BA%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv2tg7%3DgEYXSiSRJOE%3D%2BukpzSMGxr8t%3D4zJQPGyLG0n_BA%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/3B7ED14D-5E5A-4793-89CD-CA90A9614F29%40ulb.ac.be.
