--- In FairfieldLife@yahoogroups.com, "Xenophaneros Anartaxius" <anartaxius@...> wrote: > > You do realise Barry, that the pee theory is more difficult for us humans to > implement as it is much easier to apply it when standing on three legs rather > than on one, and especially at our age. :-)
Well, yes, you have to stop ;-) > > --- In FairfieldLife@yahoogroups.com, turquoiseb <no_reply@> wrote: > > > > --- In FairfieldLife@yahoogroups.com, "salyavin808" <fintlewoodlewix@> > > wrote: > > > > > > --- In FairfieldLife@yahoogroups.com, "Jason" <jedi_spock@> wrote: > > > > > > > > Xeno, a lot of Religionists and Spiritualists have > > > > misconceptions about Darwin. > > > > > > > > If you study evolution carefully, you will realise there is > > > > a perfect balance between determinism and randomness. It's > > > > not entirely deterministic and it's not entirely random > > > > either. > > > > > > > > There is a certain broad set of laws in evolution and within > > > > those laws some randomness plays a part. > > > > > > > > Religionists and Spiritualists confuse Darwin with > > > > metaphysics and mystisism. They think Darwin tries to > > > > replace it completely. Darwin as a theory only explains the > > > > mechanisms how life evolved and adapted. It states nothing > > > > about God or Consciousness. > > > > > > You hope. What it states is that god is uneccessary. > > > Consciousness evolved like everything else. All life on > > > this planet is descended from one cell, a hybrid between > > > two types of bacteria - which is all there was for > > > billions of years - there would be no complexity or > > > consciousness without that one chance event. That is > > > as hard a fact as you'll find, religious types can sit > > > around dreaming otherwise till the cows come home. > > > > When it comes to theories -- either about the "correctness" > > of one's cherished ideas or concepts or the degree to > > which one "holds the high ground" or "owns" one's opponents > > in a discussion about such things, I can think of no better > > metaphor than the one I just witnessed on my morning > > walk with my dogs. > > > > Every so often they'll feel the need to stop, lift a leg, > > and deposit their version of "Here I make my stand...this > > is MY territory, and MY version of The Theory Of Everything" > > on a bush or lamppost or bicycle or auto tire. They have > > such a pleased expression on their faces as they do this, > > similar to the expressions one imagines on the faces of > > FFLers as they deposit *their* cherished theories on the > > rest of us. One also senses a feeling of "completion," as > > if by peeing on that spot they've established their > > dominance FOREVER. > > > > But then I sit on a park bench and watch as other dogs > > come by, walking their owners. Each successive dog sniffs > > the air, senses a challenge to *their* view of Reality > > And How It Works, and then walks over and sniffs the > > actual pee-theory, "reading doggie email" as it were. > > Nine times out of ten the new dogs *disagree* with the > > first pee-theory, or with its claim of dominance, and > > insist on presenting their own. So they lift their legs or > > squat and present a counter-theory. The looks on their > > faces as they do this indicate that they *also* feel as > > if the discussion is now OVER, since they have presented > > the Ultimate Counter-Argument, and that nothing any other > > dog could...uh...express on the subject could possibly > > override their deposit of eternal wisdom. > > > > And so it goes. Each successive presentation of Unified > > Pee Theory is presented as if it's the Last Possible > > Word On The Subject, and "proves" the canine theory- > > holder supreme and unchallengeable. And each proves just > > as ephemeral as the last one. Sometimes dogs with Really > > Big Egos see other dogs daring to dispute their pee- > > theories with an "overspray," and feel compelled to go > > back to the same bush to reiterate their points, > > literally lifting their legs on those who dare to > > challenge them, and trying once more to establish > > dominance. > > > > And none of it lasts any longer than the next rainstorm. > > > > :-) > > > > > > --- "Xenophaneros Anartaxius" <anartaxius@> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > Robin, I just threw that review up there, and here you are with an > > > > > essay. The only thing I have read of Nagel's was that essay "What is > > > > > it Like to be a Bat?", and that was some 5 or 6 years ago. > > > > > Philosophers disagree, so whenever they write something, especially a > > > > > major work, you can be sure someone among their peers is going to > > > > > disagree. For example, If you recommend something and extol the > > > > > author, you can be sure someone will think something is rotten in the > > > > > state of Denmark. > > > > > > > > > > I think there is a realisation growing among scientists that > > > > > scientific theories are what are called 'effective theories'. For > > > > > example QED, quantum electro dynamics, is such a theory. It provides > > > > > a workable explanation for certain phenomena at a certain resolution, > > > > > but cannot explain anything beyond that level. QED cannot explain the > > > > > behaviour observed when protons are smashed together at high > > > > > velocity, and so another theory, QCD, quantum chromodynamics takes > > > > > over. Stephen Hawking wrote recently that we may never be able to > > > > > make a theory of everything, but rather we will have a patchwork of > > > > > effective theories which, as it were, overlay each other at the > > > > > edges, each covering a certain aspect of reality to a certain depth. > > > > > > > > > > A good example of an effective theory is the sun rises in the > > > > > morning. It is workable within a certain realm of experience, but > > > > > breaks down when one discovers the Earth is not flat, and has motions > > > > > not covered by the flat Earth theory, but if you take a walk in the > > > > > early morning, the sun rises is a perfectly satisfactory explanation. > > > > > > > > > > Darwin's theory, and its revisions provides an explanation for the > > > > > morphology of living systems and the appearance of order and > > > > > complexity in such systems. It does not deal with consciousness at > > > > > all, although some scientist tinker with the idea of applying it to > > > > > that. > > > > > > > > > > --- "Robin Carlsen" <maskedzebra@> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > Dear Xeno, > > > > > > > > > > > > You are a sweet guy--but you should, as I have done, read the whole > > > > > > book yourself. The reviews cited here I have read--even before I > > > > > > got the book from Amazon. I can assure you that when I compare the > > > > > > content of the book to the reviews, the book tacitly explains the > > > > > > necessary appearance of such reviews and even anticipates these > > > > > > reviews. The reviews are determined by a profound reaction to the > > > > > > power of Nagel's thesis. > > > > > > > > > > > > Now get what I am saying here, Xeno: IF YOU READ THE BOOK ON YOUR > > > > > > OWN you then can make an assessment of the validity of these > > > > > > reviews. The reviews, to repeat, confirm the truth of Nagel's > > > > > > critique of "a particular naturalistic *Weltanschauung* that > > > > > > postulates a hierarchical relation among the subjects of [biology, > > > > > > chemistry, and physics] and the completeness in principle of an > > > > > > explanation of everything in the universe through their > > > > > > unification". > > > > > > > > > > > > The passages I have quoted from the book stand on their own--The > > > > > > reviews are not necessary in order to assess the truth of what > > > > > > Nagel has said (as contained in my post). There is a very simple > > > > > > idea here, Xeno: to what extent does the standard view of evolution > > > > > > possess the intuitive explanatory power and complexity to account > > > > > > for our experience of what it means to be alive? Up until Nagel's > > > > > > book any concerted opposition to Darwin and materialism came from > > > > > > theism--and therefore could be dismissed on those grounds. But I am > > > > > > asking you just to do this, Xeno: Read the passages I have selected > > > > > > from *Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception > > > > > > of Nature Is Almost Certainly False*, and then tell me what Nagel > > > > > > is saying which is 1. False 2. Irrelevant 3. insignificant 4. > > > > > > Familiar. > > > > > > > > > > > > No one in my lifetime has been able with the clarity and strength > > > > > > of his intellect--and character--challenge the Darwinian idea of > > > > > > existence and the appearance of human beings from a strictly common > > > > > > sense point of view. Darwin's theory of evolution has never made > > > > > > sense to me--I mean in terms of explaining why I am a me, you are a > > > > > > you. But there has never been any way of contesting the > > > > > > evolutionary view as being a sufficient explanation for > > > > > > consciousness, cognition, and value. Nagel has laid out a case (and > > > > > > these excerpts give you some idea of the boldness and justice of > > > > > > his thinking) which was guaranteed to provoke the reviews cited by > > > > > > A.C. Lee--reviews which--since I have read the book--are motivated > > > > > > by a metaphysical fear inside the first person ontology of these > > > > > > philosophers (although that of course is a Robin inference). I find > > > > > > the reviews entirely unconvincing and beside the point. They do not > > > > > > suggest to me these philosophers have taken on the essential idea > > > > > > of Nagel's book. The reviews are the defensive and distracting > > > > > > reviews I predicted once I heard about the book. > > > > > > > > > > > > I challenge you, Xeno, since you are a bit of a compulsive killjoy, > > > > > > to analyze any of the statements I have presented here in my > > > > > > post--and tell me where they fail to challenge you right where you > > > > > > do not wish to be challenged--assuming you are an apologist for the > > > > > > orthodoxy that Nagel is confronting in his beautifully honest book. > > > > > > > > > > > > Give it a go, Xeno. I would really like that. But better than this: > > > > > > read the book. Then we can really talk about something interesting. > > > > > > > > > > > > Robin > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > --- "Xenophaneros Anartaxius" <anartaxius@> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > By A.C. Lee > > > > > > > > > > > > > > The distinguished philosopher Thomas Nagel has spent much of his > > > > > > > career defending an antireductionist view of mind. His new book, > > > > > > > "Mind and Cosmos," extends this skepticism to much of > > > > > > > contemporary scientific inquiry, including evolutionary biology, > > > > > > > and calls for a new scientific revolution based on teleological > > > > > > > principles. It's a proposal that has, unsurprisingly, been quite > > > > > > > controversial. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > At The Nation, Brian Leiter and Michael Weisberg object to > > > > > > > Nagel's prescription on two main fronts. First, they think most > > > > > > > philosophers and practicing scientists would reject > > > > > > > "reductionism" as Nagel formulates it, and thus see this line of > > > > > > > attack as "quixtotic." Nagel questions the current scientific > > > > > > > picture because it defies "common sense;" they counter by simply > > > > > > > pointing out that much of what has been proven by science, from > > > > > > > Copernicus on, in fact does. Leiter and Weisberg do see a more > > > > > > > substantial challenge in Nagel's skepticism about evolutionary > > > > > > > explanations for our ability to discern truth in ethics, logic > > > > > > > and math. But they counter that moral realism is not the only > > > > > > > philosophical plausible ethical position, and, in the case of the > > > > > > > self-evident truths of logic and math, that even if evolutionary > > > > > > > arguments for the validity of reason risk circularity, we can at > > > > > > > least point to the successes of the empirical sciences as a sign > > > > > > > that we are on the right track. Finally, they think Nagel's > > > > > > > insistence "that explanation and prediction are symmetrical" is > > > > > > > an outdated one, and that his description of what a new, > > > > > > > teleologically-oriented science would look like is insufficiently > > > > > > > clear. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > At The Boston Review, Elliot Sober echoes many of the same > > > > > > > criticisms, but drills down further on a few in particular. He > > > > > > > also thinks there is no reason to require symmetry between > > > > > > > explanation and prediction. For Sobel, "something can be both > > > > > > > remarkable and improbable." As for teleology, Sober has no > > > > > > > problem understanding certain phenomena this way, as long as > > > > > > > there are "causal underpinnings" for a given teleological > > > > > > > statement. But Nagel's position, as Sober understands it, entails > > > > > > > "teleological explanations that are both true and causally > > > > > > > inexplicable," a class for which neither Sober, nor Nagel, > > > > > > > apparently, can offer any examples. (In a strangely concessive > > > > > > > coda, Sober does admit that his "reactions may be mired in > > > > > > > presuppositions," and that history may prove Nagel to be "a > > > > > > > prophet whom naysayers such as me were unable to recognize.") > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Alva Noë is not quite as quick to dismiss Nagel. He generally > > > > > > > agrees with the need to "resist Nagel's call for a radically new > > > > > > > conception of fundamental reality," but argues in a post at 13.7 > > > > > > > Cosmos and Culture that Nagel's challenge requires a more robust > > > > > > > response. Noë points to one alternative he thinks neither Nagel > > > > > > > or his critics give enough credence to, namely, that to dispel > > > > > > > the "cognitive illusion" that we can't adequately explain life > > > > > > > and consciousness, we only need to abandon the idea that these > > > > > > > phenomena are "somehow spiritual." Yet this would be merely to > > > > > > > dissolve the problems, and Noë welcomes Nagel's book as a > > > > > > > challenge to go further. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > One World Is Enough: Few philosophers describe themselves as > > > > > > > "materialists" these days. The contemporary understanding of > > > > > > > gravity as not a strictly material entity, for instance, have > > > > > > > made "physicalist" a more common description. The Brigham Young > > > > > > > University philosophy professor James Faulconer, in a short > > > > > > > primer on Mormon metaphysics at Patheos, explains why Mormons, at > > > > > > > least, remain materialists. Joseph Smith claimed, according to > > > > > > > Faulconer, that "everything is material even if there is material > > > > > > > that we presently cannot see or understand." That "everything" > > > > > > > includes God the Father, even if he is morally perfect, immortal, > > > > > > > and otherwise so different from humans in degree as to be > > > > > > > practically inscrutable. Faulconer thinks this materialism cashes > > > > > > > out in at least two ways. First, he sees it as explaining why > > > > > > > Utah "produces a disproportionate number of scientists," and why > > > > > > > his own university supports scientific inquiry so > > > > > > > enthusiastically. Second he thinks it might account for the > > > > > > > Mormon interest in and enthusiasm for business. Without a belief > > > > > > > in another "spiritual" world, Mormons can view practicing > > > > > > > business in this world as another way of faithfully practicing > > > > > > > their religion. Indeed, Faulconer hopes that precisely because > > > > > > > Mormons are materialists, that they inhabit the only world that > > > > > > > exists, they may be more responsible stewards of it. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > --- "Robin Carlsen" <maskedzebra@> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > MIND AND COSMOS: WHY THE MATERIALIST NEO-DARWINIAN CONCEPTION > > > > > > > > OF NATURE IS ALMOST CERTAINLY FALSE by Thomas Nagel > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > The argument from the failure of psychophysical reductionism is > > > > > > > > a philosophical one, but I believe there are independent > > > > > > > > empirical reasons to be skeptical about the truth of > > > > > > > > reductionism in biology. Physico-chemical reductionism in > > > > > > > > biology is the orthodox view, and any resistance to it is > > > > > > > > regarded as not only scientifically but politically incorrect. > > > > > > > > But for a long time I have found the materialist account of how > > > > > > > > we and our fellow organisms came to exist hard to believe, > > > > > > > > including the standard version of how the evolutionary process > > > > > > > > works. The more details we learn about the chemical basis of > > > > > > > > life and the intricacy of the genetic code, the more > > > > > > > > unbelievable the standard historical account becomes . . . it > > > > > > > > seems to me that, as it is usually presented, the current > > > > > > > > orthodoxy about the cosmic order is the product of governing > > > > > > > > assumptions that are unsupported, and that it flies in the face > > > > > > > > of common sense. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I would like to defend the untutored reaction of incredulity to > > > > > > > > the reductionist neo-Darwinian account of the origin and > > > > > > > > evolution of life. It is prima facie highly implausible that > > > > > > > > life as we know it is the result of a sequence of physical > > > > > > > > accidents together with the mechanism of natural selection. We > > > > > > > > are expected to abandon this naive response, not in favor of a > > > > > > > > fully worked out physical/chemical explanation but in favor of > > > > > > > > an alternative that is really a schema for explanation, > > > > > > > > supported by some examples. What is lacking, to my knowledge, > > > > > > > > is a credible argument that the story has a nonnegligible > > > > > > > > probability of being true. There are two questions. First, > > > > > > > > given what is known about the chemical basis of biology and > > > > > > > > genetics, what is the likelihood that self-reproducing life > > > > > > > > forms should have come into existence spontaneously on the > > > > > > > > earth, solely through the operation of the laws of physics and > > > > > > > > chemistry? The second question is about the sources of > > > > > > > > variation in the evolutionary process that was set into motion > > > > > > > > once life began: In the available geological time since the > > > > > > > > first life forms appeared on the earth, what is the likelihood > > > > > > > > that, as a result of physical accident, a sequence of viable > > > > > > > > genetic mutations should have occurred that was sufficient to > > > > > > > > permit natural selection to produce the organisms that actually > > > > > > > > exist? > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > . . . the questions concern highly specific events over a long > > > > > > > > historical period in the distant past, the available evidence > > > > > > > > is very indirect, and general assumptions have to play an > > > > > > > > important part. My skepticism is not based on religious belief, > > > > > > > > or on a belief in any definite alternative. It is just a belief > > > > > > > > that the available scientific evidence, in spite of the > > > > > > > > consensus of scientific opinion, does not in this matter > > > > > > > > rationally require us to subordinate the incredulity of common > > > > > > > > sense. This is especially true with regard to the origin of > > > > > > > > life. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > The world is an astonishing place, and the idea that we have in > > > > > > > > our possession the basic tools needed to understand it is no > > > > > > > > more credible now than it was in Aristotle's day. That it has > > > > > > > > produced you, and me, and the rest of us is the most > > > > > > > > astonishing thing about it. . . . I realize that such doubts > > > > > > > > will strike many people as outrageous, but that is because > > > > > > > > almost everyone in our secular culture has been browbeaten into > > > > > > > > regarding the reductive research program as sacrosanct, on the > > > > > > > > ground that anything else would not be science. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > . . . certain things are so remarkable that they have to be > > > > > > > > explained as non-accidental if we are to pretend to a real > > > > > > > > understanding of the world . . . > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > As I have said, doubts about the reductionist account of life > > > > > > > > go against the dogmatic scientific consensus, but that > > > > > > > > consensus faces problems of probability that I believe are not > > > > > > > > taken seriously enough, both with respect to the evolution of > > > > > > > > life forms through accidental mutation and natural selection > > > > > > > > and with respect to the formation from dead matter of physical > > > > > > > > systems capable of such evolution. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > . . . It is no longer legitimate simply to imagine a sequence > > > > > > > > of gradually evolving phenotypes, as if their appearance > > > > > > > > through mutations in the DNA were un-problematic--as Richard > > > > > > > > Dawkins does for the evolution of the eye. With regard to the > > > > > > > > origin of life, the problem is much harder, since the option of > > > > > > > > natural selection as an explanation is not available, And the > > > > > > > > coming into existence of the genetic code--an arbitrary mapping > > > > > > > > of nucleotide sequences into amino acids, together with > > > > > > > > mechanisms that can read the code and carry out its > > > > > > > > instructions--seems particularly resistant to being revealed as > > > > > > > > probable given physical laws alone. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > . . . Whatever one may think about the possibility of a > > > > > > > > designer, the prevailing doctrine--that the appearance of life > > > > > > > > from dead matter and its evolution through accidental and > > > > > > > > natural selection to its present forms has involved nothing but > > > > > > > > the operation of physical law--cannot be regarded as > > > > > > > > unassailable. It is an assumption governing the scientific > > > > > > > > project rather than a well-confirmed scientific hypothesis. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >
