On 04/27/2013 09:47 PM, Christian Huitema wrote:
>> * second one: correlation of node activities within the same
>> network. In many cases, no matter whether you change your
>> addresses, it won't be solved.
> 
> That's largely true, because hosts leak tons of information on the
> network they connect to. The MAC address of course, but also things
> like host names in DHCP requests, or even the DNS names queried by
> the host. Solving that will require a significant effort.

That aside, if there's only one node active in a given network, then
changing your address periodically (particularly when you're making that
fact known) doesn't help much.



>> * third one: leaking information about the IID, which could allow
>> attackers to guess the addresses of other alive nodes.
> 
> That one is solved by RFC 4941, by this draft, or even by DHCP.

It *is* solved by DHCP, but not by RFC4941: RFC4941 addresses are
generated *in addition* to SLAAC addresses. That's why, I'm told,
Windows replaces traditional SLAAC addresses with a time-invariant
version of RFC4941 - besides *additionally* implementing RFC4941 for
temporary addresses.

Here we're mitigating address-scanning attacks, while bringing other
benefits such as privacy, by removing IIDs that are constant across
networks.


> I read Fernando's draft as engineering privacy with an exception. The
> addresses are randomized and have many privacy features, but they
> remain the same in a local context, and are thus very observable in
> that local context. That's obviously a tradeoff. I see why IT
> departments would like that feature -- but then, they could get the
> same effect by just deploying a DHCP server. 

This document aims to improve the case for SLAAC: There are many
scenarios in which SLAAC is desirable, without that meaning that you
really want a super cookie in the IPv6 addresses of nodes.

Or, put another way, from the pov of the user/host, you don't really
want to be trivially traceable even if you connect to a network that
uses SLAAC rather than DHCPv6.


> However, in the case of
> roaming the feature is highly debatable. If a host visits the same
> network multiple times, should it always reuse the same ID, or should
> it get a new identifier each time? It is very easy to argue that
> "different each time" has better privacy properties.

Agreed. For instance, draft-ietf-6man-stable-privacy-addresses-06.txt is
not a replacement for RFC4941. If you're a roaming node, you probably
want RFC4941 enabled (in addition to having
draft-ietf-6man-stable-privacy-addresses-06.txt enabled).

Cheers,
-- 
Fernando Gont
SI6 Networks
e-mail: fg...@si6networks.com
PGP Fingerprint: 6666 31C6 D484 63B2 8FB1 E3C4 AE25 0D55 1D4E 7492




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