On Oct 2, 2014, at 1:51 PM, Eleanor Saitta <e...@dymaxion.org> wrote:
> You have failed to demonstrate this in any way, other than by brute force > assertion I demonstrated it by logic. You have only yourself to blame for _choosing_ to ignore the other side's argument: > > Have you read everything in the reddit r/security link I sent you? > > Of course not. End of discussion. Kind regards, Greg Slepak -- Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also sharing with the NSA. On Oct 2, 2014, at 1:51 PM, Eleanor Saitta <e...@dymaxion.org> wrote: > Signed PGP part > On 2014.10.02 21.37, Greg wrote: > > Have you read everything in the reddit r/security link I sent you? > > Of course not. It turns out I have other things to do than read > voluminous ramblings by folks on Reddit who don't actually do field > work. I'll add it to my queue for when I've got a slow Sunday. > > > You have two possible defensible stances based on everything you > > have said so far: > > > > 1. Activists shouldn't encrypt any data whatsoever. > > > 2. Activists should use Espionage-style PD if they are going to > > choose to use encryption. > > You have failed to demonstrate this in any way, other than by brute > force assertion, appear to have no field experience, and frankly, it's > not clear if you ever even had a real security audit or cryptographic > review. Brute assertion for commercial products, in particular, tends > to be indicative of a failure to understand real-world deployment > constraints. As does naming something "Espionage", but that's largely > irrelevant. > > I'm going to stop responding to this thread from this point on, > because it's clear to me that no further useful discussion will occur > here. > > Everyone else, hopefully this exchange has been educational as far as > the kinds of testing we should be seeing tools go through. > > E. > > -- > Ideas are my favorite toys. > > -- > Liberationtech is public & archives are searchable on Google. Violations of > list guidelines will get you moderated: > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. Unsubscribe, > change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at > compa...@stanford.edu. -- Liberationtech is public & archives are searchable on Google. Violations of list guidelines will get you moderated: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu.
