1. The anti-Japanese United Front
In January 1935, at an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the
Communist Party of China held during the famous 'Long March' at Tsunyi in
Kweichow Province,
"A new Central Committee headed by Comrade Mao Tse-tung."
(Note to: Mao Tse-tung: 'Selected Works', Volume 1; Peking; 1964; p. 155).
was established.
The change of leadership was quickly followed by a change of policy.
In a report to a conference of Party activists held at Wayaopao in Northern
Shensi in December 1935, Mao Tse-tung declared that the political situation in
China had now fundamentally changed:
"A great change has now taken place in the political situation".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On Tactics against Japanese Imperialism';
(December 1935), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 1; Peking; 1964; p. 153).
This new situation, asserted Mao, was that instead of a number of imperialist
powers sharing in the domination of semi-colonial China, the armed forces of
one imperialist power -- Japan -- was now aiming to occupy all China and to
transform it into a Japanese colony:
"Today . . . the Japanese imperialists . . want to convert the whole of China
from a semi-colony shared by several imperialist powers into a colony
monopolised by Japan".
(Mao Tse-tung: ibid.; p. 154).
and in this new situation it was possible to win back the national bourgeoisie
to the anti-imperialist struggle:
"It is now possible . . for the national bourgeoisie to join the anti-Japanese
struggle".
(Mao Tse-tung: ibid.; p. 168).
"The task of the proletariat is to form a united front with the national
bourgeoisie against imperialism and the bureaucrat and warlord governments,
without overlooking its revolutionary quality".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On New Democracy' (January 1940), in: 'Selected Works', Volume
2; Peking; 1965; p. 348-49).
2.
Mao Tse-tung held that this united front against Japanese imperialism should
include not merely the urban national bourgeoisie, but also the rural national
bourgeoisie, the rich peasants. To achieve this front, Mao made several
ill-fated concessions.
Firstly, in February 1937 the Communist Party offered, if the Kuomintang would
agree to participate in a National United Front, to place the Red Army and the
Liberated Areas under the control of the Kuomintang government. In these
circumstances:
"The workers' and peasants' democratic government . . . and the Red Army . . .
will come under the direction of the Central Government inNanking and its
Military Council respectively".
(Note to: Mao Tse-tung: 'Selected Works', Volume 1; Peking; 1964; p. 281).
Secondly, it replaced the policy of confiscation of the landlords' land by one
of ('not too great') reductions in rent and interest:
"After 1936, in order to facilitate the formation of a broad anti-Japanese
national united front, the Chinese Communist Party changed its policy for the
country as a whole (from one of confiscating the landlords' land -- Ed.) to one
of reduction of rent and interest
(Note to: Mao Tse-tung: 'Selected Works', Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 77).
"This is not the time for a thoroughgoing agrarian revolution. . . Our present
policy should stipulate that landlords shall reduce rent and interest . . . but
the reductions should not be too great ".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On Policy' (December 1940), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 2;
Peking; 1965; p. 446).
"The government's policy should be one of enforcing the decree on rent
reduction and adjusting the relative interests of the landlords and the
tenants."
(Mao Tse-tung: 'Spread the Campaign to Reduce Rent . . .' (October 1943), in:
'Selected Works', Volume 3; 1965; p. 131).
"The Communist Party has made a major concession in the anti-Japanese war
period by changing the policy of land to the tiller to one of reducing rent and
interest".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On Coalition Government' (April 1945), in: 'Selected Works',
Volume 3; Peking; 1965; p. 298).
Thirdly, in putting forward a programme of 'new democracy' for the liberated
areas, the Party assured anti-Japanese national capitalists that in these areas
they would be encouraged to make profits and develop their enterprises:
"The people's republic will not expropriate private property other than
imperialist and feudal private property, and so far from confiscating the
national bourgeoisie's industrial and commercial enterprises, it will encourage
their development. We shall protect every national capitalist who does not
support the imperialists or the Chinese traitors. . . . The labour laws of the
people's republic . . . will not prevent the national bourgeoisie from making
profits or developing their industrial and commercial enterprises."
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On Tactics against Japanese Imperialism' (December 1935), in:
'Selected Works', Volume 1; Peking; 1964; p. 169).
"The new-democratic revolution . . . differs from a socialist revolution in
that it . . . does not destroy any section of capitalism which is capable of
contributing to the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal struggle".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party'
(December 1939), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 327).
"Capitalists should be encouraged to come into our anti-Japanese base areas and
start enterprises here. . . Private enterprise should be encouraged".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On Policy' (December 1940), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 2;
Peking; 1965; p. 447).
"The sector of non-monopoly capitalism in our economy should be given the
opportunity to develop".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'Postscript to "Rural Surveys"' (April 1941), in: 'Selected
Works', Volume 3; Peking; 1965; p. 15)………..
Sixthly, it presented the transition from the national-democratic to the
socialist revolution as a long-term process, taking several decades:
"In the future the democratic revolution will undoubtedly be transformed into a
socialist revolution. . . . It may take quite a long time. . . It is wrong to .
. . expect the transition to take place soon."
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On Tactics against Japanese Imperialism' (December 1935), in:
'Selected Works', Volume 1; Peking; 1964; p. 144).
"The Chinese revolution cannot avoid taking the two steps, first of New
Democracy, and then of socialism. Moreover, the first step will need quite a
long time".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On New Democracy' (January 1940), in: 'Selected Works', Volume
2; Peking; 1965; p. 358).
"A new democratic state based on an alliance of the democratic classes is
different in principle from a socialist state under the dictatorship of the
proletariat. . . . For a long time to come there will exist a special form of
state and political power, a form that is distinguished from the Russian
system, . . . namely, the new democratic form of state and political power
based on the alliance of the democratic classes. . . . . . Our general
programme of New Democracy will remain unchanged . for several decades".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On Coalition Government' (April 1945), in: 'Selected Works',
Volume 3; Peking; 1965; p. 284, 285).
In other words, it was implied that the transition to a socialist revolution
was not something which should follow the democratic stage of the revolution
with the minimum possible interruption, but a distant prospect:
"Needless to say, private enterprise . . . will inevitably continue to occupy a
dominant position for a considerable time".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'Our Economic Policy' (January 1934), in: 'Selected Works',
Volume 1; Peking; 1964; p. 144).
"In the future the democratic revolution will inevitably be transformed into a
socialist revolution. . . . It may take quite a long time. . . . It is wrong to
. . . expect the transition to take place soon".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On Tactics against Japanese Imperialism' (December 1935), in:
'Selected Works', Volume 1; Peking; 1964; p. 170).
"For a long time to come there will exist a special form of state and political
power, a form that is distinguished from the Russian system but is perfectly
necessary and reasonable for us, namely, the new-democratic form of state. . . .
Our general programme of New Democracy will remain unchanged . . . for several
decades".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On Coalition Government' (April 1945), in: 'Selected Works',
Volume 3; Peking; 1965; op. cit.; p. 285).
But according to Marxist-Leninist principles, if the Communist Party has won
the leadership of the revolutionary process, the democratic revolution should
be transformed into the socialist revolution without interruption:
"From the democratic revolution we shall at once, according to the degree of
our strength , . . , begin to pass over to the socialist revolution. We stand
for continuous revolution. We shall not stop half way".
(Vladimir I. Lenin: 'The Attitude of Social-Democracy toward the Peasant
Movement' (September 1905), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 3; London; 1946; p.
145).
"To attempt to raise an artificial Chinese wall between the first and second
revolutions, to separate them by anything else than the degree of preparedness
of the proletariat and the degree of unity with the poor peasants, is
monstrously to distort Marxism, to vulgarise it, to put liberalism in its
place".
(Vladimir I. Lenin: 'The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky'
(November 1918), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 7; London; 1946; p. 191).
3. What re-defining section of the comprador bourgoisie as ‘bureaucrat-capital’
In its strategy of offering concessions to the pro-US comprador bourgeoisie in
an effort to draw it into a national united front, the Communist Party invented
the new term of 'bureaucrat-capital', defined as that section of comprador
capital which was:
"The property of the four big families of Chiang Kai-shek, T. V. SOONG*, H. H.
KUNG* and the Chen . . . brothers".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'Manifesto of the Chinese Liberation Army' (October 1947), in:
'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 150).
It now became the policy of the Communist Party that the new-democratic state
should confiscate, not comprador capital as a whole, but only that section of
it defined as 'bureaucrat-capital', together with the capital of a few
individual comprador capitalists who actively resisted the national united
front and who were classified as war-criminals:
"Confiscate the property of the four big families of Chiang Kai-shek, T. V.
Soong, H. H, Kung and the Chen . . . brothers, and the property of the other
chief war criminals".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'Manifesto of the Chinese People's Liberation Army' (October
1947), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 150).
"Confiscate monopoly capital, headed by Chiang Kai-shek, T. V. Soong, H. H.
Kung and Chen Li-fu, and turn it over to the new-democratic state. During their
twenty-year rule, the four big families, Chiang, Soong, Kung and Chen, have
piled up enormous fortunes, valued at ten to twenty thousand million US dollars
and monopolised the economic lifelines of the whole country. . . . This capital
is popularly known in China as bureaucrat capital. This capitalist class, known
as the bureaucrat-capitalist-class, is the big bourgeoisie of China. .
The new-democratic revolution aims at wiping out only . . . the
bureaucrat-capitalist class".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'The Present Situation and Our Tasks' (December 1947), in:
'Selected Works', Volume 4; ¬¬¬Peking; 1961; p. 167, 168).
Thus, in the above report of December 1947, Mao:
"Delineated more clearly those segments of private capital earmarked for
expropriation. These potential victims were described as owners of
'bureaucratic capital'.
(Wu Yuan-li: 'The Economy of Communist China: An Introduction'; London; 1965;
p. 10).
The 'war criminals' concerned were:
"Forty-three war criminals . . . who were listed by the Communist Party of
China on December 25, 1948".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On Ordering the Reactionary Kuomintang Government . . to Arrest
the Kuomintang War Criminals: Statement by the Spokesman for the Communist
Party of China' (January 1949), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961;
p. 329).
4. After the anti-Japanese war had been won a turning point, logically should
have taken place
The Communist Party of China had long recognised in words the Marxist-Leninist
principle that the revolutionary process in a colonial-type country like China
would take place in two successive stages -- the stage of national-democratic
revolution and that of socialist revolution:
"The Chinese revolutionary movement led by the Communist Party embraces two
stages, i.e., , the democratic and the socialist revolutions, which are two
essentially different revolutionary processes.
The second process can be carried through only after the first has been
completed".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party'
(December 1939), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 330-31).
With the defeat of the Kuomintang forces on the mainland, and the liquidation
of the bureaucrat-capitalist and landlord classes, it was impossible to
disguise the fact that the first (national-democratic) stage of the
revolutionary process had been suffiently completed to enable it to go forward
to its second stage -- to the stage of socialist revolution:
"The task confronting the Party now is to build China into a great socialist
country as quickly as possible".
(Liu Shao-chi (1956): op. cit.; p. 6).
But that was not forthcoming.
In fact the Marxist-Leninist grouping within the party headed by Kao Kang,
which represented the interests of the working class, was indeed eager to go
forward to the socialist stage of the revolutionary process.
However, the national bourgeois grouping within the party headed by Liu
Shao-Chi, which represented the interests of exploiters who were engaged in
industry and commerce, was strongly opposed to the socialist transformation of
industry and commerce, since this would destroy their position as exploiters.
The comprador bourgeois grouping within the party headed by Mao Tse-Tung, which
represented exploiters who were engaged in foreign trade (sexcluding those tied
to pro-Japanese interests), was similarly strongly opposed to the socialist
transformation of commerce, since this would destroy their position as
exploiters.
However, it was politically impossible at this period -- before the 20th
Congress of the CPSU had made revisionism 'respectable' within the
international communist movement -- for the two bourgeois groupings within the
Chinese party publicly to repudiate the aim of socialism without stripping
themselves of their false 'socialist' masks.
Therefore, the political representatives of these two classes collaborated to
evolve a new revisionist theory which would enable them to carry forward the
socialist revolution in words, while holding it back in fact.
5. Pseudo-socialism celebrated by national capitalists with ‘cymbals and gongs’
In the summer of 1955, a programme began:
"For the 'socialist transformation' of industry and commerce".
('New Encyclopaedia Britannica', Volume 16; 1994; p. 145).
In the case of industry and commerce, however, this 'socialist transformation'
followed pseudo-socialist lines:
"Capitalist industry and commerce in the country has, by and large, come under
joint state-private operation."
(Liu Shao-chi: 'Political Report of the CC of the CPC to the 8th National
Congress of the Party' (September 1956) (hereafter listed as 'Liu Shao-chi
(1956)'; Peking; 1956; p. 12)
The new-democratic state maintained the 'unreasonably high' salaries which were
being received by the capitalists involved:
"Even the unreasonably high salaries enjoyed by many of the capitalists and
agents in these enterprises were continued after the changeover."
(Kuan Ta-tung: 'The Socialist Transformation of Capitalist Industry and
Commerce in China'; Peking; 1960; p. 87).
and paid the capitalists a guaranteed rate of interest on their investments,
thus maintaining exploitation of the workers:
"A fixed rate of interest was paid by the state for the total investment of the
capitalists in the joint state-private enterprises. Irrespective of locality
and trade, the interest was fixed at a rate of 5% per annum . thus maintaining
exploitation."
(Kuan Ta-tung: ibid.; p. 86-87, 91).
Indeed, the amount of profit being made increased significantly:
"Statistics of 64 factories in various parts of China which had gone over to
joint operation earlier than others revealed that their profits were
increasing. Taking their profit in 1950 as 100, it was 113 in 1951, 228 in
1952, and 306 in 1953". .
(Kuan Ta-tung: ibid.; p. 78, 91).
Not unnaturally, the capitalists welcomed this spurious socialism:
'Our bourgeoisie has heralded its acceptance of socialist transformation with a
fanfare of gongs and drums.'
(Liu Shao-chi (1956): op. cit.; p. 59).
and were happy to be 'remoulded' by 'educational measures' into 'working
people':
"While the enterprises are being transformed, educational measures are adopted
to remould the capitalists gradually . . . into working people". (Liu Shao-Chi
(1956): op. cit.; p. 25).
Thus, Liu Shao-chi was able to tell the 8th National Congress of the SPC in
September 1956 truthfully that
"Capitalist industry and commerce in the country has, by and large, come under
joint state-private operation."
(Liu Shao-chi (1956): op. cit.; p. 12).
and untruthfully that:
"We have now achieved a decisive victory in the socialist transformation of . .
. capitalist industry and commerce."
(Liu Shao-chi (1956): op. cit.; p. 11.
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