TO: Platt, Jonathan, PE and Marco
FROM: Roger

ROG (previously):
'Awareness' I see as applying to living things.  Webster's concurs.  
Pirsig writes that only living things can perceive or adjust to dynamic 
quality, so I assume I have no disagreement here with him either. The 
Webster's definition of 'choice' includes preference, so I guess I can 
live with that word applied to subatomic processes, though again I 
think it would be better to say they ARE subatomic value patterns or 
choices than to say they HAVE values or choices. As for 'sense,' I think 
that this can be used metaphorically, but only at the risk that people will 
misinterpret it to mean that electrons are discrete, living entities.  To 
stay clean, I would stick with 'values' or 'value patterns' and I would 
avoid any of the above three terms.  (I would also avoid the term 
"morals" absent about a 468 page treatise explaining how it means 
something WAY beyond conventional usage.)

PLATT:
You don’t like Pirsig stretching conventional usage of “morals.” In other 
words, you flat out disagree with his no-holds-barred statement in Lila, 
Chap. 7, as follows:

“Because Quality is morality. Make no mistake about it. They're 
identical. And if Quality is the primary reality of the world then that 
means morality is also the primary reality of the world. The world is 
primarily a moral order. But it's a moral order that neither Rigel nor the 
posing Victorians had ever, in their wildest dreams, thought about or 
heard about.”

It seems to me (and of course I could be wrong) that by denying Pirsig 
his extended use of the term “moral,” you deny a central tenant of his 
metaphysics. You apparently do not accept that the levels, including the 
inorganic, are “moral” levels. IMO that’s like denying the whole MOQ. 

ROG:
No, I do not "flat out disagree with him."  I specifically said "I would also 
avoid the term "morals" absent about a 468 page treatise explaining how it 
means 
something WAY beyond conventional usage."  He redefines morals away from 
conventional usage and then makes the statement. As redefined I agree 
completely. 

PLATT:
Your next statement also seems to deny a key MOQ principle.

ROG (previously):
As for how these qualities mysteriously emerge out of elements that 
lack them, I refer you to Lila or to any of a couple of dozen good books 
on complexity.  Simpler, less complex and versatile values can 
combine together and interact to form substantially more dynamic and 
versatile values with degrees of freedom that do not exist in the 
underlying levels. Awareness is a sophisticated version of value 
inherent in living things.

PLATT:
How life evolved from non-life as explained in Lila is in no way like 
complexity theory which attributes the appearance of complex forms to 
chance or accident. In the MOQ by contrast atoms and molecules 
responded to a Dynamic force because what DQ offered was better, 
i.e., it was morally right that they form life for greater freedom. Your 
reference to complexity theory to explain evolution makes me suspect 
you accept the conventional scientific view. I take it that as far as you’re 
concerned, Chapter 11 in Lila can be pretty much ignored as 
unscientific nonsense. In science there’s no motive for evolution. In the 
MOQ, it was morally right for life (and us) to have evolved.


ROG:
I interpretat  both science and Pirsig differently than you.  I sense a 
"subjects called molecules respond to an objective dynamic force" in your 
writing.  I don't know if it is intended, so I apologize if I overinterpret.  

I would say that Pirsig metaphysically slices the world up into 
values/relationships.  Atoms, molecules and living things are the names we 
have given to particular patterns that we derive from experience (we also 
derive our selves from experience).  Living things are 'better,' meaning more 
versatile and dynamic than non-living things and the evolution of life is the 
pattern of species change over time in terms of these value 
patterns/relationships. 

The scientific theory that I subscribe to is probably best categorized as an 
offshoot of Autopoiesis.  This is the theory that life is self organizing and 
creative and continuously finding better more versatile, dynamic, complex and 
adaptive solutions.  Remember, the MOQ does not necessarily contradict 
science.  It reinterprets and re-explains it, but it doesn't change any data. 
 I find the science and the metaphysics of quality fit together virtually 
seamlessly in this case though.  Hugo, Horse, Dan and several other current 
and former members of this forum have also explored the parallels between 
autopoiesis and the MOQ.

PLATT:
I guess what puzzles me most is that you’ll accept “values” going back 
to subatomic particles but not “morals.” All Pirsig is doing is extending 
the meaning of morality to include not just human behavior but all 
behavior, just as he extends the meaning of value to include not just 
what is preferred by humans, but by all things great and small. 

As I see it, quality, morals and values all come under the general 
heading of “Some things are better than others.” And if I was asked to 
sum up the MOQ in a sentence, that would be it.

So have I misinterpreted your beliefs? Have a misinterpreted the MOQ? 
Where have I gone wrong?

ROG:
I basically agree greatly with your synopsis of Pirsig.  My quarrel with 
'morals' is simply one of avoiding potential misunderstandings on what he 
means. (similar with my quarrel over 'atomic awareness')  And sadly, I see 
this forum as ripe with such misunderstandings.  Is my agreement with the 
basic meaning but disagreeing with clarity of the wording clear now?  (And 
thanks for the attention throughout to restate what you think I am saying so 
that I can clarify.  Well done!)

PLATT(in a separate post than above / previously to Roger)
My guess is that such sentences are too metaphorically strong for your 
liking and thus present a false picture. Instead of “awareness” would 
you accept Whitehead’s much less provocative word “prehension” to 
describe a particle’s response to an observation or an atom’s 
sensitivity to its environment?

ROG (previously):
Sure. No problem. 

PLATT:
If Roger had posted this response early on, much of the ensuing 
argument over “aware” might have been avoided. 

ROG:
And miss all the fun and all the opportunity to learn?  I respect you all 
immensely and have thoroughly enjoyed the discussion.  It helped me clarify 
things. I hope the rest of you gained something as well. Yes?

ROG (Previously):
To stay clean, I would stick with ‘values’ or ‘value patterns’ and I would 
avoid any of the above three terms (awareness, choice, sense).

PLATT:
“Atoms value” is also OK—“to value” meaning “to consider or rate 
highly” Likewise, “atoms prefer, meaning “to like better or best.” (The 
quotation marks around “prefer” cited by Elephant as meaning that 
Pirsig really didn’t mean it is a red herring. Pirsig uses “prefer” without 
quotation marks several times when talking about an atom’s 
characteristics. Ex: “Phaedrus thought this ambiguity of carbon’s 
bonding PREFERENCES was the situation the weak Dynamic forces 
needed. Lila, Chap. 11, emphasis added.)

ROG:
I am trying to be careful not to imply discrete subjects that PREFER.  I 
still argue that it is more appropriate to say that carbon and carbon bonding 
are defined by patterns of values rather than to say they HAVE patterns of 
values.  When Pirsig is being deliberate in his word choice I see him saying 
the same thing.  I agree he takes lots of detours into conventional 
subject/object usage, though he usually clears things up and confesses his 
indiscretions somewhere in the book. Wouldn't you agree?

JONATHAN:
Electrons are au courant.

PLATT:
I like it.

ROG:
I have no idea what this means either. I still prefer atoms are "Woody Allens"

AND NOW TO JONATHAN:

ROG (previously):
Just to clarify, to my knowledge nobody has argued the replacement of VALUE
for CAUSATION. This is a central tenet of the MOQ, and is one that I agree
with. My argument has been that it is absurd to say that subatomic patterns
are AWARE.  I do not see 'awareness' as a requirement to escape the 'strict
causation principle'.  Again, to my way of thinking, if you are saying that
neutrinos are aware, according to my dictionary you are saying they are
"cognizant, conscious, sensible, alive, awake, and having knowledge of
something, and that they can draw inferences from their experiences."
[snip]

JONATHAN:
Roger, you motivated me to look a 2 dictionaries I have in the house - the
American Heritage and the Collins (British). What was very interesting is that
both dictionaries included the word "mindful" in their definitions of
awareness. I'd like to see Elephant's response to this definition - it implies
that MIND can be CONTAINED in aware objects.
Can any material object be said to contain mind?
Is the human *body* aware (mindful), or is the body the human *without* the
mind?
My point is that we have to be careful (aware, mindful;-) of the context that
produced the definitions that apper in modern dictionaries, and keep a look
out for the influence of a certain celebrated French philosopher.

ROG:
I thought that was MY POINT!  I think that the concept of values absent 
causality can be (and, in Lila, was) explained without making atoms into 
little subjects.  I have tried to do so.  Aware is indeed a loaded Cartesian 
word.

ROG (previously):
If we must say so, then did Pirsig have to say so too?  Does Pirsig say so?
(that they are aware, not that they "prefer" with italics around the term.)
And if Pirsig didn't ever say so, then why is it we "must say" so?  And if we
must redefine awareness, exactly how is it we want to redefine it?  Where
will we keep this list of new definitions?

JONATHAN:
Roger, should the MoQ ever become a dominant philosophy, the effects will
surely be felt in dictionary definitions. While recognizing Pirsig's
tremendous contribution, I also note his statement (in an old message to the
Lila Squad) that most of the MoQ remains uncharted. IMO, the causality area is
one where Pirsig has left us a lot of work. 

ROG:
My intended point was simply that it is not correct that we *MUST* say they 
are aware (as Platt or someone suggested) to resolve your causality issues.  
I guess your point is that Pirsig would have agreed with Platt if he had 
delved into the issue.  If that is your point, I disagree.  I suggest that 
the more elegant and logical solution is just to say that atoms are patterns 
of value.   In fact, Pirsig takes the causation issue head on in Chapter 8, 
even listing it as a Platypus.  His answer is of course the same as what I 
have been suggesting.  

SUMMARY???

Elephant and I have been taking this issue on from several different angles, 
but my guess is that all three of you (Marco, Platt and Jonathan) now are 
starting to acknowledge at least a small, itsy-bitsy degree of validity in 
our arguments that the so-called subatomic awareness solution is prone to 
unintended platypi of its own.  

Does someone want to try to wrap up the issue and offer a solution that we 
can all agree on?  Or do we still need to hash out a few issues?  Marco, you 
still out there?  

Peace,
Rog

PS -- I know it is easy for each of us to jump to wrong conclusions on 
others' views in a forum like this.  But I share Elephant's frustration on 
the extreme degree of arguments being diverted from what we say to what 
others want us to have said so they can argue with a pet grievance.  After 
all these years, I can't even fathom that you guys would assume I am some 
type of closet determinist that was "outed".  Anyways, I am actually pretty 
convinced that I have no material disagreement with either Marco or Jonathan. 
 I sense we are arguing more out of inertia than any fundamental difference 
in views.  Let me know if you disagree. As for Platt, the two of us have 
always approached the MOQ from a slightly different angle, but we almost 
always find a way to understand and respect each other's perspective. Let's 
do a big group hug!!!!

PPS -- Elephant Man, I can't find the movie theater passage, and your 
argument on discrete has me befuddled.  I am not disagreeing with it.  I just 
don't get it.  Sometimes you get REAL philosophical, and to be honest I 
cannot always keep up with you.  Don't let me slow you down though, just 
remember that some of us have no formal training in these issues.

PPPS -  Marco, your English is wonderful.  I wish everyone was as 
understandable as you. 


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