Hi Roger, Platt and all,
I think that Platt and Roger have now distilled the argument, though
not settled it.
ROGER:
Platt, don't you see how you are taking the MOQ's patterns of Quality
and twisting them into
Cartesian/knowing/substantive/Newtonian/discrete little subjects?
Elephant has been trying to point this out for two weeks, but I don't
think
you want to read what he is offering.
PLATT:
Are you saying that patterns of Quality cannot be substantive, discrete,
knowing? If so, then I've misread Lila in its entirety. Can we not
attribute any properties to patterns of Quality?
As I understand it, in Roger and elephant's "patterns of value", VALUE
is strictly an adjective and never a verb.
Patterns are objects that HAVE value, but do not themselves value.
Platt and I disagree with this. VALUE is a verb. Atoms *value* other
atoms (hence chemical bonding) and boy honey-bees *value* girl honey
bees. Roger accuses us of turning patterns into little Cartesian
subjects. Equally, we can accuse Roger and Elephant of turning patterns
into little Cartesian objects. Supposedly, as Pirsigians we should be
able to avoid such arguments, but our cultural baggage makes this
difficult.
I suppose that R and E would say that their view of awareness and the
atom is that AWARENESS HAS THE ATOM. I can accept this, but as an
addition, not a replacement for the atom having awareness.
If it becomes a replacement and we apply this to man, we get "Awareness
has man". We then have to ask where awareness comes from and have to say
that awareness belongs to MIND (as Elephant keeps saying), and that
means that "awareness has man" applies only to man's body. Behold, we
are back at the Cartesian split.
I am now groping for something constructive to say, something elegant to
transcend Descartes.
Roger, Platt, anyone - can you help?
Jonathan
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