Jon, Sung,
I think a much clearer answer to Sung’s question is given in Natural
Propositions, p. 54:
A proposition is a sign which separately, or independently, indicates its
object.” (EPII, 307)
This definition implicitly posits propositions against predicates without any
reference indicated, the so-called “Rhemes” (cf. the Dicisign “The sky is blue”
vs the unsaturated Rheme or propositional function “___ is blue”). And it sets
Dicisigns apart from simple indices which do nothing but exactly indicate their
object (the pointing gesture, the proper name, the pronoun, etc.), thus not
performing their indicating separately from other aspects of their functioning.
Moreover, it is this definition which implies that Dicisigns comprehend more
than full-blown general, symbolic propositions and also involve
quasi-propositions like Dicent Sinsigns and Dicent Legisigns – they qualify for
the basic reason that they, too, separately indicate their object. Photographs,
for instance, may function as Dicent Sinsigns, just like statements of
identity, location or naming may function as Dicent Legisigns. Such
quasi-propositions, like the pointing of a weathercock, even give the core of
the definition: "It is, thus, clear that the vital spark of every proposition,
the peculiar propositional element of the proposition, is an indexical
proposition, an index involving an icon." ("Kaina Stoicheia", 1904, EPII, 310,
italics added).
gary f.
-----Original Message-----
From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: 9-Oct-14 12:11 AM
Sung,
This is Peirce's definition of a proposition 'qua' dicisign. The crux of the
definition is not mere indication of the object but "separate or independent"
indication of the object. The "dicey" part of "dicisign" means that the object
under investigation is indited by two distinct lines of evidence given in the
testimony of the proposition, so even if the object were immune from
prosecution by one line of evidence it could still be indited by the other, as
it were.
But I confess that I still have much to question here, and I think we have to
treat the matter of the dicisign as an ongoing investigation.
One question that worries me especially, given all the time I've spent working
on computational implementations of propositional calculus, and most of that in
the medium of calculi related to the "alpha level" of Peirce's logical graphs,
is whether the dicisign doctrine applies to these "zeroth order" propositions,
or whether it has its designs on the level of predicate calculus exclusively.
Regards,
Jon
Sungchul Ji wrote:
> Jon,
>
> I don't understand the significance of the statement that > > 'A
> proposition is a sign which separately, or independently, > indicates its
> object.'
>
> Is there a sign that does not independently indicate its object ? Can you >
> give me an example or two of such a sign ?
>
> Thanks.
>
> Sung
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
