Jon, I was simply offering a direct answer to Sung's question, which was about the significance of Peirce's definition of a proposition as "a sign which separately, or independently, indicates its object." I'm afraid the relevance of your sermon here escapes me.
gary f. -----Original Message----- From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: 9-Oct-14 11:41 PM Gary, List, I read Peirce as critically as I read anyone else, perhaps more so. I don't take anything he says on faith, I have never had to. I have learned to trust that if I read him carefully enough I will learn something worthwhile from the effort, though there have been times when it took me a decade or two before I reached a provisional understanding of what he was saying. But a critical reading involves a comparison among several accounts of the same or comparable subject matters to determine whether any of them might be more to the purpose at hand. Those of us who read Peirce for his perspicuity into the phenomena and problems of a shared world have a larger task than simply chasing hermeneutic circles through the scriptural concordances of his terminological musements. We have to decide whether what he asserts about what he dubs a "proposition", by that or any other word, has anything significant to do with is commonly called a "proposition". Of course it is always possible, and we always hope, that better mousetraps for truth can be devised by one so perspicacious as Peirce, but there is nothing automatic about the grant. Regards, Jon Gary Fuhrman wrote: > Jon, Sung, > > I think a much clearer answer to Sung’s question is given in Natural > Propositions, p. 54: > > A proposition is a sign which separately, or independently, indicates > its object.” (EPII, 307) > > This definition implicitly posits propositions against predicates > without any reference indicated, the so-called “Rhemes” (cf. the > Dicisign “The sky is blue” vs the unsaturated Rheme or propositional > function “___ is blue”). And it sets Dicisigns apart from simple > indices which do nothing but exactly indicate their object (the > pointing gesture, the proper name, the pronoun, etc.), thus not > performing their indicating separately from other aspects of their > functioning. Moreover, it is this definition which implies that > Dicisigns comprehend more than full-blown general, symbolic > propositions and also involve quasi-propositions like Dicent Sinsigns > and Dicent Legisigns – they qualify for the basic reason that they, > too, separately indicate their object. Photographs, for instance, may > function as Dicent Sinsigns, just like statements of identity, location or > naming may function as Dicent Legisigns. > Such quasi-propositions, like the pointing of a weathercock, even give > the core of the definition: "It is, thus, clear that the vital spark > of every proposition, the peculiar propositional element of the > proposition, is an indexical proposition, an index involving an icon." > ("Kaina Stoicheia", 1904, EPII, 310, italics added). > > gary f. > > -----Original Message----- From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: > 9-Oct-14 12:11 AM > > Sung, > > This is Peirce's definition of a proposition 'qua' dicisign. The crux > of the definition is not mere indication of the object but "separate or > independent" > > indication of the object. The "dicey" part of "dicisign" means that > the object under investigation is indited by two distinct lines of > evidence given in the testimony of the proposition, so even if the > object were immune from prosecution by one line of evidence it could > still be indited by the other, as it were. > > But I confess that I still have much to question here, and I think we > have to treat the matter of the dicisign as an ongoing investigation. > > One question that worries me especially, given all the time I've spent > working on computational implementations of propositional calculus, > and most of that in the medium of calculi related to the "alpha level" > of Peirce's logical graphs, is whether the dicisign doctrine applies > to these "zeroth order" propositions, or whether it has its designs on > the level of predicate calculus exclusively. > > Regards, > > Jon > > Sungchul Ji wrote: > >> Jon, >> I don't understand the significance of the statement that 'A >> proposition is a sign which separately, or independently, indicates >> its object.' >> Is there a sign that does not independently indicate its object ? >> Can you give me an example or two of such a sign ? >> Thanks. >> Sung
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