STOI. Semiotic Theory Of Information
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14551
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14559
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14614
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14616
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14626
STOI-DIS. Semiotic Theory Of Information -- Discussion
SJ:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14620
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14621
GF:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14622
Gary, List,
I read Peirce as critically as I read anyone else, perhaps more so. I don't
take anything he says on faith, I have never had to. I have learned to trust
that if I read him carefully enough I will learn something worthwhile from the
effort, though there have been times when it took me a decade or two before I
reached a provisional understanding of what he was saying.
But a critical reading involves a comparison among several accounts of the same
or comparable subject matters to determine whether any of them might be more to
the purpose at hand.
Those of us who read Peirce for his perspicuity into the phenomena and problems
of a shared world have a larger task than simply chasing hermeneutic circles
through the scriptural concordances of his terminological musements.
We have to decide whether what he asserts about what he dubs a "proposition", by
that or any other word, has anything significant to do with is commonly called a
"proposition". Of course it is always possible, and we always hope, that better
mousetraps for truth can be devised by one so perspicacious as Peirce, but there
is nothing automatic about the grant.
Regards,
Jon
Gary Fuhrman wrote:
Jon, Sung,
I think a much clearer answer to Sung’s question is given in Natural
Propositions, p. 54:
A proposition is a sign which separately, or independently, indicates its
object.” (EPII, 307)
This definition implicitly posits propositions against predicates without any
reference indicated, the so-called “Rhemes” (cf. the Dicisign “The sky is
blue” vs the unsaturated Rheme or propositional function “___ is blue”). And
it sets Dicisigns apart from simple indices which do nothing but exactly
indicate their object (the pointing gesture, the proper name, the pronoun,
etc.), thus not performing their indicating separately from other aspects of
their functioning. Moreover, it is this definition which implies that
Dicisigns comprehend more than full-blown general, symbolic propositions and
also involve quasi-propositions like Dicent Sinsigns and Dicent Legisigns –
they qualify for the basic reason that they, too, separately indicate their
object. Photographs, for instance, may function as Dicent Sinsigns, just like
statements of identity, location or naming may function as Dicent Legisigns.
Such quasi-propositions, like the pointing of a weathercock, even give the
core of the definition: "It is, thus, clear that the vital spark of every
proposition, the peculiar propositional element of the proposition, is an
indexical proposition, an index involving an icon." ("Kaina Stoicheia", 1904,
EPII, 310, italics added).
gary f.
-----Original Message----- From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:[email protected]] Sent:
9-Oct-14 12:11 AM
Sung,
This is Peirce's definition of a proposition 'qua' dicisign. The crux of the
definition is not mere indication of the object but "separate or independent"
indication of the object. The "dicey" part of "dicisign" means that the
object under investigation is indited by two distinct lines of evidence given
in the testimony of the proposition, so even if the object were immune from
prosecution by one line of evidence it could still be indited by the other,
as it were.
But I confess that I still have much to question here, and I think we have to
treat the matter of the dicisign as an ongoing investigation.
One question that worries me especially, given all the time I've spent
working on computational implementations of propositional calculus, and most
of that in the medium of calculi related to the "alpha level" of Peirce's
logical graphs, is whether the dicisign doctrine applies to these "zeroth
order" propositions, or whether it has its designs on the level of predicate
calculus exclusively.
Regards,
Jon
Sungchul Ji wrote:
Jon,
I don't understand the significance of the statement that 'A
proposition is a sign which separately, or independently, indicates its
object.'
Is there a sign that does not independently indicate its object ? Can you
give me an example or two of such a sign ?
Thanks.
Sung
--
academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA
oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
