Well, Jon, when you have THE answer to these "critical questions of our present inquiry", please do share them with us. In the meantime, telling us that you don't have the answer doesn't do much to advance the inquiry, nor does it count as "critical thinking". So for the rest of us, I think Frederik's explanation in NP of what "separately, or independently, indicates its object" means, and his examples of signs which do *not* do that — which is what I posted in answer to Sung's question — will have to suffice until someone proposes something better.
gary f. -----Original Message----- From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: 11-Oct-14 9:39 PM To: Peirce List Cc: [email protected] Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Semiotic Theory Of Information -- Discussion Thread: SJ:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14620 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14621 GF:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14622 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14633 GF:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14638 Gary, List, Sung expressed his question as follows: > Jon, I don't understand the significance > of the statement that "A > proposition is > a sign which separately, or independently, > indicates > its object." Is there a sign > that does not independently indicate its > > object? Can you give me an example or > two of such a sign? Thanks, Sung "Significance" could have many meanings, but the rest of his query tells us that he is considering the possibility that the condition "independently indicates its object" might be trivial, in the sense that it might be true of any sign, and so he is asking for counterexamples to that condition. For my part I can neither assure him that the definition is cogent or provide him with the required examples until I know myself (1) what the definiens means and (2) whether it is true of all propositions. Question 1 and Question 2 are the critical questions of our present inquiry and they are hardly answered, directly or otherwise, by simply reciting the text in question. Regards, Jon Gary Fuhrman wrote: > Jon, I was simply offering a direct answer to Sung's question, which > was about the significance of Peirce's definition of a proposition as > "a sign which separately, or independently, indicates its object." I'm > afraid the relevance of your sermon here escapes me. > > gary f. > > -----Original Message----- From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: > 9-Oct-14 11:41 PM > > Gary, List, > > I read Peirce as critically as I read anyone else, perhaps more so. I > don't take anything he says on faith, I have never had to. I have > learned to trust that if I read him carefully enough I will learn > something worthwhile from the effort, though there have been times > when it took me a decade or two before I reached a provisional understanding > of what he was saying. > > But a critical reading involves a comparison among several accounts of > the same or comparable subject matters to determine whether any of > them might be more to the purpose at hand. > > Those of us who read Peirce for his perspicuity into the phenomena and > problems of a shared world have a larger task than simply chasing > hermeneutic circles through the scriptural concordances of his > terminological musements. > > > We have to decide whether what he asserts about what he dubs a > "proposition", by that or any other word, has anything significant to > do with is commonly called a "proposition". Of course it is always > possible, and we always hope, that better mousetraps for truth can be > devised by one so perspicacious as Peirce, but there is nothing automatic > about the grant. > > Regards, > > Jon > > Gary Fuhrman wrote: >> Jon, Sung, >> >> I think a much clearer answer to Sung’s question is given in Natural >> Propositions, p. 54: >> >> A proposition is a sign which separately, or independently, indicates >> its object.” (EPII, 307) >> >> This definition implicitly posits propositions against predicates >> without any reference indicated, the so-called “Rhemes” (cf. the >> Dicisign “The sky is blue” vs the unsaturated Rheme or propositional >> function “___ is blue”). >> And it sets Dicisigns apart from simple indices which do nothing but >> exactly indicate their object (the pointing gesture, the proper name, >> the pronoun, etc.), thus not performing their indicating separately >> from other aspects of their functioning. Moreover, it is this >> definition which implies that Dicisigns comprehend more than >> full-blown general, symbolic propositions and also involve >> quasi-propositions like Dicent Sinsigns and Dicent Legisigns – they >> qualify for the basic reason that they, too, separately indicate >> their object. Photographs, for instance, may function as Dicent >> Sinsigns, just like statements of identity, location or naming may >> function as Dicent Legisigns. Such quasi-propositions, like the >> pointing of a weathercock, even give the core of the definition: "It >> is, thus, clear that the vital spark of every proposition, the >> peculiar propositional element of the proposition, is an indexical >> proposition, an index involving an icon." ("Kaina Stoicheia", 1904, EPII, >> 310, italics added). >> >> gary f. >> >> -----Original Message----- From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: >> 9-Oct-14 12:11 AM >> >> Sung, >> >> This is Peirce's definition of a proposition 'qua' dicisign. The >> crux of the definition is not mere indication of the object but >> "separate or independent" >> >> indication of the object. The "dicey" part of "dicisign" means that >> the object under investigation is indited by two distinct lines of >> evidence given in the testimony of the proposition, so even if the >> object were immune from prosecution by one line of evidence it could >> still be indited by the other, as it were. >> >> But I confess that I still have much to question here, and I think we >> have to treat the matter of the dicisign as an ongoing investigation. >> >> One question that worries me especially, given all the time I've >> spent working on computational implementations of propositional >> calculus, and most of that in the medium of calculi related to the >> "alpha level" of Peirce's logical graphs, is whether the dicisign >> doctrine applies to these "zeroth order" propositions, or whether it >> has its designs on the level of predicate calculus exclusively. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon >> >> Sungchul Ji wrote: >> >>> Jon, I don't understand the significance of the statement that 'A >>> proposition is a sign which separately, or independently, indicates >>> its object.' Is there a sign that does not independently indicate its >>> object? >>> Can you give me an example or two of such a sign? Thanks. Sung > -- academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache
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