At 11:09 PM 1/16/2015, Frederik Stjernfelt wrote:
I think we have covered this ground before, even pretty extensively so.
HP: Sorry if I missed it, but I asked for examples of Peirce's limits
on realism.
Peirce was 1) a scientific realist in the standard sense of assuming
the independent existence of objects. 2) "Extreme" refers to his
scholastic realism - assuming the reality of some universals.
HP: Of course, to physicists "some universals" are real, like laws,
and more objective than phenomena, like measurements. Other
universals are nominal, like virtue. I am asking what type of
universals would Peirce see as nominal?
FS: Howard seems to remain sceptic vis-a-vis the reality of universals . . .
HP: Of course not. I am skeptical of claims of exclusive epistemic
stances. I agree with <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism/>SEP
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism/>Realism: ". . . it is
misleading to think that there is a straightforward and clear-cut
choice between being a realist and a non-realist about a particular
subject matter. It is rather the case that one can be more-or-less
realist about a particular subject matter. Also, there are many
different forms that realism and non-realism can take."
You refer to nominalism as if it were a sin.
Howard
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