Jerry,
I guess I should have said 'diametrical opposite' instead of
'diametrical contrary' which is an atypical phrase.
But your 'S is P' & 'S is not P' are contradictories, not contraries;
they can't both be true and can't both be false.
'The dogs are four' and 'the dogs are five' are contraries: they can't
both be true but can both be false.
I'm willing to introduce a word occasionally, when I think it fills a
need. Jon pointed out that to call something inconceivable is to call it
incognizable. I pointed out that there is a word 'indubitable' in
Peircean terminology for when something is undoubtable not because it's
infallible but because find ourselves unable to doubt it because it's
part of our common sense. So a corresponding word for something that is
not absolutely inconceivable but which we are unable to conceive or
cognize because it is contrary to our common sense, could be called
'insuspectable', a kind of reverse mirror image of 'indubitable'.
Best, Ben
On 1/17/2015 12:49 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
List, Ben, Jon:
On Jan 17, 2015, at 10:36 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
I think that Gary F. is looking for the diametrical contrary of
'indubitability' in Peirce's sense. Such would be /insuspectability/.
That something is indubitable in Peirce's sense means that one can't
doubt it, even if eventually one may come to doubt it.
A highly unusual sentence, at least to this reader.
Peirce's definition seems clear enough to be categorized as a set of
predictions about a concept and hence refers to an INDIVIDUAL's
capability to speculate about the future. Time is intrinsic to this
notion. The capabilities of any individual to project into the future
is rather dependent on the personal history of the individual which in
turn, vary greatly from person to person.
1. Jon interprets CSP in a very pragmatic way.
2. Gary F. interprets Jon's pragmatism as not being sufficiently
pragmatic.
3. Ben interprets Gary's interpretation of Jon's interpretation of CSP
assertion.
Concomitantly, Ben introduces new terminology ( 'indubitability',
/insuspectability)/ and a restriction on the Aristotelian logical
notion of "contrary" by introducing a phrase, "for the diametrical
contrary". ( An Aristotelian logical contrary may be stated as the
relationship between two sentences: "S is P." "S is not P." )
While it seems clear that these interpretations of one-another's
philosophical perspectives are individual narratives. Yet, I ask, do
the step-wise regressions of meanings of these sentences points to a
general phenomena within semiotics - that of individualization of
intent/entelechy?
More generally, is any reader of this list serve capable of generating
a metaphysical interpretation of Ben's interpretation of Gary F's
interpretation of Jon's interpretation of CSP critical assertion about
the nature of his philosophy?
Cheers
Jerry
Jon, Gary F.,
I think that Gary F. is looking for the diametrical contrary of
'indubitability' in Peirce's sense. Such would be /insuspectability/.
That something is indubitable in Peirce's sense means that one can't
doubt it, even if eventually one may come to doubt it. This is
related to Peirce's critical common-sensism, in which he holds that
there is a set of propositions which people can't seriously doubt at
the time, a set which changes only slowly over time if at all. Thus,
any proposition inconsistent with those indubitable propositions
would be insuspectable at that time. However, the indubitable
propositions also tend to be vague, so inconsistencies with other
propositions will tend to be vague too.
Now, the pragmatic maxim is a maxim about definitions, not the
conduct of research, and Peirce in that context eventually calls a
conception's meaning its 'purport'. At the end of 'How to Make Our
Ideas Clear,' Peirce says that he has discussed how to make our ideas
clear, and that that is not the same thing as making them true, i.e.,
verifying them, which will be the subject of his next paper.
I think that what one can do in a conception in order to accommodate
future learning and surprises is incorporate Peirce's contrite
confession pf fallibility, plus a claim of 'successibility' (denial
of radical skepticism).
I do think that the reality of possibility makes a difference to the
pragmatic maxim in the sense that pragmatism leads to accepting such
reality and its denial tends to weaken the pragmatic maxim, since it
makes a conception's purport depend on whether certain conceived
conditions will ever be fulfilled, not on whether we think their
fulfillment is conceivable. I think Peirce's realism was little
stronger in the early 1870s than when he wrote 'How to Make Our Ideas
Clear', for example see CP 7.340-1 (1873, "Reality" in "The Logic of
1873").
Best, Ben
On 1/17/2015 10:12 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
Re: Gary Fuhrman
At: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15409
Gary,
You can try to split rhetorical hairs between cognizable and
conceivable,
but I don't think those frizzies will wash. I never said anything
about
"eternal conceivability". What you are saying here smacks of a regress
to the very brand of absolutism that Peirce's relational reform of
logic
was designed to escape.
Relativity to a "state of information" (SOI_1) is one of Peirce's
best ideas,
but it's the same thing as relativity to a "system of
interpretation" (SOI_0),
in other words, a triadic sign relation, that was always a part of
Peirce's
triadic relational theory of "logic as formal semiotics" from the
get-go.
Regards,
Jon
On 1/17/2015 9:56 AM, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
Jon,
We have no conception of incognizable consequences. But surely
there is a real possibility that a scientific
intelligence can come to know facts in the future which are
inconceivable in the present. Semiosis takes time, and
conceivability grows; if it didn’t, there would be no difference
between corollarial and theorematic deduction.
Eternal conceivability is not a pragmatic or pragmaticistically
meaningful concept.
gary f.
From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net] Sent: 17-Jan-15 7:35 AM
To: Howard Pattee Cc: Peirce List Subject:
[PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions : Chapter 8
Re: Gary Fuhrman
At: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15405
But we have no conception of inconceivable consequences.
Jon
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