List, Ben, Jon: On Jan 17, 2015, at 10:36 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote: > I think that Gary F. is looking for the diametrical contrary of > 'indubitability' in Peirce's sense. Such would be insuspectability. That > something is indubitable in Peirce's sense means that one can't doubt it, > even if eventually one may come to doubt it. >
A highly unusual sentence, at least to this reader. Peirce's definition seems clear enough to be categorized as a set of predictions about a concept and hence refers to an INDIVIDUAL's capability to speculate about the future. Time is intrinsic to this notion. The capabilities of any individual to project into the future is rather dependent on the personal history of the individual which in turn, vary greatly from person to person. 1. Jon interprets CSP in a very pragmatic way. 2. Gary F. interprets Jon's pragmatism as not being sufficiently pragmatic. 3. Ben interprets Gary's interpretation of Jon's interpretation of CSP assertion. Concomitantly, Ben introduces new terminology ( 'indubitability', insuspectability) and a restriction on the Aristotelian logical notion of "contrary" by introducing a phrase, "for the diametrical contrary". ( An Aristotelian logical contrary may be stated as the relationship between two sentences: "S is P." "S is not P." ) While it seems clear that these interpretations of one-another's philosophical perspectives are individual narratives. Yet, I ask, do the step-wise regressions of meanings of these sentences points to a general phenomena within semiotics - that of individualization of intent/entelechy? More generally, is any reader of this list serve capable of generating a metaphysical interpretation of Ben's interpretation of Gary F's interpretation of Jon's interpretation of CSP critical assertion about the nature of his philosophy? Cheers Jerry > Jon, Gary F., > > I think that Gary F. is looking for the diametrical contrary of > 'indubitability' in Peirce's sense. Such would be insuspectability. That > something is indubitable in Peirce's sense means that one can't doubt it, > even if eventually one may come to doubt it. This is related to Peirce's > critical common-sensism, in which he holds that there is a set of > propositions which people can't seriously doubt at the time, a set which > changes only slowly over time if at all. Thus, any proposition inconsistent > with those indubitable propositions would be insuspectable at that time. > However, the indubitable propositions also tend to be vague, so > inconsistencies with other propositions will tend to be vague too. > > Now, the pragmatic maxim is a maxim about definitions, not the conduct of > research, and Peirce in that context eventually calls a conception's meaning > its 'purport'. At the end of 'How to Make Our Ideas Clear,' Peirce says that > he has discussed how to make our ideas clear, and that that is not the same > thing as making them true, i.e., verifying them, which will be the subject of > his next paper. > I think that what one can do in a conception in order to accommodate future > learning and surprises is incorporate Peirce's contrite confession pf > fallibility, plus a claim of 'successibility' (denial of radical skepticism). > I do think that the reality of possibility makes a difference to the > pragmatic maxim in the sense that pragmatism leads to accepting such > reality and its denial tends to weaken the pragmatic maxim, since it makes a > conception's purport depend on whether certain conceived conditions will ever > be fulfilled, not on whether we think their fulfillment is conceivable. I > think Peirce's realism was little stronger in the early 1870s than when he > wrote 'How to Make Our Ideas Clear', for example see CP 7.340-1 (1873, > "Reality" in "The Logic of 1873"). > > Best, Ben > > On 1/17/2015 10:12 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote: > >> Re: Gary Fuhrman >> At: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15409 >> >> Gary, >> >> You can try to split rhetorical hairs between cognizable and conceivable, >> but I don't think those frizzies will wash. I never said anything about >> "eternal conceivability". What you are saying here smacks of a regress >> to the very brand of absolutism that Peirce's relational reform of logic >> was designed to escape. >> >> Relativity to a "state of information" (SOI_1) is one of Peirce's best >> ideas, >> but it's the same thing as relativity to a "system of interpretation" >> (SOI_0), >> in other words, a triadic sign relation, that was always a part of Peirce's >> triadic relational theory of "logic as formal semiotics" from the get-go. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon >> >> On 1/17/2015 9:56 AM, Gary Fuhrman wrote: >>> Jon, >>> >>> We have no conception of incognizable consequences. But surely there is a >>> real possibility that a scientific >>> intelligence can come to know facts in the future which are inconceivable >>> in the present. Semiosis takes time, and >>> conceivability grows; if it didn’t, there would be no difference between >>> corollarial and theorematic deduction. >>> Eternal conceivability is not a pragmatic or pragmaticistically meaningful >>> concept. >>> >>> gary f. >>> >>> From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net] Sent: 17-Jan-15 7:35 AM To: >>> Howard Pattee Cc: Peirce List Subject: >>> [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions : Chapter 8 >>> >>> Re: Gary Fuhrman >>> >>> At: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15405 >>> >>> But we have no conception of inconceivable consequences. >>> >>> Jon >>> >> > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu > . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu > with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > >
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