Dear Udell: I wonder if this post on a different thread, which I am sure you read, is relevant to your question in this thread:
Ozzie via <https://support.google.com/mail/answer/1311182?hl=en> list.iupui.edu 3:13 PM (17 hours ago) to Clark, PEIRCE-L Clark, List ~ I believe your discomfort arises from the fact that at the frontiers of knowledge (in any discipline), logical *abduction* tips over into *speculation* when objects do not have Pragmatic interpretants, and are replaced by nominalistic black-box mechanisms whose true properties are unknown. That leaves each "thinker" free to assign "reasonable" properties to the mechanism, and to challenge others for doing the same -- except when they happen to agree. This happens in all disciplines, as when physicists stalled out on gravity, then conceived of a new "graviton" particle emitted by atoms to explain it. They've never seen a graviton, but "it must be there." (They stay busy exploring the inside of their black box by smashing atoms in rarefied/unrealistic environments.) Back to logic. Like other humans, I *simultaneously* carry on logic at various levels: I walk down the street, look at the scenery, talk with a friend, worry about an argument I had with a family member and mull over a project I'm working on -- while carrying on numerous autonomous activities such as digestion, breathing, etc. Each of these is a logical activity. Some logic concerns our survival, some concerns our emotions, and most focuses on practical matters of lesser importance/urgency. Some logic is hard-wired into our DNA (instincts), other logic is based on experience/habit, and some is the product of on-the-fly cognition in the face of new circumstances. All logic requires energy to carry out, and all logic that concludes with a decision to act requires energy, too. Therefore, optimizing behavior requires an even higher form of logic to mediate/coordinate the competing demands for energy ordered up by the various logical mechanisms. Our colleague Edwina has written about this mediating function before. If someone claims that plants can/do communicate with each other, we would expect them to connect all of the logical dots in that story -- the physical components of plants that permits them to broadcast and receive signals, the nature of the electrochemical signals, factors in the environment that affect signaling, etc. If logic occurs in plants, we would insist, show us exactly how it operates. Yet, when we speak of human abduction, induction, deduction, interpretants, signs, etc ... well, that black-box discussion contains no actual body parts, there are no alternative types of logic taking place at the same time, data/information is costless, the product of one logical exercise is of the same nature and value as all others, etc. In short, our logical black box is chiefly filled with definitions and unrealistic/simplifying assumptions. When those clash from one discussant to the next, each argues to the reasonableness of his/her definitions and assumptions -- but (genuine) empirical evidence is seldom offered. Therefore, the debates are seldom/never resolved. Focusing solely on human cognition, then, here is my first Pragmatic question about semiotic logic: If an object has interpretants, WHERE do those (object+interpretants) reside in the brain, and WHAT links them together? Pick any object at all. If we can't conceive of the way that even one object and its interpretants exist in physical reality, then we cannot demonstrate empirically that human cognition (the physical brain) actually employs semiotic logic. This is an empirical matter; we have already asserted/predicted that the physical brain (cognition) makes use of objects and interpretants. That is only the first step. Every other aspect of semiotic logic must have some physical/empirical counterpart, too, where logic is carried out, mediated and used to direct activity. I do believe that human cognition employs semiotic logic, but belief without an operational mechanism means that our views belong in the nominalist, black-box category. It is inconsistent to believe that a physical brain evolved/optimized to carry out Pragmatic logic does so in a way divorced from physical reality. Once the physical nature of logic is addressed, other debates/discussions associated with black-box thinking will either fall by the wayside (empirical rejection) or be resolved through clarification. Among these, I include the recent discussion of knowing-how-to-be vs. DNA, language as constructed vs. instinct, different types of abduction, circumstances conducive to induction, etc. Those earlier views are not wrong, so much as they do not lead to a deeper understanding. I hope this illuminates my first paragraph above, and explains why I believe a new paradigm is required to proceed. I have learned a few things about brain research by watching TED Talks at TED.com <http://ted.com/>. Regards, Tom Wyrick *Ben Novak <http://bennovak.net>* 5129 Taylor Drive, Ave Maria, FL 34142 Telephones: Magic Jack: (717) 826-5224 *Best to call and leave messages.* Landline: 239-455-4200 *My brother's main phone line.* Mobile (202) 509-2655* I use this only on trips--and in any event messages arrive days late.* Skype: BenNovak2 *"All art is mortal, **not merely the individual artifacts, but the arts themselves.* *One day the last portrait of Rembrandt* *and the last bar of Mozart will have ceased to be — **though possibly a colored canvas and a sheet of notes may remain — **because the last eye and the last ear accessible to their message **will have gone." *Oswald Spengler On Wed, Oct 14, 2015 at 1:51 PM, Benjamin Udell <bud...@nyc.rr.com> wrote: > Dear Ben Novak, > > On the one hand, in calling attention to surprise and perplexity as the > occasion of abductive inference (as opposed to deductive and inductive > inference), Peirce is talking about a generic necessary condition which the > general character of abduction reflects in being a response to that > condition. The surprise, the violation of accepted explanation or the > unexpected lack of explanation, leads one to needing to think a bit outside > the box, bring into the mix an idea new to the case; that's abductive > inference. > > On the other hand, as your police example points out, surprise, - or, in > the phenomenon itself, anomalousness, complication, etc., - was not > generally a sufficient condition for pursuing the abductive trail when > Peirce wrote, any more than it is today. In any actual society and any > actual mind, there needs to be some motivated curiosity, and the social and > psychological conditions can certainly vary in their hospitality to focused > abductive thinking and methods of follow-up. Peirce of course would have > been interested in all that, though it would take more a inspirational or > exemplificative role than a dispositive role in his _*philosophy*_ of how > one _*ought*_ to think. One needs to be not too trapped in inquiry > methods of tenacity, authority, or the a priori (or, as I would generalize > them, the method of willful belief, the method of contest and ascendancy, > and the method of wishful belief, as well as a method of belief in reaction > to others' beliefs - contrarianism, partisanism, and so on), and the > dominance of such a method could mark an age, an intellectual age at least. > To pursue an abductive trail, one needs to be not too busy with other > things, as you say, even if one knows enough to be surprised by the > phenomenon; the means need to be not too arduous; and one needs the 'means' > that consists in having some notion of how to apply to the case the method > of learning from experience, observation, experiment, etc. There need to be > means, motive, and opportunity (even if the motive is a general devotion to > some research questions). The police and others in the old days did not > familiarize themselves with the kinds of evidence that would provide them > with illuminative surprises, and the methods of thinking and investigating > were correspondingly poor (which is not to say that they're perfect today). > Yet some people, especially the kind who stick their noses into everybody's > business, surely did (as one sees some doing today) abduce a lot about the > people whom they know - relatives, neighbors, co-workers, and even keep an > eye out for evidence that would affect their surmises. Such a busybody's > mind is a novel (somebody once said to me "His mind is a novel," which > struck me as one of the great remarks), the kind of novel that's full of > intrigue. But it's not a work of deep imagination, it's the busybody's > diary, a slice-of-life tell-all somewhat mixed with fancies, the daily soap > opera. A power-seeker may thrive on, indeed revel in, being such a busybody > (as the remark's subject did, in his way); and the power gained also helps > such a person to be a bigger busybody. Well, of course; knowledge is power. > I guess that a person whose own personality is a kind of blank or has some > sort of emptiness or precisely a shallowness of imagination might be > obsessed with filling his or her mind with other people and all their > furniture too. Continually monitoring them. Well, it could be good, evil, > indifferent, etc. I'm thinking of some of the themes in your thesis. > > Getting back to how I started this thread, not that I think that we need > to keep revisiting it, I still can't think of an emotion specific to the > arbitrary (Priman, in Peircean terms) appearance (as opposed to the > conflicting appearance), other than the ones that I mentioned. On the > occasion of attenuative deduction, I'd add that a contingent statement > regarded as false is what seems excluded, insular, "cryptic," barren of > sound conclusions, but when it's reevaluated as true, one may be caught in > a twilight zone where it still seems excluded yet there it is (and maybe > something else needs to be excluded), and that's where somewhat of a > feeling of impatience or suspense about the ramifications comes in. I like > the idea of attenuative deduction as typically resulting like a > recalculation from an update of input, but the idea seems bit "out there" > and seems to lead to some problems. > > Best, Ben > > On 10/13/2015 4:36 PM, Ben Novak wrote: > > Dear Ben Udell: > > I really didn't intend to send only to you, but I guess I didn't notice > that merely hitting reply resulted in that. It is my hope that my email and > your reply will now appear on the list, and we can see if others find them > of interest... > > Back to the subject. What I am suggesting is that the motivation for > thinking abductively is quite different than it was when Peirce wrote. I > think I mentioned in an earlier email about how revolutionary Sherlock > Holmes stories were to police forces, and that historically it took several > decades before police forces really began using Holmes' logic in the > investigation of cases. > > Today, on the other hand, adductive logic is by far the dominant logic in > our culture and society. Most young people naturally and almost > instinctively first evaluate whatever they hear in abductive ways. How > different this was a century ago! The Scotland Yard and police inspectors > in Holms' stories were not caricatures, but normal; it was Holmes who was > different. Today, forensics is the big thing, with NCIS programs on all the > time. > > So, I am suggesting two things. First, that the question of what sparks > abductive questioning was certainly different when Peirce wrote, than it is > today. What seems important today is not simply surprise, but some > additional reason to cause one to act on the strange set of facts. Simply > put, there are entirely too many strange facts to get excited about. For > example, once it was possible to take an auto engine apart and find out how > it works, and auto mechanic and wannabes were everywhere. Today, how an > automobile engine works is as mysterious as how a Boeing 747 Jumbo jet > engine works. But few have the time--or the need--to study either. > Millions, such as me, use the computer every day without any idea of how > computers work. > > So, it is not sufficient to be faced with a surprising set of facts > anymore. When I think of it, the computer I am writing this on is a > total--and surprising--mystery to me. > > One of the things I enjoy about the discussions on Pierce L is the degree > of specialty with which many participants can investigate the subjects of > abduction, semiotics, etc., as well as the efforts of some for a more > unified theory. But, on the other hand, I do miss the observation of, and > accounting for, the vast amount of daily things that are relevant. > > I suggest that these subjects are ubiquitous, and that if we were more > conscious of daily life and experiences, we would find much more fodder for > our work. Part of what I think important in this is a lot more awareness of > culture and history. > > Ben Novak > > *Ben Novak <http://bennovak.net>* > 5129 Taylor Drive, Ave Maria, FL 34142 > Telephones: > Magic Jack: (717) 826-5224 *Best to call and leave messages. * > Landline: 239-455-4200 *My brother's main phone line.* > Mobile (202) 509-2655* I use this only on trips--and in any event > messages arrive days late.* > Skype: BenNovak2 > > *"All art is mortal, not merely the individual artifacts, but the arts > themselves. One day the last portrait of Rembrandt and the last bar of > Mozart will have ceased to be — though possibly a colored canvas and a > sheet of notes may remain — because the last eye and the last ear > accessible to their message will have gone."* Oswald Spengler > > On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 12:40 PM, Benjamin Udell < <bud...@nyc.rr.com> > bud...@nyc.rr.com> wrote: > > Dear Ben Novak: > > Thanks for this. I don't know why you sent it only to me and not to > peirce-l. > > Looking at the history of dominant logics certainly gives a panoramic > dimension to the discussion. I think that it helps that you note the > difference between abductive inference, which is as pervasive as any other > mode of inference in the mind, and abductive logic, and its methodeutical > elaboration (which involves the interplay of all the modes of inference), > as a dominant logic of an age. However, I'm looking at a feeling that would > be involved in the occasion of induction generally, and it seems similar > to, yet not the same as, the kind of surprise that Peirce discusses as the > occasion of abductive inference, the abduction-inspiring surprise of > conflict with one's beliefs about what can be. What I'm looking at instead > is not the sense that something shouldn't have happened, that it conflicts > with expectations and ought to be impossible, but rather that it seems kind > of arbitrary or 'slanted' or fluky. Downard's reply to me at peirce-l > quotes Peirce on active surprise versus passive surprise, and Peirce's idea > of passive surprise sounds like what I'm talking about, but Peirce's > example of a eclipse that one had neither expected to happen nor expected > not to happen, seems not the clearest example, it makes it seem as if > eclipses were sometimes feasible or probable but still uncertain. > > In the case of attenuative deduction's occasion, I'm thinking of what one > deduces _*from*_ the new observation, not of how one deduces _*to*_ it > from the undoubted already-given. I'm not sure what to call the emotion > associated with it in this case, but maybe it's a kind of impatience or > sense of suspense. I'm somewhat in a welter of thoughts about these things > lately. Anyway, I'm thinking that the occasion is when one learns that > something that one had thought contingently false turns out to be true or > still seems even now pretty much false but still just plausibly true (a > hypothetical explanation that has arisen). It had seemed contingently false > (I mean false but not impossible) but suddenly there it is, or seems to be, > seemingly coy, cryptic, vague, insular, putting one into suspense. So one > decreases the crypticness and suspense by deducing the consequences, the > Excel chart recalculates the outcomes from updated input, and so on. One > can check those outcomes against reality to corroborate, inductively. > > Well, my views on all this are still somewhat tentative. > > Best, Ben > > On 10/12/2015 1:14 PM, Ben Novak wrote: > > Dear Ben Udell: > > I recall reading somewhere in Peirce that each age is determined by the > dominant logic of that age, and that when the dominant logic changes, the > perspectives of each age change. > > In regard to your question: > > ". . . if one knew in advance that that the population consists of reds > and greens, and if one found in the sample a 50-50 distribution of red and > green, that would still seem arbitrary. How does one 'explain' it or > account for it? One induces that the total population has a 50-50 > distribution of red and green; if true, then the sample's distribution is > _*not > so arbitrary*_. I am unsure what emotional response to associate with > such arbitrariness. It may involve a sense of being detoured, skewed, > diverted, interested, something like that." > > Think of two persons from two different ages coming upon a wondrous > landscape, such as, for example, the Grand Canyon. The one from a deductive > age, such as the Scholastic period, may be struck with awe at the beauty > and majesty he perceives, while someone from the age of induction might > wonder how to classify it so as to fit into an encyclopedia of all > knowledge. But someone from the age of adductive reasoning will be led to > ask, "How did this hole in the ground come to be?" > > I gather this impression from the history of the science of geology, see > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_geology > . . . and the story of the man considered to be the Father or Founder of > modern geology, James Hutton > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_Hutton > > In the stories of the birth of geological science, it is easy to see how > different ages applied their best reasoning to the problem of the origins > of the earth and its features. When the question first arose, they turned > to the ancient wisdom to reason deductively to what they observed. Later, > as observations multiplied as a result both of the invention of the > printing press and the idea of collecting information in encyclopedias, and > sharing it through societies, new theories could encourage testing > resulting in new reports and new theories. Finally, nascent geologists had > enough information to begin to know what to look for, and begin to think > backwards to new and different causes. > > Now, adductive logic has always existed, as shown in Eco and Sebeok's *The > Sign of Three*. But adductive logic could not easily be applied until two > preconditions were present. First, a large body of observations made > available by encouraging experiments, together with recording and > publishing. Second, was the divorcing of the mind from experiences of awe, > beauty, and morality. Thus Peirce's comment about adductive logic not > bestowing a "single smile upon beauty, upon moral virtue, or upon > abstract truth--the very things that alone raise Humanity above Animality." > With that in place, both every regularity, as well as every irregularity, > can quite suddenly seem strange, invoking a "why" and a "how--where every > "why" is understood solely in terms of prior causality, and not teleology. > > So, I am proposing that it is a shift in perspective to an abductive > approach (=pragmaticism) that may be part of the answer to your question > about being "unsure what emotional response to associate with such > arbitrariness. A simple change of the perspective in which problems are > seen can induce the feeling you are seeking to understand, as most horror > movies begin with everything seeming ordinary, until suddenly something > happens that makes it all seem eerie. > > Insofar as you suggest that "It may involve a sense of being detoured, > skewed, diverted, interested, something like that," I suggest that the > sense of being "detoured," "skewed," or "diverted," arises primarily from > being focused upon causality and effects, to the exclusion of feelings of > awe, beauty, morality, even pleasure, etc. > > Well, that is my contribution. > > Ben Novak > > *Ben Novak <http://bennovak.net>* > 5129 Taylor Drive, Ave Maria, FL 34142 > Telephones: > Magic Jack: (717) 826-5224 *Best to call and leave messages.* > Landline: 239-455-4200 *My brother's main phone line.* > Mobile (202) 509-2655* I use this only on trips--and in any event > messages arrive days late.* > Skype: BenNovak2 > > *"All art is mortal, not merely the individual artifacts, but the arts > themselves. One day the last portrait of Rembrandt and the last bar of > Mozart will have ceased to be — though possibly a colored canvas and a > sheet of notes may remain — because the last eye and the last ear > accessible to their message will have gone."* Oswald Spengler > > On Sun, Oct 11, 2015 at 7:41 PM, Benjamin Udell <bud...@nyc.rr.com> wrote: > > List, > > Some may remember my attempts to outline, as forming a system, such > heuristic aspects, given by conclusions to premisses, as an abductive > inference's natural simplicity, an induction's verisimilitude, an > attenuative deduction's new aspect, and an equipollential deduction's > nontriviality. > > I've hit upon something that strikes a novel (to me) but also Peircean > note, involving the idea of Firstness, so I thought I'd pass it along. > > For a long time I was careful to distinguish between surprise (of an > anomaly) and bewilderment at excessive complexity or complication. Peirce > usually mentions surprise as the occasion of inquiry in general and of > abductive inference in particular, but occasionally mentions complication > as such occasion. Now, the idea of abductive inference's natural simplicity > seems more a response to complication than to anomaly or surprise. I won't > belabor that appearance, but will just say that I wondered what appearance > or feeling (akin to puzzlement, but not puzzlement) would be the occasion > of a chiefly inductive inquiry, or of an inductive inference in the course > of inquiry. Then it finally dawned on me that I was paying too much > attention to the temporal mode of the feeling (overturning of expectation > versus overturning of supposition) and not enough to the overturning, the > conflict. What occasions induction (besides an occasioning inquiry) is not > a conflict (a secundan thing), a cognitive dissonance, but a sense of > something _*arbitrary*_, gratuitous, spontaneous, unnecessary though > possible, which, in Peircean terms, means a whiff of Firstness (see > Peirce's "Quale-Consciousness" for example). > > If one has a sample from a population about which one had no particular > expectations, then any definite result is bound to seem arbitrary, > arbitrarily one-sided, to seem like some things that one has seen and > unlike other things (unless one supposes some Bayesian priors in the > absence of evidence, which isn't a Peircean approach anyway). While the > occasion of abductive inference seems surprising, contrarian, so to speak, > the occasion of induction seems partisan, it just takes sides. This > arbitrary character, while not surprising or perplexing, is still, let's > say, striking. From a non-Bayesian viewpoint, if one knew in advance that > that the population consists of reds and greens, and if one found in the > sample a 50-50 distribution of red and green, that would still seem > arbitrary. How does one 'explain' it or account for it? One induces that > the total population has a 50-50 distribution of red and green; if true, > then the sample's distribution is _*not so arbitrary*_. I am unsure what > emotional response to associate with such arbitrariness. It may involve a > sense of being detoured, skewed, diverted, interested, something like that. > > Best, Ben > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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