Dear Ben Novak,
I haven't been following that thread carefully, since I've gotten busy
with practical matters.
On re-reading my previous message, I find that I misplaced a phrase (in
one of my two uses of it) in such a way that you may have thought that I
was criticizing you, suggesting that you were trapped in a method of
tenacity or authority, or whatever. I don't think that at all. Here it
is with the phrase inserted in boldface into its proper place:
[....] Peirce of course would have been interested in all that,
though it would take more a inspirational or exemplificative role
than a dispositive role in his /philosophy/_ of how one _/ought/_ to
think. **To pursue an abductive trail,** one needs to be not too
trapped in inquiry methods of tenacity, authority, or the a priori
[....]
[End quote]
As to my question, I think I was getting myself into some contortions
about deduction because in some half-conscious way I was still
introducing the idea of conflict. Now, Peirce said that deduction is for
prediction. That by itself is enough to suggest that an emotion of
impatience belongs to the occasion of deduction — an impatience with the
vagueness of the future, or the coyness of the present in telling us it
— one doesn't want to wait for nature to take its course, one wants to
find out ahead of time, on the basis of accumulated data, what is the
fate, for example of the Milky Way. (It turns out to be on a collision
course with the Andromeda galaxy.)
— In (attenuative) deduction one notices certain necessary but
perspectivally new consequents about what is going to happen. (To reduce
impatience.)
— In induction one expects certain unnecessary consequents sufficient
for the antecedents, but also similar to them, about what is actually
happening. (To reduce feeling of a skew or arbitrariness.)
— In abduction (a.k.a. retroduction) one supposes certain contingent,
'can-be', but also particularly plausible, naturally simple, consequents
about what has happened. (To reduce feeling of surprise, perplexity,
conflict with assumptions or expectations.)
Tom Wyrick's comments might be taken as relevant to my question if one
thought that I was pursuing a question of psychology. The philosophical
study of semiotics, inference, etc., is at a cenoscopic level, concerned
with positive phenomena in general, not with special classes or
populations of concrete phenomena. One wouldn't expect questions about
statistical inference and its principles to depend on results in brain
studies any more than one would expect number theory to depend on
results in brain studies. If brain study conclusions could be used to
support conclusions in number theory, I doubt that number theorists
would be too proud to use such brain studies. What the brain studies may
help resolve instead are questions of /implementations/_ of logic,
semiotics, statistical inference, number theory, etc., in homo sapiens.
They might help show specific, mathematically or logically arbitrary
skews of such implementations, and so on.
The positivists divided sciences into formal (i.e., mathematics and
deductive logic) and factual. I never got clear on where they put
philosophy, I suspect they hoped to make it into a formal science.
Peirce divided discovery sciences into mathematics, cenoscopy
(_/philosophia prima/ _)
http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/cenoscopy , and idioscopy
(physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, etc.). Understanding Peirce's
views on this helps clarify his approach to (philosophical) logic as
formal semiotic - the formal study of signs and semiosis, a study not
resting _/logically/_ on neurology, psychology, linguistics, or
sociology, but sometimes related to them genealogically, in drawing on
them for examples, generalizing from them, where the word
'generalization' is used in Peirce's preferred sense of _/selective/_
generalization of characters to a wider domain. I've argued a number of
times here at peirce-l (somebody disagreed) that we should feel free to
look at actual concrete historical cases without worrying too much about
whether they'll bias us in philosophical inquiry. I think Peirce had no
hesitation about it. On the other hand I think that Peirce was quite
right to keep track of whether the dependence of one science on another
is a logical dependence or a dependence for examples and inspiration.
Best, Ben
On 10/21/2015 9:28 AM, Ben Novak wrote:
Dear Udell:
I wonder if this post on a different thread, which I am sure you read,
is relevant to your question in this thread:
Ozzie via list.iupui.edu
3:13 PM (17 hours ago)
to Clark, PEIRCE-L
Clark, List ~
I believe your discomfort arises from the fact that at the
frontiers of knowledge (in any discipline), logical abduction tips
over into speculation when objects do not have Pragmatic
interpretants, and are replaced by nominalistic black-box
mechanisms whose true properties are unknown. That leaves each
"thinker" free to assign "reasonable" properties to the mechanism,
and to challenge others for doing the same -- except when they
happen to agree.
This happens in all disciplines, as when physicists stalled out on
gravity, then conceived of a new "graviton" particle emitted by
atoms to explain it. They've never seen a graviton, but "it must
be there." (They stay busy exploring the inside of their black
box by smashing atoms in rarefied/unrealistic environments.)
Back to logic. Like other humans, I simultaneously carry on logic
at various levels: I walk down the street, look at the scenery,
talk with a friend, worry about an argument I had with a family
member and mull over a project I'm working on -- while carrying on
numerous autonomous activities such as digestion, breathing, etc.
Each of these is a logical activity. Some logic concerns our
survival, some concerns our emotions, and most focuses on
practical matters of lesser importance/urgency. Some logic is
hard-wired into our DNA (instincts), other logic is based on
experience/habit, and some is the product of on-the-fly cognition
in the face of new circumstances. All logic requires energy to
carry out, and all logic that concludes with a decision to act
requires energy, too. Therefore, optimizing behavior requires an
even higher form of logic to mediate/coordinate the competing
demands for energy ordered up by the various logical mechanisms.
Our colleague Edwina has written about this mediating function before.
If someone claims that plants can/do communicate with each other,
we would expect them to connect all of the logical dots in that
story -- the physical components of plants that permits them to
broadcast and receive signals, the nature of the electrochemical
signals, factors in the environment that affect signaling, etc.
If logic occurs in plants, we would insist, show us exactly how it
operates.
Yet, when we speak of human abduction, induction, deduction,
interpretants, signs, etc ... well, that black-box discussion
contains no actual body parts, there are no alternative types of
logic taking place at the same time, data/information is costless,
the product of one logical exercise is of the same nature and
value as all others, etc. In short, our logical black box is
chiefly filled with definitions and unrealistic/simplifying
assumptions. When those clash from one discussant to the next,
each argues to the reasonableness of his/her definitions and
assumptions -- but (genuine) empirical evidence is seldom
offered. Therefore, the debates are seldom/never resolved.
Focusing solely on human cognition, then, here is my first
Pragmatic question about semiotic logic: If an object has
interpretants, WHERE do those (object+interpretants) reside in the
brain, and WHAT links them together? Pick any object at all. If
we can't conceive of the way that even one object and its
interpretants exist in physical reality, then we cannot
demonstrate empirically that human cognition (the physical brain)
actually employs semiotic logic. This is an empirical matter; we
have already asserted/predicted that the physical brain
(cognition) makes use of objects and interpretants.
That is only the first step. Every other aspect of semiotic logic
must have some physical/empirical counterpart, too, where logic is
carried out, mediated and used to direct activity.
I do believe that human cognition employs semiotic logic, but
belief without an operational mechanism means that our views
belong in the nominalist, black-box category. It is inconsistent
to believe that a physical brain evolved/optimized to carry out
Pragmatic logic does so in a way divorced from physical reality.
Once the physical nature of logic is addressed, other
debates/discussions associated with black-box thinking will either
fall by the wayside (empirical rejection) or be resolved through
clarification. Among these, I include the recent discussion of
knowing-how-to-be vs. DNA, language as constructed vs. instinct,
different types of abduction, circumstances conducive to
induction, etc. Those earlier views are not wrong, so much as
they do not lead to a deeper understanding.
I hope this illuminates my first paragraph above, and explains why
I believe a new paradigm is required to proceed. I have learned a
few things about brain research by watching TED Talks at TED.com.
Regards,
Tom Wyrick
*Ben Novak <http://bennovak.net> *
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Mozart will have ceased to be — though possibly a colored canvas and a
sheet of notes may remain — because the last eye and the last ear
accessible to their message will have gone."/ Oswald Spengler
On Wed, Oct 14, 2015 at 1:51 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
Dear Ben Novak,
On the one hand, in calling attention to surprise and perplexity as
the occasion of abductive inference (as opposed to deductive and
inductive inference), Peirce is talking about a generic necessary
condition which the general character of abduction reflects in being
a response to that condition. The surprise, the violation of accepted
explanation or the unexpected lack of explanation, leads one to
needing to think a bit outside the box, bring into the mix an idea
new to the case; that's abductive inference.
On the other hand, as your police example points out, surprise, - or,
in the phenomenon itself, anomalousness, complication, etc., - was
not generally a sufficient condition for pursuing the abductive trail
when Peirce wrote, any more than it is today. In any actual society
and any actual mind, there needs to be some motivated curiosity, and
the social and psychological conditions can certainly vary in their
hospitality to focused abductive thinking and methods of follow-up.
Peirce of course would have been interested in all that, though it
would take more a inspirational or exemplificative role than a
dispositive role in his _/philosophy/_ of how one _/ought/_ to think.
One needs to be not too trapped in inquiry methods of tenacity,
authority, or the a priori (or, as I would generalize them, the
method of willful belief, the method of contest and ascendancy, and
the method of wishful belief, as well as a method of belief in
reaction to others' beliefs - contrarianism, partisanism, and so on),
and the dominance of such a method could mark an age, an intellectual
age at least. To pursue an abductive trail, one needs to be not too
busy with other things, as you say, even if one knows enough to be
surprised by the phenomenon; the means need to be not too arduous;
and one needs the 'means' that consists in having some notion of how
to apply to the case the method of learning from experience,
observation, experiment, etc. There need to be means, motive, and
opportunity (even if the motive is a general devotion to some
research questions). The police and others in the old days did not
familiarize themselves with the kinds of evidence that would provide
them with illuminative surprises, and the methods of thinking and
investigating were correspondingly poor (which is not to say that
they're perfect today). Yet some people, especially the kind who
stick their noses into everybody's business, surely did (as one sees
some doing today) abduce a lot about the people whom they know -
relatives, neighbors, co-workers, and even keep an eye out for
evidence that would affect their surmises. Such a busybody's mind is
a novel (somebody once said to me "His mind is a novel," which struck
me as one of the great remarks), the kind of novel that's full of
intrigue. But it's not a work of deep imagination, it's the
busybody's diary, a slice-of-life tell-all somewhat mixed with
fancies, the daily soap opera. A power-seeker may thrive on, indeed
revel in, being such a busybody (as the remark's subject did, in his
way); and the power gained also helps such a person to be a bigger
busybody. Well, of course; knowledge is power. I guess that a person
whose own personality is a kind of blank or has some sort of
emptiness or precisely a shallowness of imagination might be obsessed
with filling his or her mind with other people and all their
furniture too. Continually monitoring them. Well, it could be good,
evil, indifferent, etc. I'm thinking of some of the themes in your
thesis.
Getting back to how I started this thread, not that I think that we
need to keep revisiting it, I still can't think of an emotion
specific to the arbitrary (Priman, in Peircean terms) appearance (as
opposed to the conflicting appearance), other than the ones that I
mentioned. On the occasion of attenuative deduction, I'd add that a
contingent statement regarded as false is what seems excluded,
insular, "cryptic," barren of sound conclusions, but when it's
reevaluated as true, one may be caught in a twilight zone where it
still seems excluded yet there it is (and maybe something else needs
to be excluded), and that's where somewhat of a feeling of impatience
or suspense about the ramifications comes in. I like the idea of
attenuative deduction as typically resulting like a recalculation
from an update of input, but the idea seems bit "out there" and seems
to lead to some problems.
Best, Ben
On 10/13/2015 4:36 PM, Ben Novak wrote:
Dear Ben Udell:
I really didn't intend to send only to you, but I guess I didn't
notice that merely hitting reply resulted in that. It is my hope
that my email and your reply will now appear on the list, and we can
see if others find them of interest...
Back to the subject. What I am suggesting is that the motivation for
thinking abductively is quite different than it was when Peirce
wrote. I think I mentioned in an earlier email about how
revolutionary Sherlock Holmes stories were to police forces, and
that historically it took several decades before police forces
really began using Holmes' logic in the investigation of cases.
Today, on the other hand, adductive logic is by far the dominant
logic in our culture and society. Most young people naturally and
almost instinctively first evaluate whatever they hear in abductive
ways. How different this was a century ago! The Scotland Yard and
police inspectors in Holms' stories were not caricatures, but
normal; it was Holmes who was different. Today, forensics is the big
thing, with NCIS programs on all the time.
So, I am suggesting two things. First, that the question of what
sparks abductive questioning was certainly different when Peirce
wrote, than it is today. What seems important today is not simply
surprise, but some additional reason to cause one to act on the
strange set of facts. Simply put, there are entirely too many
strange facts to get excited about. For example, once it was
possible to take an auto engine apart and find out how it works, and
auto mechanic and wannabes were everywhere. Today, how an automobile
engine works is as mysterious as how a Boeing 747 Jumbo jet engine
works. But few have the time--or the need--to study either.
Millions, such as me, use the computer every day without any idea of
how computers work.
So, it is not sufficient to be faced with a surprising set of facts
anymore. When I think of it, the computer I am writing this on is a
total--and surprising--mystery to me.
One of the things I enjoy about the discussions on Pierce L is the
degree of specialty with which many participants can investigate the
subjects of abduction, semiotics, etc., as well as the efforts of
some for a more unified theory. But, on the other hand, I do miss
the observation of, and accounting for, the vast amount of daily
things that are relevant.
I suggest that these subjects are ubiquitous, and that if we were
more conscious of daily life and experiences, we would find much
more fodder for our work. Part of what I think important in this is
a lot more awareness of culture and history.
Ben Novak
*Ben Novak <http://bennovak.net> *
5129 Taylor Drive, Ave Maria, FL 34142
Telephones:
Magic Jack: (717) 826-5224 <tel:%28717%29%20826-5224> /*Best to call
and leave messages.* /
Landline: 239-455-4200 <tel:239-455-4200> */My brother's main phone
line./ *
Mobile (202) 509-2655 <tel:%28202%29%20509-2655> */I use this only
on trips--and in any event messages arrive days late./ *
Skype: BenNovak2
/"All art is mortal, not merely the individual artifacts, but the
arts themselves. One day the last portrait of Rembrandt and the last
bar of Mozart will have ceased to be — though possibly a colored
canvas and a sheet of notes may remain — because the last eye and
the last ear accessible to their message will have gone."/ Oswald
Spengler
On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 12:40 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
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