Actually, it is logic that draws on both mathematics and phenomenology. http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2012/05/31/definition-and-determination-4/
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2014/08/24/c-s-peirce-•-syllabus-•-selection-1/ Who draws quickest and who bites the dust is another question. Regards, Jon http://inquiryintoinquiry.com > On Oct 29, 2015, at 2:05 AM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> wrote: > > Jeff, list, > > It's VERY late on the East Coast, so I'll keep this quite brief for now: a > single question. > > In what sense can phenomenology be said to draw "from both mathematics and > from logic"? > >> Certainly from the standpoint of Peirce's 'classification of the sciences' >> phenomenology can be seen to draw from mathematics, especially from the >> simplest mathematics. the logic of mathematics (involving the >> understanding that there are monads, dyads, triads, a kind of valency >> principle relating these, a reduction principle, discrete, >> pseudo-continuous and continuous structures, etc.) > > In addition. phenomenology can, as can all sciences, draw upon a logica > utens. But, except for its providing 'examples' and the like ('the like' > including logical lessons learned from it's formal study), again. from the > standpoint of the classification of the sciences, can phenomenology really be > said to draw from formal logic, logica docens? If so, how? > > Best, > > Gary R > > > > > Gary Richmond > Philosophy and Critical Thinking > Communication Studies > LaGuardia College of the City University of New York > C 745 > 718 482-5690 > >> On Thu, Oct 29, 2015 at 1:02 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard >> <jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote: >> Hi Gary R., List, >> >> My aim was to draw on points that are developed in the context of the >> logical theory for the sake of understanding how he might be using the terms >> "firstness, secondness, thirdness" in the phenomenological theory. For my >> part, I take the aim of developing phenomenology as its own branch of >> philosophical inquiry quite seriously. As such, I said "in the first >> instance" because that is how--historically speaking-- Peirce arrived at >> these notions. He started from the side of a philosophical logic and was >> examining the ways that various predicates can stand in different kinds of >> relations. On my reading of the development of his account of the >> categories, Peirce was working at the level of phenomenology, logic and >> metaphysics from the very start (e.g. in the Lowell Lectures and in New >> List). Slowly, he gained a sense of the importance of separating more >> clearly between the goals guiding each kind of inquiry along with the >> methods that we should use in developing the respective accounts of the >> phenomenological, logical and metaphysical categories. >> >> When he finally decided to make phenomenology a major branch of >> philosophical inquiry in its own right, he made it clear that phenomenology >> draws from both mathematics and from logic. When we are drawing from >> mathematics, it appears that were developing the account of the categories >> "from the inside." That is, we are looking at examples of formal >> conceptions in math--such as that of generating a number series or >> generating a line by moving a particle--and then we are drawing on these >> conceptions for clarifying the formal elements that are part of common >> experience concerning positive matters. When we are coming at phenomenology >> from the other direction and drawing from logic theory, we are asking: what >> elements in experience are necessary for the very possibility of having >> signs that are significant and for drawing inferences that are valid? We >> then ask--are these formal elements really found in our common experience? >> If so, let us learn to see them more clearly in their many guises. >> >> Let me add a bit more. One reason we need a phenomenological theory is >> that, for Peirce, as for other logicians of his generation, the science of >> logic should be based on observations. All of the observations are drawn >> from our ordinary experience--including especially the phenomena associated >> with self-control and the phenomena involved in evaluating arguments as >> valid or invalid. As such, we need to develop an account of the basic >> elements that are an essential part of all of the phenomena we might >> observe. The account of the formal and material elements is designed to put >> us in a better position to analyze the phenomena we observe for the sake of >> seeing more clearly what is necessary, when it comes to forming hypotheses, >> to make sense of the phenomena that are calling out for explanation. Before >> drawing such inferences, we need to correct for observational errors. >> >> So, to offer an example, Augustus De Morgan, makes the following point in >> Formal Logic, or, The Calculus of inference, necessary and probable. The >> question he is trying to answer in this chapter on probability is: how much >> confidence can we place in testimony provided by a number of witnesses? >> Here is what he says about the fit between his theory and the phenomena that >> are part of our common experience: >> >> The student of this subject is always struck by the frequency of the >> problems in which the science confirms an ordinary notion of common life, or >> is confirmed by it, according to his state of mind with respect to the whole >> doctrine. It is impossible to say that we a theory made to explain common >> phenomena, and hence affording no reason for surprise that it does explain >> them. The first principles are too few and two (sic) simple, the train of >> deductions ends in conclusions too remote. I believe hundreds of cases >> might be cited in which the results of this theory are found already >> established by the common sense of mankind: in many of them, the >> mathematical sciences were not powerful enough to give the modes of >> calculation, when the principles of the theory were first digested. >> >> The conclusion we can draw from De Morgan's remark is, I think, quite >> clear. In the absence of a clear account of the phenomena we observe as >> part of our common experience, the selection of the best logical theory will >> be underdetermined. What is more, we need to be careful not to draw on the >> same phenomena we relied on in forming our hypotheses when we are testing >> those hypotheses. So, let's make sure we have an adequate theoretical >> account of the the phenomena that are serving as the data for our >> theoretical inquiries. >> >> --Jeff >> >> Jeff Downard >> Associate Professor >> Department of Philosophy >> NAU >> (o) 523-8354 >> ________________________________________ >> From: Gary Richmond [gary.richm...@gmail.com] >> Sent: Wednesday, October 28, 2015 7:43 PM >> To: Peirce-L >> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce's categories >> >> Jeff wrote: >> >> If Redness is understood, in the first instance, as the result of an >> abstraction from the conception of red, why not think of Firstness, in the >> first instance, as the result of an abstraction from the conception of what >> is first? In this way, we focus the attention not on this or that red >> thing, and not even on this or that feeling of red, but on the kind of >> relationship that obtains when the predicate is considered separately from >> the things that might stand in that relationship. >> >> From the standpoint of logic, I would tend to fully agree with you. But from >> that of phenomenology, I have some reservations. There *are* in fact red >> things, and blue things, and snow may indeed appear much more blue than >> white in a given situation of light and shade. And there are, in addition, >> possible firstnesses which even modal logics can't really quite handle in >> reality. >> >> This is to suggest that firstness, logically speaking, *is*, as you say, an >> abstraction, but that the "first instance" is *not* a logical abstraction, >> but a phenomenon. and even, for the sake of argument, a mere possible >> phenomenon. >> >> So, from the conceptions of first, second and third, we abstract from the >> thought of any particular thing that might stand in relation to x--is first, >> y--is second and z--is third. By pealing the things that x, x and z might >> stand for away from the relation, we get the notions of the relationships of >> firstness, secondness and thirdness considered in themselves. Here, I am >> following Peirce's explanations of how we should talk about relatives, >> relations and relationships. >> >> Again, I would tend to agree with you--and Peirce--when one considers the >> categories strictly from the standpoint of logic. >> >> Btw. Joe Ransdell and I tended to disagree on this matter. He would, I >> think, be siding with you in this matter, in a sense suggesting that logic >> as semiotic was 'sufficient', not quite imagining that phaneroscopy could >> really be a scientific discipline--at least, not much of one. >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R >> >> >> >> >> [Gary Richmond] >> >> Gary Richmond >> Philosophy and Critical Thinking >> Communication Studies >> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York >> C 745 >> 718 482-5690<tel:718%20482-5690> >> >> On Wed, Oct 28, 2015 at 9:10 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard >> <jeffrey.down...@nau.edu<mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>> wrote: >> Gary F., Gary R., List, >> >> If Redness is understood, in the first instance, as the result of an >> abstraction from the conception of red, why not think of Firstness, in the >> first instance, as the result of an abstraction from the conception of what >> is first? In this way, we focus the attention not on this or that red >> thing, and not even on this or that feeling of red, but on the kind of >> relationship that obtains when the predicate is considered separately from >> the things that might stand in that relationship. >> >> So, from the conceptions of first, second and third, we abstract from the >> thought of any particular thing that might stand in relation to x--is first, >> y--is second and z--is third. By pealing the things that x, x and z might >> stand for away from the relation, we get the notions of the relationships of >> firstness, secondness and thirdness considered in themselves. Here, I am >> following Peirce's explanations of how we should talk about relatives, >> relations and relationships. >> >> --Jeff >> >> Jeff Downard >> Associate Professor >> Department of Philosophy >> NAU >> (o) 523-8354 >> ________________________________________ >> From: Gary Richmond [gary.richm...@gmail.com<mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com>] >> Sent: Wednesday, October 28, 2015 4:07 PM >> To: Peirce-L >> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce's categories >> >> Matt wrote; >> >> My uses of 'First', 'Second', or 'Third' are to denote specific >> instantiations of the categories of Firstness, Secondness, or Thirdness. >> This is similar to how I use 'a general' as a specific instantiation of >> generality. Perhaps we all should follow this standard. Saying "category the >> Third" just seems like bad grammar. Same with saying "a Thirdness." >> >> I'm not sure that I fully agree. Sometimes Peirceans like to speak of, say, >> Thirdness, as a category, or in some other way which does not represent an >> "instantiation" of a category (I'm not even sure what "instantiation" means >> exactly in regard to 1ns and 3ns especially). >> >> Also, since except for certain types of analysis, the categories are all >> three present in any genuine tricategorial relation, "instantiation" seems a >> problematic expression. Perhaps I'm missing your meaning, however. >> >> I agree with you that saying "category the Third" is just (Peirce's) bad >> grammar. I don't know anyone else who uses that expression today. And I >> would also say that "a Thirdness" is not only bad grammar, but probably >> altogether meaningless. >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R >> >> >> >> [Gary Richmond] >> >> Gary Richmond >> Philosophy and Critical Thinking >> Communication Studies >> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York >> C 745 >> 718 482-5690<tel:718%20482-5690> >> >> On Wed, Oct 28, 2015 at 6:11 PM, Matt Faunce >> <mattfau...@gmail.com<mailto:mattfau...@gmail.com><mailto:mattfau...@gmail.com<mailto:mattfau...@gmail.com>>> >> wrote: >> My uses of 'First', 'Second', or 'Third' are to denote specific >> instantiations of the categories of Firstness, Secondness, or Thirdness. >> This is similar to how I use 'a general' as a specific instantiation of >> generality. Perhaps we all should follow this standard. Saying "category the >> Third" just seems like bad grammar. Same with saying "a Thirdness." >> >> Matt >> >> On 10/28/15 5:49 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: >> Gary, list, >> >> Thanks for your contribution to the discussion of this question which, >> however, seems to focus on Peirce's writings on categories prior to the 20th >> century. >> >> At the moment my sense (and that's pretty much all it is, while I do think >> that at least a mini-research project is in order) is that as he approaches, >> then enters, the 20th century that Peirce uses the -ness suffix more and >> more, especially in introducing his tricategoriality into a discussion. Once >> that's been done, the context makes it clear what is first (i.e, 1ns), etc. >> in the ensuing discussion. >> >> So, in a word, I think he sees that employing the -ness helps disambiguate >> its use in any given context, especially in introducing his no doubt >> strange, to some even today, notion of three phenomenological categories. >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu><mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu>> >> . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to >> l...@list.iupui.edu<mailto:l...@list.iupui.edu><mailto:l...@list.iupui.edu<mailto:l...@list.iupui.edu>> >> with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu> . To UNSUBSCRIBE, >> send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to >> l...@list.iupui.edu<mailto:l...@list.iupui.edu> with the line "UNSubscribe >> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >
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