Gary F, GF: In the paragraph at issue, Peirce is clearly *defining* two kinds of > signs as parts of other signs: “If a sign, *B*, only signifies characters > that are elements (or the whole) of the meaning of another sign, *A*, > then *B* is said to be a *predicate* (or *essential part*) of *A*. If a > sign, *A*, only denotes real objects that are a part or the whole of the > objects denoted by another sign, *B*, then *A* is said to be a *subject* > (or *substantial part*) of *B*.” Do you not agree that these are > definitions of *predicate* and *subject*?
FR: No, I do agree that these are definitions of predicate and subject. But I also note there is an ambiguity in the way it is stated, that permits the possibility that a term may be such a sign that has a predicate or subject. GF: Peirce then proceeds to define *depth* and *breadth* in terms of > predicates and subjects: > “The totality of the predicates of a sign, and also the totality of the > characters it signifies, are indifferently each called its logical *depth*. > … The totality of the subjects, and also, indifferently, the totality of > the real objects of a sign is called the logical *breadth*.” Now, when > you say that “Peirce was deliberately including all signs, and not simply > propositions”, are you claiming that all signs have depth and breadth? > According to Peirce’s definition here, a sign can have depth only if it has > predicates and signifies characters. Do all signs do that? Likewise, in > order to have breadth, a sign must have subjects and real objects. Do all > signs have those? If not, how can you claim that the referent of the term > “a sign” in those definitions can be *any* sign at all? Peirce’s > definitions specify that a sign that has depth *and* breadth (and thus > can convey information) must have predicate(s) *and* subject(s). Does > that apply to all kinds of sign? FR: First of all, I would like to note that because the totality of the predicates of a sign is identified with the totality of characters it signifies, and is its logical depth, and precisely how a term's logical depth is determined is by the totality of characters it signifies, this supports the case I am making. Likewise in the case of the the totality of subjects. I am not sure it is required that every sign have a predicate and a subject. He says IF a sign, B, only signifies characters that are elements of the meaning of another sign, A, then B is said to be a predicate (or essential part). This doesn't necessarily mean that every sign must have a predicate. Likewise in the case of the subject. Now, having said that, let's consider the possibility, as you suggest, that there are signs that do not have real objects. This is different from saying that a sign has no subject. A subject is supposed to be a sign (A) that denotes the real objects the other sign (B) denotes. So let us separate those into two different points. I think it may be too much to argue that a sign has no real object, because this implies it has no dynamical object. Are you comfortable with asserting that there are signs with no dynamical object? I would like to hear about that idea, if you have something to say. Going further along the same lines, let us in parallel fashion note that a predicate is a sign (B) that signifies the characters that the other sign (A) signifies. Do you claim that there can be a sign which signifies nothing? In order that a sign be a sign, it must signify something about its object. This signifying is typically characterized by Peirce as, well, characters that the sign attributes to the (dynamical) object. I think that every sign must signify something about some object. Not only must it both signify something and be about an object, it must also have an interpretant. Any interpretant, being determined by the sign to be so determined to the object in the way the original sign is, must denote that very same object, and signify it in some way related to how the original sign signifies. That is, it must have, if not the whole, at least elements of the meaning of the original sign. And yes, this applies to all signs. So far as I can tell, this is simply tautology, given the definition of sign. GF: I think you’re overlooking Peirce’s statement that signs fulfill that > purpose *by being joined to other signs.* FR: I don't think I overlooked that statement; in point of fact, that was why I mentioned in bold print in my last post that no term has information outside of the synthetic propositions in which it participates. > Also what he says in the Syllabus and elsewhere about how complex signs > *involve* simpler signs, which offers a much less convoluted explanation > of how all signs play their parts in approaching the ideal of the Absolute > Truth. > FR: I'm not sure what the point is of referencing how complex signs involve simpler signs; and if you don't mind, would you please be so kind as to offer a page reference for me that makes the point? > In the “Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations” (1903) Peirce > defines a “sign” as “a representamen of which some interpretant is a > cognition of a mind.” FR: I'm not sure what the point was of quoting the definition of a sign as "a representamen of which some interpretant is a cognition of a mind." > Then in 1909 he writes that: > “The mode of being of the composition of thought, which is always of the > nature of the attribution of a predicate to a subject, is the living > intelligence which is the creator of all intelligible reality, as well as > of the knowledge of such reality. It is the *entelechy*, or perfection of > being” (CP 6.341, 1909). > What kind of sign joins a predicate to a subject? Do we really want to say > that all signs do that, or that “terms” do that? FR: The kind of sign that joins a predicate to a subject is pretty clearly the proposition. I have no argument with that. But observe that the sign that is a predicate of another sign, does not require that it be attributed to that other sign in order to be its predicate, according to the passage that we are discussing; likewise for a subject. Moreover, just because a proposition is the kind of sign that attributes a predicate to a subject, that does not make it any less true that a term can have something predicated of it, or that it can have subjects of which it is predicated (and thus have subjects). A proposition simply makes explicit the process by which this happens. I want to make sure to state that I do not think propositions and terms are the same thing. I have concerns about what he said in KS in comparison to statements made elsewhere regarding the logical quantities and information, and I am attempting to make sense of it all in a way that, well, makes sense. I have to admit some lasting concern about what he has had to say about signs and predicates and subjects. You have been arguing strenuously that by signs he means propositions, but I would very much prefer to believe it did not refer to propositions at all, because this would contradict what he said in 1893, and I found that statement highly suggestive. At the same time, after putting a lot of thought into this reply, I have to admit that I can't deny a proposition must denote and signify, and consequently must have predicate and subject in the sense in which they are discussed in the passage. In fact, it is hard to see how any sign could have no object or signify nothing about the object, in virtue of being a sign. I guess this just amounts to the conclusion that yes, Peirce meant to apply the statements to every sign, whatsoever. -- Franklin --------------------------------------------------- On Mon, Nov 16, 2015 at 10:42 AM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: > Franklin, my responses inserted below. > > > > Gary f. > > > > *From:* Franklin Ransom [mailto:pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com] > *Sent:* 13-Nov-15 15:02 > *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 1 <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> > *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments > > > > Gary F, list, > > > > Seeing as how discussion has gotten far away from "Vol.2 of CP, on > Induction," I feel it is best to change the subject, and thus the thread, > of the discussion. Hopefully the subject is sufficiently vague. > > > > I have re-read KS through. With respect to Peirce's use of the word "sign" > instead of "proposition" in the paragraph at issue, I still think that > Peirce was deliberately including all signs, and not simply propositions. > > GF: In the paragraph at issue, Peirce is clearly *defining* two kinds of > signs as parts of other signs: “If a sign, *B*, only signifies characters > that are elements (or the whole) of the meaning of another sign, *A*, > then *B* is said to be a *predicate* (or *essential part*) of *A*. If a > sign, *A*, only denotes real objects that are a part or the whole of the > objects denoted by another sign, *B*, then *A* is said to be a *subject* > (or *substantial part*) of *B*.” Do you not agree that these are > definitions of *predicate* and *subject*? > > > > Peirce then proceeds to define *depth* and *breadth* in terms of > predicates and subjects: > > “The totality of the predicates of a sign, and also the totality of the > characters it signifies, are indifferently each called its logical *depth*. > … The totality of the subjects, and also, indifferently, the totality of > the real objects of a sign is called the logical *breadth*.” Now, when > you say that “Peirce was deliberately including all signs, and not simply > propositions”, are you claiming that all signs have depth and breadth? > According to Peirce’s definition here, a sign can have depth only if it has > predicates and signifies characters. Do all signs do that? Likewise, in > order to have breadth, a sign must have subjects and real objects. Do all > signs have those? If not, how can you claim that the referent of the term > “a sign” in those definitions can be *any* sign at all? Peirce’s > definitions specify that a sign that has depth *and* breadth (and thus > can convey information) must have predicate(s) *and* subject(s). Does > that apply to all kinds of sign? > > > > But I have a thought about what is going on in the text that may explain > the way in which he is discussing signs, though I suppose it might be > somewhat unorthodox. Consider that we have just been discussing cases where > Peirce remarks that propositions and arguments may be regarded as terms, > and alternatively that terms and propositions may be regarded as arguments. > Perhaps in KS, what we have is Peirce suggesting that terms and arguments > may be regarded as propositions. > > > > In the case of arguments, Peirce makes the point explicit: "That a sign > cannot be an argument without being a proposition is shown by attempting to > form such an argument" (EP2, p.308). > > > > In the case of terms, this requires a little argumentation. It is clear > that terms have logical quantity. In particular, natural classes like "man" > have informed logical quantity; or more simply, information. Although it is > true that Peirce says "[b]ut 'man' is never used alone, and would have no > meaning by itself" (ibid, p.309-310), it is also true that in ULCE, the > information of a term is determined by the totality of synthetic > propositions in which the term participates as either predicate or subject;* > its informed depth and breadth is due to the cases in which the term is not > used alone, but with respect to other terms in propositions*. In the case > of being used as predicate, it increases in informed breadth; in the case > of subject, it increases in informed depth. Note that when the term appears > as a subject, the predicate of the proposition is predicated of the term, > and that when the term appears as a predicate, it has the subject of the > proposition as its subject. > > > > Now if we consider the term as a proposition, this would simply amount to > supposing its logical depth given as predicate and its logical breadth > given as subject in a proposition. So we could say of man, "All men are > such-and-such-and-such", and by this we would denote all real objects that > are men and all the characters that man signifies. This is not a very > practical thing to do, but it is theoretically possible. It also satisfies > what Peirce says in the passage when he defines predicate and subject with > respect to, not simply propositions, but signs in general. > > > > That's the interpretation I'm suggesting, namely that terms can be > regarded as propositions. There are also some other points that are > relevant to the claim that Peirce means signs, and not simply propositions. > Although Peirce does admit that it is the proposition which is the main > subject of the scholium as a whole, the term "proposition" appears a couple > of times before the paragraph in question. Moreover, Peirce also goes on to > explain rhemas and arguments as well after the passage in question, and > then comes to focus on the idea of the symbol, which applies to all three. > And, as I have suggested, Peirce is showing how terms and arguments may be > regarded as propositions, So while his discussion of signs is focused > around the idea of proposition, what he says of propositions has > consequences for our understanding of signs in general, and so for terms > and arguments. Although "[w]hat we call a 'fact' is something having the > structure of a proposition, but supposed to be an element of the very > universe itself," it is also true that "[t]he purpose of every sign is to > express 'fact,' and by being joined to other signs, to approach as nearly > as possible to determining an interpretant which would be the *perfect > Truth*, the absolute Truth, and as such...would be the very Universe" > (ibid, p.304). So here we see that fact is focused on the idea of the > proposition, but it has consequences for how we should understand what all > signs are up to, what the purpose of every interpretant is, regardless of > whether it is the interpretant of a proposition or of another type of sign. > > GF: I think you’re overlooking Peirce’s statement that signs fulfill that > purpose *by being joined to other signs.* Also what he says in the > Syllabus and elsewhere about how complex signs *involve* simpler signs, > which offers a much less convoluted explanation of how all signs play their > parts in approaching the ideal of the Absolute Truth. > > > > In the “Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations” (1903) Peirce > defines a “sign” as “a representamen of which some interpretant is a > cognition of a mind.” Then in 1909 he writes that: > > “The mode of being of the composition of thought, which is always of the > nature of the attribution of a predicate to a subject, is the living > intelligence which is the creator of all intelligible reality, as well as > of the knowledge of such reality. It is the *entelechy*, or perfection of > being” (CP 6.341, 1909). > > What kind of sign joins a predicate to a subject? Do we really want to say > that all signs do that, or that “terms” do that? > > > > Then, at the end of the text when Peirce revisits the idea of judgment, we > find him saying the following: "The man is a symbol. Different men, so far > as they can have any ideas in common, are the same symbol. Judgment is the > determination of the man-symbol to have whatever interpretant the judged > proposition has." (ibid, p.324) Now I would suppose that the judgment is a > certain kind of proposition, but the man-symbol is not likely to be > regarded as being a proposition, nor an argument. It is a term, but we see > in this respect that it is like a proposition, because just as the judgment > is a determination of the man-symbol to have whatever interpretant the > judgment has, in turn "[a]ssertion is the determination of the man-symbol > to determining the interpreter, so far as he is interpreter, in the same > way" (ibid). That is, the man-symbol now acts like a proposition in > communicating the interpretant of the judged proposition to the > interpreter, though the man-symbol is not properly a proposition but a > term; but despite normally being considered a term, in this case it > expresses a fact, which is properly what a proposition does. > > > > --Franklin > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 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