Ed, Thanks for your response. You wrote :
"Logic" is a product of the human brain only. "The Universe" is not a product of the human brain, (111815-1) and therefore it is not logical." I can't quite agree with (111815-1). Instead I would assert that "Logic may be a product of the Universe as is the human brain. Hence it is not surprising (111815-2) that that the logical reasoning of the human mind agrees with what happens in the Universe." All the best. Sung On Wed, Nov 18, 2015 at 8:56 AM, Ed Dellian <ed.dell...@t-online.de> wrote: > Sung, > > You say that the Universe is "by and large logical". This is not true. > "Logic" is a product of the human brain only. "The Universe" is not a > product of the human brain, and therefore it is not logical, and its > language is not the human mathematical logic of algebra. The rational > language of the Universe is Geometry (Plato, 400 BC, Galileo, 1623 AD). > Geometry as the art of measuring refers to everything "which is really > there" and therefore has its distinct measure. Mathematical logic, or the > art of calculating, refers to "what *could be* there" (cf. my 2012 essay > "The language of Nature is not Algebra", on my website > www.neutonus-reformatus.com, entry nr. 40, 201). Logic and algebra is an > "anthropocentric" art rooted in the human brain only; geometry is > "cosmocentric" and refers to the reality and truth of Nature (based on the > reality and measurability of space and time) > > Ed. > > ------------------------------ > *Von:* sji.confor...@gmail.com [mailto:sji.confor...@gmail.com] *Im > Auftrag von *Sungchul Ji > *Gesendet:* Mittwoch, 18. November 2015 12:29 > *An:* PEIRCE-L > *Cc:* biosemiotics; Sergey Petoukhov; Robert E. Ulanowicz; Ed Dellian; > Auletta Gennaro; Hans-Ferdinand Angel; Rudiger Seitz > *Betreff:* Fwd: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments > > Hi, > > A correction: > > Please replace "nucleotides, A, T, G, and C for DNA and RNA" in (*4*) > with "nucleotides, A, T, G, and C for DNA, and A,T, G and U for RNA". > > Thanks. > > Sung > > > > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > From: Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> > Date: Tue, Nov 17, 2015 at 9:04 PM > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments > To: PEIRCE-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> > Cc: biosemiotics <biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee>, Sergey Petoukhov < > spetouk...@gmail.com>, Ed Dellian <ed.dell...@t-online.de>, "Robert E. > Ulanowicz" <u...@cbl.umces.edu> > > > (The table below may be distorted beyond easy recognition.) > > Franklin, Gary R, lists, > > In connection with writing my manuscript on the cell language theory to be > published by Imperial College Press, I am toying with the ideas expressed > in Table 1 below. If anyone has any suggestions or comments, I would > appreciate hearing from you. > > There are several points that need explanations: > > (*1*) I coined three new words, 'cellese', 'humanese', 'cosmese', to > facilitate discussions. I am assuming that 'cosmese' is synonymous with > what we call logic, since the Universe is by and large 'logical'. > > (*2*) I imported the concept of "double articulations" from linguistics > to biology in 1997 [1-6]. (I feel funny to list so many of my own > references here despite Franklin's recent criticism. The only > justification I have for doing so is to assure the members of these lists > that most of the statements that I make on these posts are supported by my > published research results, as is also the case for many of the discussants > on these lists.) > > (*3*) When I applied the concept of "double articulation" to cell > biology, I was logically led to invoke the concept of "third articulation" > (see the second row, *Table 1*) in order to account for some of the > cellular metabolism and processes. I then decided to export this concept > back to humanese where "double articulation" originated, leading to the > distinction between *sentences* and *linguistic texts* including simple > syllogisms. This extension seems reasonable because we can then say that > > 1) *words denote *(first 6 of the 10 classes of the Pericean triadic > signs that I listed in my previous post) > > 2) *sentences decide or judge *(Classes 7, 8 & 9 of Peircean signs) > > 3)* texts argue *(the 10th class, i.e, argument symbolic legisign)*.* > > > > __________________________________________________________ > > *Table 1*. The common structures of the languages at three levels -- > 'cellese', 'humanese' and 'cosmese' [7].' > > __________________________________________________________ > > > *1st articulation 2nd articulation '3rd > articulation'* > > __________________________________________________________ > > 'humanese' words letters > sentences > | | > | > V V > V > sentences words > syllogisms/texts > ___________________________________________________________ > > 'cellese' 1-D biopolymers monomers 3-D > biopolymers > | | > | > V V > V > 3-D biopolymers 1-D biopolymers chemical > waves [8] > > ____________________________________________________________ > > 'cosmese' terms X > propositions > (or logic ?) | | > | > V V > V > propositions terms > arguments > _____________________________________________________________ > > > (*4*) You will notice the appearance of x in the middle of the 4th row. > I was led to postulate this entity based solely on the symmetry > consideration with respect to the other two rows: x must be there, and I am > at a loss what this may be. Does anyone on these lists know if Peirce > discussed something related to this ? Can x be what Peirce called 9 groups > of signs (i.e., qualisign, sinsign, legisign, icon, index, symbol, rheme, > dicisign, and argument) ? If so, these 9 groups of signs may be akin to > the monomers in biology (i.e., 4 nucleotides, A, T, G, and C for DNA and > RNA, and 20 amino acids for proteins), and letters of the alphabets in > human languages. This may justify Peirce's division of signs into 9 groups > and 10 classes, which I referred to as "elementary signs" and "composite > signs", respectively, in [biosemiotics:46], which elicited oppositions from > Franklin in his recent post and Edwina in 2012. > > (*5*) If the above considerations are right in principle, we may > conclude that language is one of those "simple concepts applicable every > subject" that Peirce was talking about. Another simple concept applicable > to every subject may be "waves", since humanese is mediated by sound waves, > cellese by electromagnetic, mechanical and chemical concentration waves, > and cosmese by electromagnetic, gravitational and probability waves. > These conclusions are in good agreement with the *Petoukhov hypothesis* > that organisms are akin to musical instruments [9, 10] and Pythagorian and > Plato's idea of* Musica universalis* (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ > Musica_universalis; I want to thank Jerry Chandler for bringing this idea > to my attention recently). > > All the best. > > Sung > > > References: > [1] Ji, S. (1997). Isomorphism between cell and human languages: > molecular biological, bioinformatics and linguistic implications. > *BioSystems* *44:*17-39. > [2] Ji, S. (1997). A cell-linguistic analysis of apoptosis, *Comments > on Toxicology* *5*(6):571-85. > [3] Ji, S. (1999). The cell as the smallest DNA-based molecular > computer. *BioSystem* 52:123-133. > [4] Ji, S. (1999). The Linguistics of DNA: Words, Sentences, Grammar, > Phonetics, and Semantics. *Ann. N. Y. Acad. Sci.* *870:* 411-417. > > [5] Ji, S. (2001). Isomorphism between Cell and Human Languages: Micro- > and Macrosemiotics, *in* *Semiotics 2000: “Sebeok’s Century”, *S. > Simpkins, J. Deely, (eds.), Legas, Ottawa, pp. 357-374. > [6] Ji, S. (2002). Microsemiotics of DNA. *Semiotica* *138*(1/4): > 15-42. > > [7] Ji, S. (2012). The Wave-Particle Complementarity in Physics, B > iolgy and Philosophy. In: Molecular Theory of the Living Cell: Concepts, > Molecular Mechanisms, and Biomedical Applications. Springer, New York. > PDF retrievable from conformon.net under Publications > Book Chapters. > See Table 2.13 on pp. 44-45. > [8] Ji, S. (2012). The Isomorphism between Cell and Human Languages: The > Cell Language Theory <http://www.conformon.net/?attachment_id=1098>. > ibid. PDF retrievable from conformon.net under Publications > Book > Chapters. See Table 6.3 on p.166. > [9] Petoukhov, S. V. (2015) Music and the Modeling Approach to > Genetic Systems of Biological Resonances. Extended Abstract, The 4th > ISIS Summit, Vienna, Austria, 2015. > http://sciforum.net/conference/70/paper/2812 > [10] Petoukhov, S. V. (2015) The system-resonance approach in > modeling genetic structures. BioSystems (in press, > http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/aip/03032647). > > > > > > > On Tue, Nov 17, 2015 at 3:40 AM, Franklin Ransom < > pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> Gary F, >> >> GF: In the paragraph at issue, Peirce is clearly *defining* two kinds of >>> signs as parts of other signs: “If a sign, *B*, only signifies >>> characters that are elements (or the whole) of the meaning of another sign, >>> *A*, then *B* is said to be a *predicate* (or *essential part*) of *A*. >>> If a sign, *A*, only denotes real objects that are a part or the whole >>> of the objects denoted by another sign, *B*, then *A* is said to be a >>> *subject* (or *substantial part*) of *B*.” Do you not agree that these >>> are definitions of *predicate* and *subject*? >> >> >> FR: No, I do agree that these are definitions of predicate and subject. >> But I also note there is an ambiguity in the way it is stated, that permits >> the possibility that a term may be such a sign that has a predicate or >> subject. >> >> GF: Peirce then proceeds to define *depth* and *breadth* in terms of >>> predicates and subjects: >>> “The totality of the predicates of a sign, and also the totality of the >>> characters it signifies, are indifferently each called its logical >>> *depth*. … The totality of the subjects, and also, indifferently, the >>> totality of the real objects of a sign is called the logical *breadth*.” >>> Now, when you say that “Peirce was deliberately including all signs, >>> and not simply propositions”, are you claiming that all signs have >>> depth and breadth? According to Peirce’s definition here, a sign can have >>> depth only if it has predicates and signifies characters. Do all signs do >>> that? Likewise, in order to have breadth, a sign must have subjects and >>> real objects. Do all signs have those? If not, how can you claim that the >>> referent of the term “a sign” in those definitions can be *any* sign at >>> all? Peirce’s definitions specify that a sign that has depth *and* breadth >>> (and thus can convey information) must have predicate(s) *and* subject(s). >>> Does that apply to all kinds of sign? >> >> >> FR: First of all, I would like to note that because the totality of the >> predicates of a sign is identified with the totality of characters it >> signifies, and is its logical depth, and precisely how a term's logical >> depth is determined is by the totality of characters it signifies, this >> supports the case I am making. Likewise in the case of the the totality of >> subjects. >> >> >> I am not sure it is required that every sign have a predicate and a >> subject. He says IF a sign, B, only signifies characters that are elements >> of the meaning of another sign, A, then B is said to be a predicate (or >> essential part). This doesn't necessarily mean that every sign must have a >> predicate. Likewise in the case of the subject. >> >> >> Now, having said that, let's consider the possibility, as you suggest, >> that there are signs that do not have real objects. This is different from >> saying that a sign has no subject. A subject is supposed to be a sign (A) >> that denotes the real objects the other sign (B) denotes. So let us >> separate those into two different points. I think it may be too much to >> argue that a sign has no real object, because this implies it has no >> dynamical object. Are you comfortable with asserting that there are signs >> with no dynamical object? I would like to hear about that idea, if you have >> something to say. >> >> >> Going further along the same lines, let us in parallel fashion note that >> a predicate is a sign (B) that signifies the characters that the other sign >> (A) signifies. Do you claim that there can be a sign which signifies >> nothing? In order that a sign be a sign, it must signify something about >> its object. This signifying is typically characterized by Peirce as, well, >> characters that the sign attributes to the (dynamical) object. >> >> >> I think that every sign must signify something about some object. Not >> only must it both signify something and be about an object, it must also >> have an interpretant. Any interpretant, being determined by the sign to be >> so determined to the object in the way the original sign is, must denote >> that very same object, and signify it in some way related to how the >> original sign signifies. That is, it must have, if not the whole, at least >> elements of the meaning of the original sign. And yes, this applies to all >> signs. So far as I can tell, this is simply tautology, given the definition >> of sign. >> >> >> GF: I think you’re overlooking Peirce’s statement that signs fulfill that >>> purpose *by being joined to other signs.* >> >> >> FR: I don't think I overlooked that statement; in point of fact, that was >> why I mentioned in bold print in my last post that no term has information >> outside of the synthetic propositions in which it participates. >> >> >>> Also what he says in the Syllabus and elsewhere about how complex signs >>> *involve* simpler signs, which offers a much less convoluted >>> explanation of how all signs play their parts in approaching the ideal of >>> the Absolute Truth. >>> >> >> FR: I'm not sure what the point is of referencing how complex signs >> involve simpler signs; and if you don't mind, would you please be so kind >> as to offer a page reference for me that makes the point? >> >> >>> In the “Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations” (1903) Peirce >>> defines a “sign” as “a representamen of which some interpretant is a >>> cognition of a mind.” >> >> >> FR: I'm not sure what the point was of quoting the definition of a sign >> as "a representamen of which some interpretant is a cognition of a mind." >> >> >>> Then in 1909 he writes that: >>> “The mode of being of the composition of thought, which is always of the >>> nature of the attribution of a predicate to a subject, is the living >>> intelligence which is the creator of all intelligible reality, as well as >>> of the knowledge of such reality. It is the *entelechy*, or perfection >>> of being” (CP 6.341, 1909). >>> What kind of sign joins a predicate to a subject? Do we really want to >>> say that all signs do that, or that “terms” do that? >> >> >> FR: The kind of sign that joins a predicate to a subject is pretty >> clearly the proposition. I have no argument with that. But observe that the >> sign that is a predicate of another sign, does not require that it be >> attributed to that other sign in order to be its predicate, according to >> the passage that we are discussing; likewise for a subject. Moreover, just >> because a proposition is the kind of sign that attributes a predicate to a >> subject, that does not make it any less true that a term can have something >> predicated of it, or that it can have subjects of which it is predicated >> (and thus have subjects). A proposition simply makes explicit the process >> by which this happens. >> >> >> I want to make sure to state that I do not think propositions and terms >> are the same thing. I have concerns about what he said in KS in comparison >> to statements made elsewhere regarding the logical quantities and >> information, and I am attempting to make sense of it all in a way that, >> well, makes sense. I have to admit some lasting concern about what he has >> had to say about signs and predicates and subjects. You have been arguing >> strenuously that by signs he means propositions, but I would very much >> prefer to believe it did not refer to propositions at all, because this >> would contradict what he said in 1893, and I found that statement highly >> suggestive. At the same time, after putting a lot of thought into this >> reply, I have to admit that I can't deny a proposition must denote and >> signify, and consequently must have predicate and subject in the sense in >> which they are discussed in the passage. In fact, it is hard to see how any >> sign could have no object or signify nothing about the object, in virtue of >> being a sign. I guess this just amounts to the conclusion that yes, Peirce >> meant to apply the statements to every sign, whatsoever. >> >> >> -- Franklin >> >> >> --------------------------------------------------- >> >> On Mon, Nov 16, 2015 at 10:42 AM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: >> >>> Franklin, my responses inserted below. >>> >>> >>> >>> Gary f. >>> >>> >>> >>> *From:* Franklin Ransom [mailto:pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com] >>> *Sent:* 13-Nov-15 15:02 >>> *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 1 <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> >>> *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments >>> >>> >>> >>> Gary F, list, >>> >>> >>> >>> Seeing as how discussion has gotten far away from "Vol.2 of CP, on >>> Induction," I feel it is best to change the subject, and thus the thread, >>> of the discussion. Hopefully the subject is sufficiently vague. >>> >>> >>> >>> I have re-read KS through. With respect to Peirce's use of the word >>> "sign" instead of "proposition" in the paragraph at issue, I still think >>> that Peirce was deliberately including all signs, and not simply >>> propositions. >>> >>> GF: In the paragraph at issue, Peirce is clearly *defining* two kinds >>> of signs as parts of other signs: “If a sign, *B*, only signifies >>> characters that are elements (or the whole) of the meaning of another sign, >>> *A*, then *B* is said to be a *predicate* (or *essential part*) of *A*. >>> If a sign, *A*, only denotes real objects that are a part or the whole >>> of the objects denoted by another sign, *B*, then *A* is said to be a >>> *subject* (or *substantial part*) of *B*.” Do you not agree that these >>> are definitions of *predicate* and *subject*? >>> >>> >>> >>> Peirce then proceeds to define *depth* and *breadth* in terms of >>> predicates and subjects: >>> >>> “The totality of the predicates of a sign, and also the totality of the >>> characters it signifies, are indifferently each called its logical >>> *depth*. … The totality of the subjects, and also, indifferently, the >>> totality of the real objects of a sign is called the logical *breadth*.” >>> Now, when you say that “Peirce was deliberately including all signs, >>> and not simply propositions”, are you claiming that all signs have >>> depth and breadth? According to Peirce’s definition here, a sign can have >>> depth only if it has predicates and signifies characters. Do all signs do >>> that? Likewise, in order to have breadth, a sign must have subjects and >>> real objects. Do all signs have those? If not, how can you claim that the >>> referent of the term “a sign” in those definitions can be *any* sign at >>> all? Peirce’s definitions specify that a sign that has depth *and* >>> breadth (and thus can convey information) must have predicate(s) *and* >>> subject(s). Does that apply to all kinds of sign? >>> >>> >>> >>> But I have a thought about what is going on in the text that may explain >>> the way in which he is discussing signs, though I suppose it might be >>> somewhat unorthodox. Consider that we have just been discussing cases where >>> Peirce remarks that propositions and arguments may be regarded as terms, >>> and alternatively that terms and propositions may be regarded as arguments. >>> Perhaps in KS, what we have is Peirce suggesting that terms and arguments >>> may be regarded as propositions. >>> >>> >>> >>> In the case of arguments, Peirce makes the point explicit: "That a sign >>> cannot be an argument without being a proposition is shown by attempting to >>> form such an argument" (EP2, p.308). >>> >>> >>> >>> In the case of terms, this requires a little argumentation. It is clear >>> that terms have logical quantity. In particular, natural classes like "man" >>> have informed logical quantity; or more simply, information. Although it is >>> true that Peirce says "[b]ut 'man' is never used alone, and would have no >>> meaning by itself" (ibid, p.309-310), it is also true that in ULCE, the >>> information of a term is determined by the totality of synthetic >>> propositions in which the term participates as either predicate or subject;* >>> its informed depth and breadth is due to the cases in which the term is not >>> used alone, but with respect to other terms in propositions*. In the >>> case of being used as predicate, it increases in informed breadth; in the >>> case of subject, it increases in informed depth. Note that when the term >>> appears as a subject, the predicate of the proposition is predicated of the >>> term, and that when the term appears as a predicate, it has the subject of >>> the proposition as its subject. >>> >>> >>> >>> Now if we consider the term as a proposition, this would simply amount >>> to supposing its logical depth given as predicate and its logical breadth >>> given as subject in a proposition. So we could say of man, "All men are >>> such-and-such-and-such", and by this we would denote all real objects that >>> are men and all the characters that man signifies. This is not a very >>> practical thing to do, but it is theoretically possible. It also satisfies >>> what Peirce says in the passage when he defines predicate and subject with >>> respect to, not simply propositions, but signs in general. >>> >>> >>> >>> That's the interpretation I'm suggesting, namely that terms can be >>> regarded as propositions. There are also some other points that are >>> relevant to the claim that Peirce means signs, and not simply propositions. >>> Although Peirce does admit that it is the proposition which is the main >>> subject of the scholium as a whole, the term "proposition" appears a couple >>> of times before the paragraph in question. Moreover, Peirce also goes on to >>> explain rhemas and arguments as well after the passage in question, and >>> then comes to focus on the idea of the symbol, which applies to all three. >>> And, as I have suggested, Peirce is showing how terms and arguments may be >>> regarded as propositions, So while his discussion of signs is focused >>> around the idea of proposition, what he says of propositions has >>> consequences for our understanding of signs in general, and so for terms >>> and arguments. Although "[w]hat we call a 'fact' is something having the >>> structure of a proposition, but supposed to be an element of the very >>> universe itself," it is also true that "[t]he purpose of every sign is to >>> express 'fact,' and by being joined to other signs, to approach as nearly >>> as possible to determining an interpretant which would be the *perfect >>> Truth*, the absolute Truth, and as such...would be the very Universe" >>> (ibid, p.304). So here we see that fact is focused on the idea of the >>> proposition, but it has consequences for how we should understand what all >>> signs are up to, what the purpose of every interpretant is, regardless of >>> whether it is the interpretant of a proposition or of another type of sign. >>> >>> GF: I think you’re overlooking Peirce’s statement that signs fulfill >>> that purpose *by being joined to other signs.* Also what he says in the >>> Syllabus and elsewhere about how complex signs *involve* simpler signs, >>> which offers a much less convoluted explanation of how all signs play their >>> parts in approaching the ideal of the Absolute Truth. >>> >>> >>> >>> In the “Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations” (1903) Peirce >>> defines a “sign” as “a representamen of which some interpretant is a >>> cognition of a mind.” Then in 1909 he writes that: >>> >>> “The mode of being of the composition of thought, which is always of the >>> nature of the attribution of a predicate to a subject, is the living >>> intelligence which is the creator of all intelligible reality, as well as >>> of the knowledge of such reality. It is the *entelechy*, or perfection >>> of being” (CP 6.341, 1909). >>> >>> What kind of sign joins a predicate to a subject? Do we really want to >>> say that all signs do that, or that “terms” do that? >>> >>> >>> >>> Then, at the end of the text when Peirce revisits the idea of judgment, >>> we find him saying the following: "The man is a symbol. Different men, so >>> far as they can have any ideas in common, are the same symbol. Judgment is >>> the determination of the man-symbol to have whatever interpretant the >>> judged proposition has." (ibid, p.324) Now I would suppose that the >>> judgment is a certain kind of proposition, but the man-symbol is not likely >>> to be regarded as being a proposition, nor an argument. It is a term, but >>> we see in this respect that it is like a proposition, because just as the >>> judgment is a determination of the man-symbol to have whatever interpretant >>> the judgment has, in turn "[a]ssertion is the determination of the >>> man-symbol to determining the interpreter, so far as he is interpreter, in >>> the same way" (ibid). That is, the man-symbol now acts like a proposition >>> in communicating the interpretant of the judged proposition to the >>> interpreter, though the man-symbol is not properly a proposition but a >>> term; but despite normally being considered a term, in this case it >>> expresses a fact, which is properly what a proposition does. >>> >>> >>> >>> --Franklin >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> ----------------------------- >>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >>> PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe >>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> > > > -- > Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. > > Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology > Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology > Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy > Rutgers University > Piscataway, N.J. 08855 > 732-445-4701 > > www.conformon.net > > > > -- > Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. > > Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology > Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology > Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy > Rutgers University > Piscataway, N.J. 08855 > 732-445-4701 > > www.conformon.net > -- Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net
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