Edwina, I don't see this discussion as beneficial for either of us, and think it's time to let it go. I appreciate your clearly very spirited attempt to correct my misunderstanding and ignorance, and I'm sorry that we can't understand one another on this issue.
-- Franklin --------------------------------------------- On Sun, Dec 20, 2015 at 5:56 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > Franklin - briefly, I don't see language as 'just grammar' and therefore, > disagree with your description of me: > > I suppose that you have somehow gotten stuck on the idea that the > development of a language must be a development of its grammar. > > I don't see that the development of the knowledge base of a society > requires a 'development of the grammar' of its language! [From what to > what????] Just as I don't see that the words/terms must be in place BEFORE > the thought - as you seem to believe. I believe the opposite - the thought > is expressed by a slew of new words or, using old words, by giving them new > meanings. > > I see a language as a grammar and words - and the words can change their > meaning, and also, new words can be created. But - I don't equate the > cognitive nature of a group with their language. You seem to do this. > > Of course a word, since it is purely a symbol, only means what the human > mind has defined it to mean. But - does man think only in words? Of course > not - as Peirce noted, man uses both words and other external symbols (eg, > graphs, diagrammes, mathematics) to articulate his thoughts. > > No, I don't pit Firstness versus Thirdness and I didn't say that it > 'erases' Thirdness. Remember, that Thirdness is about generalities and it > can, as such, permit multiple versions and meanings of the same symbol. Nor > did I say that the human mind is independent of language - and wonder how > you came up with both these conclusions about my views. BUT, MIND, as a > natural axiom of the universe, IS independent of language - As I pointed > out - it appears in the work of bees, of crystals. The human mind, with > very little innate knowledge, is not independent of symbolic communication > - which, in one format, language, operates within a grammatical structure > expressed in 'bits' or words. > > Edwina > > ----- Original Message ----- > *From:* Franklin Ransom <pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com> > *To:* Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu> > *Sent:* Sunday, December 20, 2015 4:40 PM > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations > > Edwina, > > My point is that ANY peoples, - since they have the capacity for thought - >> and thus, ANY language, can achieve such a result - and it doesn't require >> any 'development of the language'. > > > It certainly does require that the language has developed the terms that > allow more complex thoughts to be articulated. > > I suppose that you have somehow gotten stuck on the idea that the > development of a language must be a development of its grammar. As I had > been saying to Sungchul originally, language is a term than can be taken in > a wider sense, and it depends in what sense that term is meant. Clearly, > you want to identify language and grammar as the same thing. I believe that > the vocabulary of a language is also part of what that language is, and the > development of a language's available vocabulary is a development of that > language. Shakespeare, for example, is commonly understood to have > transformed the English language and made it much more expressive in terms > of its vocabulary. Whether one should include the culture and history that > goes with a language as being part of the language, is also a matter for > consideration. I'm not trying to say that one should think of language in > that way, only that this is one way to think about the meaning of the term; > and one needs to get clear about what is meant by the term 'language' when > discussing language. I said that at the outset, and I would have > appreciated it if you read the original discussion and understood that > before accusing me of erroneous views based on your own presumption as to > what language is and what must be meant by its development. I attempted to > clarify that by a language being capable of articulating scientific > terminology, I did not mean that it required a change in its general > grammar to do so, but that there is a community of thought, expressed in > that language, that has developed in that language to express scientific > concepts and understanding. Not every human language has come to develop in > this way with respect to every science there is as of today, and there will > no doubt be sciences in the future that language today, even the one we > currently use, has yet to develop the way to thinking through and > articulating. > > I have made no attempt to deny that Firstness is at work in language, and > have specifically said that creativity and innovation is important. But I > think you overstated the case for how great a role Firstness plays a role, > to the point of erasing the presence of Thirdness. I referenced the idea of > the Cartesian ego because you seemed to be expressing the view that the > human mind, as it exists today, is altogether independent of language, and > could get along thinking just as well without the use of an inherited > language. I strongly believe that this is a false view of the matter, and > that we are, in large part, dependent upon language for our thinking (not > completely, of course, as there is genuine creative force at work as well). > I am reminded of a quote from Peirce, "Some Consequences of Four > Incapacities", EP 1, p.54; CP, vol. 5, para.313-314; italics in original, > bold added by me: > > "313. ...Again, consciousness is sometimes used to signify the *I think*, > or unity in thought; but the unity is nothing but consistency, or the > recognition of it. Consistency belongs to every sign, so far as it is a > sign; and therefore every sign, since it signifies primarily that it is a > sign, signifies its own consistency. The man-sign acquires information, and > comes to mean more than he did before. But so do words. Does not > electricity mean more now than it did in the days of Franklin? Man makes > the word, and the word means nothing which the man has not made it mean, > and that only to some man. *But since man can think only by means of > words or other external symbols, these might turn round and say: "You mean > nothing which we have not taught you, and then only so far as you address > some word as the interpretant of your thought."* In fact, therefore, men > and words reciprocally educate each other; each increase of a man's > information involves and is involved by, a corresponding increase of a > word's information. > > 314. Without fatiguing the reader by stretching this parallelism too far, > it is sufficient to say that there is no element whatever of man's > consciousness which has not something corresponding to it in the word; *and > the reason is obvious. It is that the word or sign which man uses is the > man himself.* For, as the fact that every thought is a sign, taken in > conjunction with the fact that life is a train of thought, proves that man > is a sign; so, that every thought is an *external *sign, proves that man > is an external sign. That is to say, the man and the external sign are > identical, in the same sense in which the words *homo* and *man* are > identical. *Thus my language is the sum total of myself; for the man is > the thought.*" > > -- Franklin > > ------------------------------------------------ > > On Sun, Dec 20, 2015 at 3:55 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> > wrote: > >> Franklin - thanks for your reply. Please see my comments below: >> >> ----- Original Message ----- >> *From:* Franklin Ransom <pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com> >> *To:* Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu> >> *Sent:* Sunday, December 20, 2015 2:53 PM >> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations >> >> Edwina, >> >> I will quote myself from the response I gave to Matt Faunce right before >> replying to you. >> >> "Matt, list, >> >> Can you give your source for this? >> >> >> 1) I cannot. I confess that my statement was not well-thought out. I did >> not mean to imply anything about the possibility of developing scientific >> terminology in any given human language. What I meant "about the >> development of a language to the point where it can articulate scientific >> terminology" is thinking about the case of where we find ourselves today, >> in the state in which scientific terminology has actually developed to the >> point it has. Obviously not every human language in history has developed >> to the point of having the terminology that the sciences today command. For >> example, the use of Latin words for developing terms identifying species in >> biology, and the whole host of such terms that have been developed. Or the >> development of mathematical language to the point where physical theories >> like the general and special theories of relativity can be articulated. >> >> EDWINA: I don't think that 'language' develops as a language and then >> possibly at some time, this development enables it to 'develop scientific >> terminology'. Indeed, I don't know what you mean by 'development of a >> language'. You seem to be suggesting that there is something in the grammar >> that must develop!? >> I think that the* terms* used to 'name scientific issues' can be created >> in any language. I don't see what has to develop in a language to render it >> then and only then, capable of 'articulating scientific terminology'. >> >> 2) I take it for granted though that it is widely acknowledged that human >> languages do differ with respect to the rules of construction and the >> things that can be said. If there has not been a vocabulary established in >> a given language for discussing projective geometry, people speaking only >> that language won't be able to say things about it without going through >> the work of developing a system of terminology in order to say things about >> it, or by translating from another language. >> >> EDWINA: Of course a language can develop a new system of terminology! The >> English and other modern-use languages have all developed such a capacity >> for 'discussing projective geometry'. Any language can and does develop new >> terms. All the time. That's the nature of thought, and thus, of language - >> its openness to new terms. >> >> 3) My essential point though was just to point out that trying to look to >> human language as a model for representing reasoning, or the subject matter >> of logic, is an ill-considered and ill-advised venture, precisely because >> there is so much difference between human languages. It's not as though a >> universal human language has been discovered by linguists, so I raised >> concerns about Sungchul's reliance on 'human language' as his model for >> representing reasoning. If one is to accept Sunchul's approach, we would >> have to admit that there are different kinds of reasoning, one for each >> human language, and logic would cease to be a general science of reasoning, >> and would become indistinguishable from linguistics." >> >> EDWINA: I agree with you that language should not be used as a model for >> representing reasoning or logic, since - although language IS logically >> ordered - this doesn't mean that its logical order is *also* a model for >> logical reasoning. Peirce repeats that 'reasoning is of a triadic >> constitution' (6.321) - and this doesn't fit in with the constitution of a >> language. As he also says, logic is 'independent of the structure of the >> language in which it may happen to be expressed" 3.430.And I also reject, >> as do you, that there are 'different kinds of reasoning, one for each human >> language'. But the very FACT that 'the world is chiefly governed by thought >> [1.349] means that it includes ALL three modal categories. Not just >> Thirdness, habit, a 'frozen language'. >> >> 4) If you think this statement does not clarify my position well enough, >> please let me know what specifically you feel continues to be an important >> issue. If it helps, by saying that human languages differ with respect to >> the things that can be said, I don't mean to imply that the language can't >> develop, say, a mathematical science that will permit it to talk about, >> say, principles of geometry. But if the work has not been done to develop >> that terminology, then the average member of that linguistic community will >> find it very challenging to think and express those principles, and will >> have to commit to developing the language in a determinate to talk about >> those sorts of ideas. >> >> EDWINA: I think that you have indeed explained your position - and I've >> outlined, I think my differences. By the way, the average member of our >> own linguistic community finds it very difficult to think about and express >> current principles of science. >> >> >> 5) I would like to add that you have not acknowledged that your own >> position, Edwina, is in conflict with Peirce's views, in that language does >> have an impact on what we think, and so does play some role in determining >> the thoughts we have, as individuals and as a community. Thought determines >> thought, and all thought being in signs, this means that language does >> determine thought to some extent. Your "radical freedom from language" >> theory is really just nothing but the discredited idea of the Cartesian >> ego. The habits of language persist and we are forced often to work within >> the confines of those habits. Yes, innovation and creativity is possible, >> but not in the "blank slate" way you suggest. Peirce would not have to >> spend so much effort on terminology, to the point of articulating an ethics >> of terminology, if the words we use don't matter for how we think. Just >> consider your debates regarding sign and representamen. Does it matter that >> you get that terminology right with everyone else, if you agree that >> language doesn't really matter and everyone really does understand already >> what is being thought about? Why care about getting clear about the >> language being used, if not to get clear about the thinking with everyone >> else? >> >> EDWINA: I don't agree with your view that my view is in conflict with >> Peirce's views. After all, a major axiom in Peircean semiosis, which >> describes thought, is the category of Firstness, the capacity for freedom >> and innovation. This means that new signs, new thoughts, new words, are >> basic to Peircean semiosis - and this is most certainly NOT similar to a >> 'blank slate'. I don't agree with you that my view that cognition [not the >> same as consciousness] which I consider is a basic property of our species >> - and of all matter - is akin to the Cartesian Ego - which is a 'thing in >> itself'. The Peircean Mind is a basic property/process of matter, and I >> repeat a favourite quote >> "Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the >> work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world" 4.551 >> >> Certainly, Thirdness, as habit, expressed in the normative meaning of >> words, and thus their restriction in meaning, contributes to the shared >> community-of-knowledge that a linguistic group shares. But such shared >> meanings, as in the debate some of us have with the meaning of 'sign' and >> 'representamen' , are debates about communal meanings among a group. This >> is NOT the same as the ability of a language to articulate *novel >> thoughts*. As I said, since thought is a basic capacity of our species, >> and thought operates within semiosis and the three categories...then, the >> category of Firstness enables novel interactions with the envt and thus, >> new terminology. My point is that ANY peoples, - since they have the >> capacity for thought - and thus, ANY language, can achieve such a result - >> and it doesn't require any 'development of the language'. >> >> Edwina >> >> ------------------------------ > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 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