As it seems there is still some interest in this thread, maybe now’s the time
to introduce the third trichotomy of signs which Peirce defines in his essay on
divisions of triadic relations.
First we should note that the order of the three trichotomies reflects the same
order as the three correlates of a triadic relation, proceeding from simple to
complex. This manner of division brings out the fact that triadic relations
involve various dyadic relations among the correlates, but cannot be reduced to
them (unless they are degenerate).
Thus the first trichotomy regarded the sign monadically, “according as the sign
in itself is a mere quality, is an actual existent, or is a general law,” with
no reference to the other two correlates at all. The second trichotomy focussed
on the dyadic sign-object relation, “according as the relation of the sign to
its object consists in the sign's having some character in itself, or in some
existential relation to that object, or in its relation to an interpretant.”
The third in that second trichotomy, the symbol, thus appears as the first
correlate of a genuine triadic relation, because its relation to its object
consists in its relation to an interpretant, and thus it can’t be defined
without mentioning all three correlates; the dyadic sign-object relation cannot
be considered apart from the interpretant, as it can be for the icon and index.
The third trichotomy will focus on the triadic sign-object-interpretant
relation, dividing the sign “according as its Interpretant represents it as a
sign of possibility or as a sign of fact or a sign of reason.” The crucial idea
here, which was so effectively emphasized in Frederik Stjernfelt’s Natural
Propositions, is that the interpretant represents the sign, not the sign
considered monadically as in the first trichotomy, nor the dyadic sign-object
relation as in the second trichotomy, but the irreducibly triadic
sign-object-interpretant correlation. Or we might say that in this third
trichotomy, the interpretant represents the sign in its manner of representing
its object.
So here’s the trichotomy as Peirce defined it in NDTR:
CP 2.250. According to the third trichotomy, a Sign may be termed a Rheme, a
Dicisign or Dicent Sign (that is, a proposition or quasi-proposition), or an
Argument.
A Rheme is a Sign which, for its Interpretant, is a Sign of qualitative
Possibility, that is, is understood as representing such and such a kind of
possible Object. Any Rheme, perhaps, will afford some information; but it is
not interpreted as doing so.
251. A Dicent Sign is a Sign, which, for its Interpretant, is a Sign of actual
existence. It cannot, therefore, be an Icon, which affords no ground for an
interpretation of it as referring to actual existence. A Dicisign necessarily
involves, as a part of it, a Rheme, to describe the fact which it is
interpreted as indicating. But this is a peculiar kind of Rheme; and while it
is essential to the Dicisign, it by no means constitutes it.
252. An Argument is a Sign which, for its Interpretant, is a Sign of law.
Or we may say that a Rheme is a sign which is understood to represent its
object in its characters merely; that a Dicisign is a sign which is understood
to represent its object in respect to actual existence; and that an Argument is
a Sign which is understood to represent its Object in its character as Sign.
The Argument, then, can be taken as the climax of the development by which
interpretants come to represent signs as representing objects. Interpretant
signs become fully recursive when they represent signs as representing objects
which are themselves signs — which indeed are legisigns, or “laws.” Triadic
relations don’t get more genuine than that.
Peirce next proceeds to present an argument in defence of these definitions,
based on logical principles; but we’ll have to look at that later.
Gary f.
} It takes a long time to learn that life is short. [gnox] {
<http://gnusystems.ca/wp/> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway
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