Jon,
I've based my analysis on CP 2.623 and what I gave as the order of
hypothesis is exactly Peirce's there. In his diagram he clearly outlines
"Hypothesis" (and Deduction) as commencing at a Rule. There can be no
question of the text there. So, are you saying that he's wrong in that
outline?
At 2.624 he further remarks: "Hypothesis is where we find some very curious
circumstances, which would be explained by the supposition that it was the
case of *a certain general rule*, and there upon adopt that supposition."
That 'supposition', that 'general rule' is why Hypothesis commences at a
Rule at CP 2.623: "It is the inference of a *case* *from* a *rule* and a
*result*."
We seem to be talking past each other.
Best
Gary R
[image: Gary Richmond]
*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*
On Thu, May 5, 2016 at 6:58 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
wrote:
> Gary R., List:
>
> Just a few quick observations for the moment ...
>
> - According to CP 5.189, abduction begins with the Result, the
> surprising fact (C); not with the Rule, the circumstances of its occurrence
> (B), which comes second.
> - Logically, the sequence of the two premisses makes no difference for
> ANY of the three forms of inference; so we need good reasons to prefer one
> order vs. the other in each of them.
> - I am still having a hard time seeing a practical difference between
> induction and your second version of abduction; you "guess" the Rule
> *because
> *of the Result, and the Case is how you subsequently go about
> corroborating or falsifying it.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Thu, May 5, 2016 at 4:51 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Jon, List,
>>
>> You wrote: "how the three forms of inference themselves are presented in
>> CP 2.623. That text seems to indicate that ANY reasoning process that
>> concludes with a Rule is (by definition) induction."
>>
>> That is true. So, for all 3 inference patterns:
>>
>> Result, 1ns
>> |> Rule, 3ns
>> Case, 2ns
>>
>> *Induction*:
>>
>> 2nd, 1ns, All these beans from the sample are white;
>> |> (End) 3ns, All the beans from this bag are *probably* white.
>> (Begin) 1st, 2ns, This large sample of beans is from this bag.
>>
>> Abduction in the bean example (including my diagram) does *not* end with
>> a rule, but rather *begins* with a rule, whether it's one already known
>> (a strict reading of 2.623) or, in my variation or extrapolation from that,
>> one which is retroduced.
>>
>> So for abduction ("hypothesis" in the bean example) one begins with a
>> rule (just as one does with deduction, but now moving vectorially in the
>> opposite direction):
>>
>> First, the strict reading if hypothesis (as given in 2.623).
>>
>> *Hypothesis (*from a rule already known):
>>
>> **2nd, 1ns: This handful of beans I find on the table are white:
>> |> *(Begin), 3ns: All the beans in this bag are white,
>> ***(End), 2ns: These beans are *possibly* from this bag.
>>
>> Now, I've tried to extrapolate to another kind of hypothesis than this
>> 'sleuthing' type; in this second situation one does *not *already know
>> for certain that the rule is that all the beans in the bag are white, but
>> guesses (retroduces?) that that may *possibly* be the rule. So my
>> variation.
>>
>> *Hypothesis (*from a new rule I guess to be true):
>>
>> **2nd, 1ns: *Because* I find a handful of white beans next ot it:
>> |> (Start)*1st, 3ns: I think this bag of beans may all be white,
>> (End)*** 3rd, 2ns: *But *I will have to examine (sample) the entire bag
>> to see if all are indeed white and that what I thought was *possibly *the
>> case is actually the case (that my hypothesis is true).
>>
>> I mentioned in my original post that I might find that all the beans in
>> the bag are actually black, and that my hypotheses was wrong (and, as Ben
>> noted, most are). Then I'll have to come up with another hypothesis, say
>> that the bag of white beans was removed for some reason.
>>
>> OK, admittedly this is stretching the bean example. But unless you are
>> reading my diagrams incorrectly, in both versions one begins at the rule
>> and ends at the case.
>>
>> This is exactly how I described my variation in the first long post in
>> this thread. I wrote:
>>
>>
>> In
>> *. . . *
>> my abductive variation o
>> f
>> the bean example
>> ,
>> one needs in a
>> n important
>> way to see all three
>> phases
>> all-at-once-together (as Matthias Alexander might have put it
>> ; or as Ben Udell recently wrote, "you have to look at the inference as
>> a whole"
>> ), so that I*presume* a rule (3ns) is in effect,
>> that is,
>> that all the beans in this bag are white, *because* I see a handful of
>> white (1ns) beans
>> nearby which
>> I imagine to *possibly* be from that bag *were* a sample (2ns) to be
>> taken.
>> [
>> As a further step in my inquiry, I
>> might
>> take that sample and find that all the beans are
>> , in fact, not white but
>> black
>> .
>> I now look for another explanation and
>> discover
>> that some of the bags of beans were earlier removed including the one
>> with all white beans
>> ; in this case my hypothesis turned out to be incorrect
>> .
>> ]
>>
>>
>> So, again, and as I remarked in another thread, in the bean example *both
>> *deduction and abduction commence with a rule, while induction concludes
>> with a rule.
>>
>> The Result is a character sampled for.
>> |> Rule de-/abduction begin @ & induction ends @ a Rule.
>> Case (a sample) induction begins here
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Gary R
>>
>>
>> [image: Gary Richmond]
>>
>> *Gary Richmond*
>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
>> *Communication Studies*
>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>> *C 745*
>> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*
>>
>> On Thu, May 5, 2016 at 4:41 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
>> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Gary R., List:
>>>
>>> Perhaps we are simply coming up against a limitation of not only the
>>> bean example, but also how the three forms of inference themselves are
>>> presented in CP 2.623. That text seems to indicate that ANY reasoning
>>> process that concludes with a Rule is (by definition) induction. However,
>>> I vaguely recall that Peirce held up Kepler's discovery that planetary
>>> orbits are elliptical--clearly a Rule--as a paradigmatic instance of
>>> abduction. More food for thought ...
>>>
>>> Regards,
>>>
>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>>
>>> On Thu, May 5, 2016 at 1:53 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Jon S, List,
>>>>
>>>> Jon concluded:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I wonder if I am simply looking at all of this from a different
>>>> perspective than your "vectorial" analysis--which, by the way, I value
>>>> greatly for having helped me sort out my concept of the "logic of
>>>> ingenuity" in engineering (1ns/3ns/2ns).
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Well, I'm certainly pleased that vectorial analysis has proved helpful
>>>> to you in developing your "logic of ingenuity" in engineering, your recent
>>>> series of articles on the topic being very solid work indeed in my opinion.
>>>>
>>>> I offered a 'variation' on the bean example because of a point I'd
>>>> recently made regarding the importance I give to a kind of abduction where
>>>> the law (rule) is *not* known, where the hypothesis is concerned with
>>>> positing a *hitherto unknown law*. Perhaps the bean example doesn't
>>>> work very well for that purpose, but I will stick with my vectorial
>>>> analysis for abduction, or perhaps, retroduction: that one forms the
>>>> abduction of the new law all-at-once-together out of the storehouse of ones
>>>> knowledge of the issue which only the testing of it will show as confomring
>>>> to reality or not.
>>>>
>>>> I'm afraid that I am not able to grasp the analysis in the penultimate
>>>> paragraph of your message. But, again, your response may be the result of
>>>> my trying to generalize Peirce's vectorial order for abduction from the
>>>> bean example which, admittedly, is explicitly concerned with the kind of
>>>> 'sleuthing' abduction (whereas the rule *is* already knowns) I
>>>> referred to in an earlier post. Perhaps that stretches the bean example
>>>> further than it ought to be taken. But did I present a kind of induction in
>>>> my recent analysis? I don't think so. It's just not the kind of abduction
>>>> the bean example was divised to illustrate, thus, my 'variation'.
>>>>
>>>> But, be that as it may, I think I've said all I have to say on the
>>>> topic for now. Thanks for reading through my extended analysis which, I
>>>> hope, at least put some light on the 6 vectors themselves, whether or not
>>>> they apply to all inference patterns neatly or not.
>>>>
>>>> Best,
>>>>
>>>> Gary R
>>>>
>>>
>>
>>
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