Gary R., List: I do not believe that we are talking past each other, just sharing thoughts from our different perspectives.
I acknowledge that CP 2.623 presents the Rule as the first premiss of both Deduction and Hypothesis. However, does Peirce say anything there--or anywhere else, for that matter--to indicate that this is the only "correct" or "proper" sequence? On the contrary, that whole section on the three forms of inference begins in CP 2.619 with a different example of deduction. Enoch and Elijah were men, all men die; Hence, Enoch and Elijah must have died. Here the order is Case/Rule/Result, as confirmed by how Peirce assigns these labels to the three propositions in CP 2.620, even though he there presents the Rule first. *Barbara*, is, in fact, nothing but the application of a rule. The so-called major premiss lays down this rule; as, for example, *All men are mortal*. The other or minor premiss states a case under the rule; as, *Enoch was a man*. The conclusion applies the rule to the case and states the result: *Enoch is mortal*. All deduction is of this character; it is merely the application of general rules to particular cases. Then Peirce gives yet another example. All quadrangles are figures, But no triangle is a quadrangle; Therefore, some figures are not triangles. But here the reasoning is really this: *Rule.*--Every quadrangle is other than a triangle. *Case.*--Some figures are quadrangles. *Result.*--Some figures are not triangles. These two arguments are logically equivalent, and although the "translation" is given as Rule/Case/Result, the original is given as Case/Rule/Result. In other words, as I have said before, the order of the two premisses is irrelevant to the underlying logic. Now, note Peirce's statement after the Enoch example that the Rule is general (Thirdness) and the Case is particular (Secondness). If we then attribute Firstness to the conclusion, the deductive vector is either 3ns/2ns/1ns (as you advocate) or 2ns/3ns/1ns--which, interestingly, is the same as what I have been suggesting as the abductive vector based on CP 5.189. The difference is that the Case and Result switch places, and thus they also switch categories; hence why I wondered earlier if there is a good reason why the three propositions must (or at least should) be assigned to the same categories for all three inference types. As for CP 2.624, my reading of the text is that "the supposition" is not the Rule itself, but rather "that the [curious circumstance] was a case of a certain general rule." This phrasing--not just any rule, or a supposed rule, but a *certain* rule--suggests strongly to me that the Rule is already known to the one drawing the abductive inference. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, May 5, 2016 at 6:46 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> wrote: > Jon, > > I've based my analysis on CP 2.623 and what I gave as the order of > hypothesis is exactly Peirce's there. In his diagram he clearly outlines > "Hypothesis" (and Deduction) as commencing at a Rule. There can be no > question of the text there. So, are you saying that he's wrong in that > outline? > > At 2.624 he further remarks: "Hypothesis is where we find some very > curious circumstances, which would be explained by the supposition that it > was the case of *a certain general rule*, and there upon adopt that > supposition." That 'supposition', that 'general rule' is why Hypothesis > commences at a Rule at CP 2.623: "It is the inference of a *case* *from* > a *rule* and a *result*." > > We seem to be talking past each other. > > Best > > Gary R >
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