Gary R., List: Thanks for your patience and persistence. You make a good case (no pun intended) that the logic of deduction is more clearly presented by giving the Rule first, followed by the Case as something that necessarily falls under it; and that this was one of the specific points that Peirce intended to convey in the passage of interest. Hence, that sequence (3ns/2ns/1ns) is to be preferred, even if it is not strictly required.
Can the same be said of presenting the Rule first in hypothesis/abduction, as Peirce does in CP 2.623? I am still inclined to think otherwise--consistent with CP 5.189, the surprising fact (Result) properly comes first, followed by the circumstances of its occurrence (Rule) as the reason why the surprising fact would be a matter of course if the credible conjecture (Case) is true. So besides having three different conclusions, the three forms of inference have three different starting points--Rule/Case/Result for deduction, Case/Result/Rule for induction, and Result/Rule/Case for abduction. Of course, it also remains unresolved between us whether the surprising fact in abduction corresponds to Firstness, as the Result does in deduction; or to Secondness, as Peirce typically categorizes facts in other contexts. And I still see guessing a Rule as induction, rather than abduction; one must know (or presuppose) that these white beans are from this bag in order to infer that all of the beans in this bag are (probably) white. See my comments on the Kepler example, as well. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
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