Helmut, A lot has been written on Bayes and Peirce, not all of it nonsense, so you might have some luck with a web search on those two names alone.
The way my stats profs taught it, Bayes' Rule is a deductive theorem, so it cannot add one bit to the information you actually have in the data, only afford different ways of looking at it. It is often proposed as a method for diagnosis, that is, abduction, but it can't really do that in a proper Peircean sense. Peirce discussed these issues under the heading of "inverse probability" and why there is no such thing, so you might find Peirce-pertinent discussion under that search tag. Regards, Jon Sent from my iPad > On Mar 17, 2017, at 4:20 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote: > > Dear List Members, > I think, that the Peircean truth is the similarity between the immediate and > the dynamical object, achieved in the infinite future, and this similarity > will be perfect (after indefinite time), when the only aspect, that tells it > (the similarity) from sameness, is, that the immediate object is still inside > the sign, whilst the dynamical one is remaining outside of it. > Is that so, or somehow like that? > Anyway, I guess, that the origins, the histories of both the immediate and > the dynamical object ly in the past, not in the future. So truth, I think, is > a matter of the past, not of the future. > And, if one thinks, that the past and it´s truth may, or even will be > uncovered in the (be it infinite) future, then I would say, that this belief > is a Bayesian one. > Because, as far as I have understood Bayesianism, I think that Bayesianists > believe that the past can be mathematically reconstructed from the present > (no information is completely lost). > But isn´t it rather so, that there is loss of information? And documentation > is always incomplete? > That would mean, that truth in the sense of "It had happened like this" can > never be achieved. > But truth in the sense of truth about the nature of nature can, if you > believe that the nature of nature (that would be the natural laws) does not > change (at least not undocumented, but who or what should do the > documentation?) > Now, Peirce did not even believe this (see: Tychism). But he did believe in > the truth being a function of future time (with truth being an asymptote). So > is it ok to say, that Peirce had a belief similar to what later was called > Bayesianism? > Best, > Helmut > > 17. März 2017 um 16:42 Uhr > "Jerry LR Chandler" <jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote: > > John, List > > > On Mar 16, 2017, at 1:49 PM, John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> wrote: > > > > But if we use some language with a finite alphabet and limit > > the theories to a finite specification, there are at most > > a countable number of theories. > > > > But there are two ways for a theory expressed in discrete signs > > to describe a continuous aspect of the world: > > Yes, there are two ways, so your assertion is reasonable. > But, is this assertion logically complete pragmatically? > > Can you relate either of your theoretical ways to modes of description or > modes of explanation of genetic material or cellular metabolism, both of > which express discrete signs? > > The number of ways to express discrete signs is limited by the > pre-suppositions about the foundations of mathematics and the illations to > modes of description and modes of explanation. > > Thus, in my mind, the question arises , > “How do the two ways you list relate to categorial modes of description and > functorial modes of explanation?” > > CSP’s “nine-fold way” of creating cyclic arguments to generate legisigns > succeeds in this challenge, does it not? > > I would further suggest that CSP’s nine-fold way succeeds because of the > constraints it places on the meaning of symbols. > > Cheers > > Jerry > > > > John > > > > ----------------------------- > > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY > > of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > > > > > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu > . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu > with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > >
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