John, List

> On Mar 16, 2017, at 1:49 PM, John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> wrote:
> 
> But if we use some language with a finite alphabet and limit
> the theories to a finite specification, there are at most
> a countable number of theories.
> 
> But there are two ways for a theory expressed in discrete signs
> to describe a continuous aspect of the world:

Yes, there are two ways, so your assertion is reasonable.
But, is this assertion logically complete pragmatically?

Can you relate either of your theoretical ways to modes of description or modes 
of explanation of genetic material or cellular metabolism, both of which 
express discrete signs?

The number of ways to express discrete signs is limited by the pre-suppositions 
about the foundations of mathematics and the illations to modes of description 
and modes of explanation. 

Thus, in my mind, the question arises , 
“How do the two ways you list relate to categorial modes of description and 
functorial modes of explanation?” 

CSP’s “nine-fold way” of creating cyclic arguments to generate legisigns 
succeeds in this challenge, does it not?

I would further suggest that CSP’s nine-fold way succeeds because of the 
constraints it places on the meaning of symbols.

Cheers

Jerry


> John
> 
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